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 Berkeley is commonly interpreted as having thought that sensible objects have a 
continuous existence when unperceived by finite minds; that this continuity is constituted by 
God’s constant perception; that sensible objects are collections of ideas perceived at many 
different times by many different minds; and that, despite all appearances, this is all 
consonant with what commonsense says. I argue that all of these interpretive claims are 
false, and that we have not yet come to grips with the bulk of Berkeley’s actual metaphysical 
views. 
 The key to uncovering Berkeley’s actual views is to understand his account of 
language. I defend a novel interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy of language and then 
apply this account to dissolve some familiar problems related to his metaphysics. Berkeley 
has a pluralistic view about the ends of language, but he also thinks that significant 
philosophical statements must express coherent ideas. That is, Berkeley holds a hybrid 
ideational theory of language. In part, this means that Berkeley’s epistemology is 
fundamental. For the ideas one’s words stand for are Berkeleian ideas; particular, determinate 
(i.e., not abstract), private, mind-dependent, sensory ideas. This has implications for how we 
understand a number of Berkeleian views: that we immediately perceive sensible objects; that
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sensible objects are collections of ideas; that sensible objects, though mind-dependent, exist 
continuously even when no finite mind perceives them. I argue that Berkeley held a radically 
nominalist account of sensible objects; Berkeleian sensible objects are just the particular 
ideas picked out by a name-token. 
 The principal roadblock to a nominalist interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy is the 
worry that it conflicts with claims that his system is consistent with, and even more, a defense 
of commonsense. I show that Berkeley’s defense of commonsense is misunderstood; he is 
not defending commonly believed propositions, but fending off what he sees as the 
dangerous philosophy of materialism which he considers a threat to the normal credulity and 
faithfulness of “the vulgar,” for whom the perceived world is the real world. Berkeley’s 
radical nominalism is therefore integral to this project since it eliminates any gap between 
what is and what is perceived.  
 v 
 
To my wife, Michelle;  
my mother, De;  
and my sister, Kelly; 





This work has benefited greatly from the input of many people, but none more than 
Alan Nelson. To him I owe the greatest thanks, not just for his support and counsel, but for 
his friendship.  
 I extend special thanks to the other members of the examination committee—Bill 
Lycan, Ram Neta, David Reeve, and Tad Schmaltz—for selflessly and unhesitatingly 
agreeing to take on what would otherwise be the thankless task of reading a dissertation.  
Portions of this dissertation began life as separate papers. The first draft of what 
became Chapter 3 was written for a seminar taught by Nicholas Jolley in 2004 at the 
University of California, Irvine. I’m grateful to Nick for his encouragement and helpful 
feedback on this early work, as well as to the Department there for its support during my 
three-year tenure at UCI. A much more recent version was presented at the American 
Philosophical Association Eastern Division meeting in New York in 2009. I was fortunate 
enough to have Sukjae Lee and Kenneth Winkler both comment on the paper there, and I 
thank them both. I also want to thank Dick Brook, Georges Dicker, and Tom Lennon for 
their probing questions and helpful suggestions at that meeting and afterward. 
 The first draft of Chapter 4 was written for presentation at the International Berkeley 
Society meeting in Newport, RI in June 2008. I thank Stephen Daniel for organizing the 
conference, and the audience for their helpful comments, particularly Melissa Frankel, 
Thomas Lennon, and Samuel Rickless. More recently, a version was presented at the 
American Philosophical Association’s Pacific Division meeting in San Francisco in 2010. I’m 
 vii 
particularly grateful to Becko Copenhaver, Lex Newman, and John Russell Roberts for their 
constructive comments and criticism there. My thanks also to D. Kenneth Brown, Ram 
Neta, David Reeve, Kurt Smith, and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the History of 
Philosophy for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. 
 More recently, a version of Chapter 2 was presented at the Pacific Northwest/ 
Western Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at Simon Fraser University in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. I thank Lisa Shapiro and the SFU Philosophy Department for 
a superbly organized conference, and to Michael Della Rocca, Karolina Hübner, Dominik 
Perler, Michael Rosenthal, and Amy Schmitter for their penetrating questions and 
constructive feedback.  
 Dissertations are difficult things to write. Well, that may not be true of all of them, 
but this dissertation was a difficult thing for me to write. I sincerely doubt I could or would 
have accomplished the feat without the saint-like patience and support of my wife, Michelle. 
This work is for her, even if she never reads a word of it. 
 viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... x 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTERS 
1. THE HYBRID IDEATIONAL THEORY OF LANGUAGE ....................... 11 
1.1. A LOCKEAN LINEAGE ............................................................................. 12 
1.2. THE LOCKEAN VIEW OF LANGUAGE ................................................... 13 
1.3. SIGNIFICATION ......................................................................................... 19 
1.4. IDEAS AS IMAGES ..................................................................................... 22 
1.5. BERKELEY’S SHORT-LIVED LOCKEAN PERIOD .................................. 24 
1.6. ABSTRACT IDEAS ...................................................................................... 26 
1.7. THE END(S) OF LANGUAGE .................................................................... 31 
1.8. A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY ..................................................................... 32 
1.9. HOW FAR DOES HE GO? ........................................................................ 33 
1.10. “… AT BOTTOM THEY HAVE NO MEANING IN THEM.” ....................... 35 
1.11. THE HYBRID IDEATIONAL THEORY ..................................................... 38 
2. BERKELEY’S RADICALLY NOMINALISM .............................................. 41 
2.1 A MATTER OF MATTER, IN BRIEF ......................................................... 42 
2.2 HOUSES, MOUNTAINS, AND RIVERS ..................................................... 43 
2.3 THE PUZZLE OF IMMEDIACY ................................................................. 45 
2.4 A SIMPLE CASE OF MODUS PONENS ..................................................... 48 
 ix 
2.5 SENSIBLE OBJECTS AS ‘SENSIBLE OBJECTS’ ......................................... 56 
2.6 RADICAL NOMINALISM IN ACTION ....................................................... 61 
3. THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY ........................................................... 66 
3.1 A GUIDED TOUR OF THE PROBLEM  .................................................... 68 
3.2 RADICAL NOMINALISM REDUX ............................................................. 80 
3.3 REGULARITIES IN THE GAPS .................................................................. 88 
3.4 PUTTING THE ‘PROBLEM’ TO REST ........................................................ 94 
4. BERKELEY’S ‘DEFENSE’ OF ‘COMMONSENSE’ .................................. 97 
4.1 WHAT IS BERKELEY DEFENDING? ...................................................... 100 
4.2 HOW IS BERKELEY DEFENDING ‘COMMONSENSE’? ........................ 110 
4.3 PAPPAS’S PROPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT .................................................. 119 
4.4 PROBLEMS FOR PAPPAS ......................................................................... 123 
4.5 ROBERTS’S RELIGIOUS IMAGE .............................................................. 126 
4.6 RESPONSE TO ROBERTS ......................................................................... 129 
4.7 LETTING BERKELEY BE BERKELEY .................................................... 130 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 134 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: “Trickle-down” approach to the standard view  ................................................. 81 
Figure 2: “Bubble-up” approach to the standard view ....................................................... 83 
Figure 3: Radically Nominalist account .................................................................................. 85 
INTRODUCTION: A SYMPATHETIC INTERPRETATION 
This is probably the only dissertation in the history of philosophy to begin with a 
story about a comedian and a car. Here it is:  
 When funnyman and inimitable car aficionado Jay Leno pulled a 1927 Duesenberg 
Model X out of the garage in Burbank, CA where it had lain undisturbed for nearly 40 years, 
he had a choice to make.  
 The car was one of only thirteen of its kind, of which only four were known to still 
exist, and this one was the last one ever made. It was unbelievably valuable—easily worth 
more than $1,000,000 were it in good condition. The car’s rarity was only one reason for its 
incredible value. Duesenbergs were not only rare cars, they were astonishingly powerful, 
innovative, brilliantly designed cars. A Duesenberg won the Indianapolis 500 in 1924, 1925, 
and 1927. By 1928, the model SJ had a top speed of 140 miles per hour when most cars 
couldn’t reach 100. Their powerful reputation lingers in our lingo even today. Some say the 
phrase, “It’s a doozie!” (or “Duesey!”) originated with the make, because no other 
automobile could match the power and quality of a Duesenberg. Jay’s new find was also 
mothballed for 40 years because, as he said, “somebody had done a horrible job of messing 
with the engine,” leaving behind fatally broken timing gears and valve springs.  
 But what do you do with a broken, neglected, 80 year-old, potentially million-dollar 
car? Leaving it as-is was never an option; one does not collect classic cars to let them sit, 
broken, collecting dust. Among car buffs, though, there are two schools of thought about 
how to treat old cars. Some think that classic cars are first and foremost classic cars, and that 
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their being classics should take a back seat to their being the best cars they can be. These 
hot-rodders see old cars as used canvases on which to apply new paint and new technology, 
combining modern substance with classic form. The results are newer, faster, strange, and 
sometimes wonderful creations that bear only superficial resemblances to their originals. Hot 
rods are less restored than remade or renewed, with great emphasis on new.  
 Others see classic cars as primarily classics, not simply because they are old but 
because they are ancestors of today’s cars. They not only provide us a glimpse as to how 
things were then, they also help explain how things got to be how they are now. Originalists 
see classics as testaments to the ingenuity of their designers, who were relatively constrained 
by limited resources and technology. Classic cars are examples of how designers dealt with 
challenges, and the solutions they arrived at, for the most part, remain models for some of 
the most advanced vehicles we have today. 
 In the end, Jay decided on what he called a sympathetic restoration. This meant 
returning the Model X as close as possible to its original condition, as much as possible using 
original methods and materials. It also meant that once the engine was repaired and running, 
there would be no further extensive renovations—not even a new paint job. The last 
remaining Model X would remain, through and through, a Model X. The result is one of the 
finest, most authentic examples of the genius and foresight of the early days of the 
automotive industry. 
What does any of this have to do with philosophy?  
The broad aim of this work is to present and defend an interpretation of the 
philosophy of George Berkeley. It is a work in the history of philosophy, and any historical 
project presents one with a choice not unlike the choice presented to Mr. Leno by the Model 
X: what do you do with this old thing?  
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The parallels between philosophical interpretation and automotive restoration are 
surprisingly apt, to an extent. Like classic cars, the great dead philosophers are intellectual 
ancestors to their present day counterparts.1 Studying them likewise provides us with both a 
view as to how the past was and a better idea of how the present came to be. The great dead 
philosophers represent particularly important moments in the history of our discipline. Like 
early carmakers, they were each constrained by their own peculiar limitations and directed at 
their individual goals, and their systems developed as a function of these pressures. In many 
cases, they still serve as paradigms for our most modern theories, or at the very least, as the 
source of the terms of debate. 
Berkeley in particular was a Duesey of a philosopher. The automobile changed 
transportation as much as the new “way of ideas” changed philosophy, and the Duesenberg 
and Berkeley were each early stars in their burgeoning traditions. Berkeley’s system was 
dramatically innovative; his theory of vision, in particular, was nothing short of 
revolutionary.2 Despite this, Berkeley had few adherents, and his standing was quickly 
overshadowed by the great Hume and Kant, much as Duesenberg ultimately faded behind 
the industrial juggernauts of Ford, General Motors, and Daimler-Benz. There might be 
fewer Berkeleian Idealists today than there are running Duesenbergs, yet his legacy is evident 
in pop culture, movies, jokes, and the name of a university of some note.3  
                                                
1 Not for nothing did Alfred North Whitehead write that all philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato. See 
Whitehead (1960) 39. 
2 See, for example, Margaret Atherton’s excellent book, Berkeley’s Revolution in Vision. Atherton (1990. 
3 Of course, I mean the University of California, Berkeley. However, John Perry has recently and very 
humorously denied that UC-Berkeley is actually named after the good Bishop Berkeley. Perry said in the Claire 
Miller Lecture at the 42nd Chapel Hill Colloquium (I’m paraphrasing), “Berkeley [the university] was originally 
named after Berkeley [the philosopher], but no longer. It used to be the University of California, Berkeley. It is 
now the University of California at Berkeley, so it is named after the town of Berkeley, which was named for 
the university it grew up around, the University of California, Berkeley, which was named after [the 
philosopher] Berkeley.” 
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There is a divide among philosophers interested in historical figures analogous to the 
one among classic car enthusiasts. Some see historical philosophers as worth studying to the 
extent that what they had to say is relevant or useful to us today. What is not true in them is 
“dead,” and what is dead is unimportant; our job as philosophers is to “display the life below 
the surface” to help advance our own contemporary projects.4  
I certainly agree that studying historical philosophers can help contribute to 
contemporary projects, but I reject the implication that only what is acceptable by today’s 
standards in the systems of the great dead philosophers is worth paying attention to. And I 
would hasten to add that discerning what is true in the systems of a great dead philosopher 
requires first discerning what is in the systems.  
This is not easy. It is not easy for all the same reasons that clearly understanding any 
contemporary philosopher is not easy, and for others as well. We are removed from 
historical philosophers by time, language, worldview, ideology, and scientific background. 
These all make forming a clear picture of their views harder (though we might have 
differences along these lines with a contemporary), but what’s worse, we cannot simply ask 
them for clarification. We have only their texts to go on, along with whatever circumstantial 
knowledge we have of their time, place, and intellectual environment. And so on the 
opposite side of this divide are those who see that primary value in studying the history of 
philosophy as historical; the history of philosophy is important as history, and whether all or 
any of that history is “dead” by contemporary standards is irrelevant.  
I will not argue here that one way of approaching the history of philosophy is more 
                                                
4 See Jonathan Bennett (1968) 340. Bennett opens with this: “Most of the Critique of Pure Reason is prima facie 
dead, because prima facie dependent upon wholly indefensible theories.” For Bennett, the ‘vitality’ of a 
philosophical work is apparently commensurate with its level of contemporary believability. I quote Bennett 
because he is the clearest proponent of this type of view, not the only one. 
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valuable than another. I will not even claim that one way is easier than another. The two 
approaches can be advantageous to each other, and together, enrich the discipline as a 
whole. Nor are they exclusive of one another; an historical project need not be entirely 
focused on the historical minutiae or the relevance to contemporary debates. Indeed, an 
interpretation that is completely concerned with one or the other is likely to suffer as a 
result.  
This work is likewise a mix of both motivations, but it falls close to the latter, 
historical approach than the other. It is an attempt at what I call a sympathetic interpretation. 
The primary aim of this work is to provide a novel interpretation of the central elements of 
Berkeley’s philosophy. I will argue that these are his theory of ideas, his philosophy of 
language, and the account of the metaphysics of ordinary objects that these generate. This is 
a “sympathetic” interpretation the way that Jay Leno’s restoration of the Duesenberg was  
sympathetic; the aim is to produce a picture of Berkeley’s philosophy that is, as much as 
possible, faithful to his written works and their historical context, irrespective of whether 
this picture would be acceptable as a contemporary theory. An interpretation will count as 
successful, on this approach, if it can show that Berkeley’s conclusions are defensible when 
considered in context with the intellectual landscape of his day; i.e., his inherited 
philosophical commitments, the state of science at the time, etc.  
A sympathetic interpretation need not ignore questions of contemporary relevance, 
however. Indeed, as I suggested above, the questions might best be answered in light of a 
sympathetic interpretation; it is only after we have determined what Berkeley’s philosophy is 
that we can begin to answer questions about how relevant his philosophy is, and how it fares 
by contemporary standards. That said, I do not mean to suggest that this sympathetic 
interpretation will provide a picture of Berkeley’s philosophy that fares particularly well by 
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contemporary standards. Even if, as I argue, the true shape of Berkeley’s system has not 
been appreciated before now, Berkeley’s philosophy is still fundamentally Idealist and theo-
centric, and so will be no more popular in contemporary debates than any other Idealist, 
theo-centric view (which is to say, not very much).5 But the view developed here will show, 
in ways perhaps unappreciated before, that Berkeley’s thought has surprising relevance to 
contemporary debates nonetheless. The peculiar limitations of his theory of ideas, combined 
with his philosophy of language, illustrate a fundamental challenge to any account of 
language that ties meaning to a psychological entity as, for example, Gricean accounts appear 
to do. And Berkeley’s way of dealing with the potential skeptical consequences of his 
account of sensible objects points the way to an austere empiricist challenge to the more 
moderate empiricisms of Quine or van Fraassen. In short, there is much we can learn from 
Berkeley, even if we ultimately reject his Idealism. 
The sympathetic interpretation begins in Chapter 1 where Berkeley’s first great work 
begins: with his criticisms of the Lockean account of language and the doctrine of abstract 
ideas that Berkeley takes to be driven by it. We will see that Berkeley rejected the simple view 
espoused by Locke and adopted a pluralist account of the ends of language, along with a 
plurality of criteria for linguistic success. Most importantly, though, was Berkeley’s 
modification of the Lockean ideational theory of meaning, what I call Berkeley’s hybrid 
ideational theory, on which words (employed in some linguistic practices) become 
meaningful by designating or signifying ideas in the mind of the speaker. Seeing how this 
                                                
5 By Idealism, I denote any type of positive metaphysical view on which the most fundamental entities are only 
thinking things; minds, spirits, monads, what have you. Among the early Moderns, Berkeley and Leibniz are 
clearly Idealists by this definition, while Descartes might arguably be classified as one as well (if one takes God 
to be both most fundamental and only a thinking thing). Though they are often conflated, I distinguish 
Idealism from another Berkeleian view, namely, immaterialism, which I take to be the denial that there is any 
such thing as (or anything answering to the name of) “matter.” Berkeley is both an Idealist and an 
immaterialist.   
 7 
theory applies in light of Berkeley’s own unique theory of ideas will provide the interpretive 
key for understanding a host of other features of his philosophical system. 
One such feature is Berkeley’s account of sensible objects. This is the focus of 
Chapter 2. Berkeley’s claims about sensible objects are (pardon the pun) sensational—
sensible objects are nothing but collections or “congeries” of ideas, which ideas exist only so 
long as they are perceived. The esse of sensible objects is percipi—for them to be is for them 
to be perceived. This is perhaps Berkeley’s most famous dictum, and one of his most 
puzzling. For, it seems to entail that what we regard as single physical objects are 
metaphysically many. And on a natural reading of Berkeley’s theory of ideas, it seems to 
entail that the object you perceive is numerically distinct from the object I perceive, and that 
the object you see now is numerically distinct from the one you saw a moment ago. Add to 
these concerns Berkeley’s apparently inconsistent claims about the immediacy of our 
perception of sensible objects and one begins to wonder whether Berkeley has a coherent 
account of sensible objects at all. I argue that he does have a coherent account and the way 
to uncovering it is through an application of the hybrid ideational theory of language. We 
will find that the puzzles mentioned above are pseudo-puzzles generated by the surface 
grammar of language. These pseudo-puzzles disappear when we follow Berkeley’s advice and 
move past the appearances of language—when we “draw the curtain of words.” Applying 
the hybrid ideational theory, we find that Berkeley’s account of sensible objects is radically 
nominalist—the collections of ideas that he calls ‘sensible objects’ are just those ideas 
signified by sensible object word-tokens.  
 In Chapter 3, we will see how the radically nominalist account of sensible objects 
gives us the resources to, once and for all, dissolve the most enduring puzzle in Berkeley’s 
philosophy: if the esse of sensible objects is percipi, what is Berkeley’s position on sensible 
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objects that we believe to exist unperceived? The most well known answer to this question 
invokes God’s perception, receiving its most colorful expression in the limerick by Msgr. 
Ronald Knox and its reply: 
 There once was a man who said “God 
 Must find it exceedingly odd 
 If He finds that this tree 
 Continues to be 
 When there’s no one about in the Quad.” 
 
Reply: 
 “Dear Sir, Your astonishment’s odd: 
 I am always about in the Quad. 
 And that’s why the tree  
 Will continue to be 
 Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God.” 
 
Since sensible objects depend for their existence on the perception of a mind, and since (so 
this line goes) sensible objects often exist independent of the perception of any particular 
finite mind, their continuous existence must be preserved by the ever-watchful perception of 
God. 
 Things are not quite so simple, however, for there are good reasons to resist the 
claim that Berkeley’s God perceives in a manner that is either necessary or sufficient for 
ensuring that sensible objects have a continuous existence. This is not a problem, however, 
for the hybrid ideational theory can be brought to bear on this issue as well. If we keep 
strictly to Berkeley’s theory of language and the radically nominalist account of sensible 
objects that it generates, we find that the entire issue of continuity is another pseudo-puzzle. 
Berkeleian sensible objects do, in one sense, have a continuous existence, but the radically 
nominalist account shows that this kind of continuity does not require the existence of any 
ideas perceived by God in the gaps between the times when finite minds perceive given 
objects. Nor does it require an appeal to unanalyzed counterfactual conditionals as do even 
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the most well worked out phenomenalist interpretations do. Indeed, what the radically 
nominalist account shows is that, on Berkeley’s theory of language, a problem of continuity 
cannot even be coherently formulated. 
 An interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy that can provide a coherent picture of his 
metaphysics of sensible objects and dissolve away internal tensions (to the degree this is 
possible) is clearly desirable. This account has the potential to do just that, but one might 
say, only at the expense of undercutting one of the other most important aspects of 
Berkeley’s philosophy—his defense of commonsense. Before Reid or even Hume, Berkeley 
championed himself as the philosopher of commonsense: “I side in all things with the 
Mob,” he famously writes. If the hybrid ideational theory of language and the radically 
nominalist account of sensible objects are to be accepted as viable interpretations of 
Berkeley’s philosophy, there must be an explanation of how these strikingly unorthodox 
views mesh with Berkeley’s frequent, public claims to be, in some way, on the side of 
commonsense and a friend to “the Vulgar.” This is the focus of Chapter 4. 
 Not only is there such an explanation, but it is in fact generated by the hybrid 
ideational theory itself. For it is Berkeley’s recognition of the connection between the 
Vulgar’s insulation from skepticism and their pedestrian linguistic tendencies that pointed 
the way to his rejection of the Lockean theory of language. What we will see is that 
Berkeley’s defense of commonsense is much different than traditionally understood. It is not 
a defense-cum-apology for any and all commonly held opinions, but an attack against what 
Berkeley sees as a skeptical threat to the Vulgar and Learned alike. The threat is 
representative realism in all forms, particularly Lockean materialism, and Berkeley aims to 
destroy it from the foundation: the doctrine of abstraction. So, far from being at odds with 
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the hybrid ideational theory and the radically nominalist account of sensible objects, for they 
share the attack on abstract ideas as their common core. 
CHAPTER 1: BERKELEY’S HYBRID IDEATIONAL THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
 
This dissertation is amazing. 
By this, I do not mean to be evaluating its quality as a work in the history of 
philosophy, or to be remarking on the achievement of having written something of such a 
size, or on such a topic. Its quality will be evaluated by people who know better than I, and 
while it took me great pains to write it, others have written far longer, and very likely, far 
better dissertations.   
Rather, I mean that it is amazing that anything like it exists at all. It is, in print, a 
conglomeration of squiggly lines on thin sheets of bleached tree pulp. And yet they are not 
merely squiggly lines, for they have the remarkable property of meaning something. Not all 
of them, mind you—here are some squiggly lines that mean nothing at all:  
(1) S’bnAk;wW ph~!TLvis eE?eQaäur.  
(2) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.6 
Nevertheless, most of the squiggly lines in this dissertation do mean something and that’s an 
amazing fact when one considers how strange it is that squiggly lines manage to mean 
anything at all. 
This notion of meaning is at once perfectly obvious and astonishingly difficult to 
understand. We know that most of the sentences in this dissertation have it. We know that 
(1) and (2) don’t. We even know that both (1) and (2) might have it under different 
circumstances, say, if they were part of an esoteric code or an alien language. This knowledge 
                                                
6 Not only is this a nonsensical sentence, it’s a famous nonsensical sentence, first appearing in Noam Chomsky’s 
groundbreaking 1957 Syntactic Structures.  
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is all quite ordinary. Knowing what all these squiggles mean is another, more difficult matter. 
We learn to recognize written language before we learn to read it as language. But all of this 
is, quite literally, child’s play compared to understanding how these squiggles—and the noises 
I would make if I were reading them out loud—mean what we know they mean. Let us call 
this the Puzzle of Meaning: how do words and sentences get their meaning?   
The aim of this chapter is to describe the peculiar answer Berkeley gives to the 
Puzzle of Meaning. This is important, I will argue, because the way Berkeley thinks words 
acquire meaning informs a great deal of his larger philosophical system and properly 
understanding this aspect of his thought is key to resolving a number of long-standing 
interpretive puzzles.  
 
1.1: A LOCKEAN LINEAGE 
I take it as an interpretive axiom that Berkeley—and any historical philosopher, for 
that matter—can be best understood within his historical context, as reading and responding 
to his contemporaries. We know from his notebooks that Berkeley read widely, but we also 
know that no one of his contemporaries dominated his thought more than John Locke, so 
much so that it is not an overstatement to say that nearly every facet of Berkeley’s 
philosophical system is a reaction to, or otherwise influenced by, Locke’s philosophy.7 
                                                
7 This claim is indeed so uncontroversial I have relatively little to say in its defense. Of course, to what extent 
Berkeley reacted to or was influenced by Locke is a matter of some dispute, but there is underlying agreement 
among scholars that there was some such influence and that it pervades nearly all of Berkeley’s thought. The 
reader may satisfy herself that this is so by consulting a few competent reviews of Berkeley’s works, but if you 
are willing to be persuaded by evidence that requires less ambition on your part, I offer you the following 
circumstantial evidence. By 1707 when Berkeley produced his first philosophical work, Of Infinites, all the major 
works of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz had been published save Leibniz’s Theodicy 
(1710) and Monadology (1714). And yet in the entirety of Berkeley’s corpus, Descartes is mentioned by name 
only two dozen times; Hobbes only 18 times; Malebranche, 16 times; Spinoza, 15 times; Leibniz, a mere dozen 
times. Locke, on the other hand, is mentioned by name nearly 70 times throughout Berkeley’s writings. Even 
where Locke is not named, he is often clearly the subject of conversation, such as in the Introduction to the 
Principles of Human Knowledge where Berkeley criticizes the work of “a late deservedly esteemed philosopher”, 
one who happens to be the author of a certain Essay on Human Understanding (PHK, Intro §11). Of course 
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Nowhere is this reaction more evident, or more violent, than on the issue of language. It 
would be fair to say that on this issue, Berkeley is focused exclusively on Locke. So, before 
we can properly understand Berkeley’s views, we must first understand the views he was 
influenced by and responding to. This means first understanding Locke’s views, or rather, 
what Berkeley took to be Locke’s views. This last caveat is crucial. Claims that Berkeley 
misunderstood Locke’s actual views are quite common.8 Unfortunately, they are also not 
without merit. Berkeley was, by all accounts, an honest and virtuous man in private life, but 
he was a less-than-careful interpreter of his opponents. So, while a detailed exegesis of 
Locke’s own view is a valuable project in its own right, it is a project the scope of which lies 
well beyond my purposes here. Instead, I want to sketch Locke’s views on language in broad 
strokes, saving the detail work for seeing how Berkeley interpreted it. What is most 
important for our purposes is uncovering Berkeley’s views that are a reaction to his 
understanding of Locke’s views. Consequently I will not be concerned to answer definitively 
any questions regarding the accuracy of Berkeley’s understanding of Locke. 
 
1.2: THE LOCKEAN VIEW OF LANGUAGE 
 Locke’s theory of language is best understood in its relationship to what he called his 
“Historical, plain Method.”9 The aim of Locke’s Essay is to make the human understanding 
                                                
Locke is the author of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 1690, Berkeley’s mistaken 
citation of the work as the ‘Essay on Human Understanding’ notwithstanding. 
8 The issue has generated considerable heat and light. See, for example: John Mackie, 1976, Problems from Locke, 
especially chapters 1-2; Margaret Wilson, 1982, “Did Berkeley Completely Misunderstand the Basis of the 
Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction in Locke?” in Turbayne (1982); Peter Alexander, 1974, “Boyle and 
Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities”, Ratio 16 (1): 51-67; Winston H. F. Barnes, 1940, “Did Berkeley 
Misunderstand Locke?” Mind 49 (193): 52-57. 
9 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. I, ch. i, sect. 2. Hereafter, citations to Locke’s Essay will take the 
form, Essay I.i.2. For a particularly interesting account of the historical plain method, see D. Kenneth Brown’s 
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itself a subject of study, to “enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane 
Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent.”10 
Laying aside questions about the metaphysics of the mind, his method involves tracing the 
ideas of the mind back to their origins in experience, thereby giving an account of how we 
come to think the ways we do. Success in the historical plain method would, Locke thinks, 
answers questions about the certainty of our putative knowledge and give us insight into the 
relative justification of beliefs found to be uncertain. Locke writes: 
I shall imagine I have not wholly misimploy’d my self … if, in this Historical, plain 
Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to 
attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down and Measures of the 
Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be 
found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory…11 
 
The account of language Locke presents in Book III of the Essay is an example of just such 
an effort to trace a uniquely human concern back to its origins.12 The origin of language 
stems from “God having designed Man for a sociable Creature.”13 Requiring a tool for 
organization and cooperation, man “had by Nature his Organs so fashioned as to be fit to 
frame articulate Sounds, which we call Words.”14 The ability to produce articulate sounds not 
being sufficient (supposedly) for the ends of organization and cooperation:  
[I]t was farther necessary, that he should be able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal 
Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, 
                                                
dissertation The Strict Interpretation of Locke’s Theory of Ideas, submitted to the University of California at Irvine, 
2006, chapter 3. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 The four books of the Essay are titled, respectively, Of Innate Notions, Of Ideas, Of Words, and Of Knowledge and 
Opinion. 
13 Essay III.i.1. 
14 Ibid., original emphasis. 
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whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men’s Minds be 
conveyed from one to another.15 
 
Locke here expresses the first and most fundamental thesis of his philosophy of language, 
what I will call the Priority Thesis (PT): 
PT: Thought is logically prior to language, language being a method of making one’s 
thoughts known to others. 
 
As Paul Guyer notes, Locke’s endorsement of PT puts him in a tradition stretching back to 
Aristotle.16 We will see later that Berkeley falls squarely in the same tradition. 
 The Priority Thesis leaves open the question of how a language—or more precisely, a 
system of noises or symbols—‘makes one’s thoughts known to others.’ A word might bear 
any number of relations to a thought. Locke thinks the relation is one of signification: 
Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of 
him that uses them …17 
 
This is not helpful, for as Jonathan Bennett rightly points out, Locke simply helps himself to 
‘stand for’ without explanation.18 The question is one of meaning: words have meaning, but 
how? In virtue of what does the symbol (or the noise) ‘cat’ mean ‘a member of the family 
Felidae’, when the very similar symbol ‘cet’ has no meaning at all. An appeal to the sign itself 
gives us no answer; there is nothing intrinsically meaningful about ‘cat’ such that English 
speakers use that symbol to mean ‘a member of the family Felidae’ rather than ‘cet.’ Locke is 
at least vaguely aware of the puzzle, for he notes that parrots and other birds are capable of 
producing articulate sounds, of mimicking speech, but nevertheless fail to count as language 
                                                
15 Ibid., original emphasis. 
16 See Guyer (1994) 119. See also Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16a4-9. 
17 Essay III.ii.2. 
18 Bennett (1971) 3.  
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users; that is, fail to mean anything by their noises.19 But as Locke states in the very first 
sentence of the Essay, “it is the Understanding that sets Man above the rest of sensible 
Beings.”20 So the difference between merely articulate sounds and meaningful articulate 
sounds—language—must likewise depend on our understanding. Thus, we can see that 
Locke takes the logical priority of thought as a necessary condition for a system of symbols 
to count as language. Noting this, we can look back at the claim about signification and 
distill a principle about meaning from it. I will call it the Significance Thesis (ST): 
ST: A word is a meaningful if and only if it stands for an idea in the mind of the 
speaker (writer). 
 
ST immediately raises a number of issues, the lingering question of what it is for a word to 
‘stand for’ an idea principal among them. Equally problematic are the apparent implications 
of ST that for every meaningful word there must be a corresponding idea, and that the 
grammar of speech must depend on a compositionalist grammar of ideas.  
The first of these implications seems straightforward: if the addition or removal of a 
word from a sentence affects the meaning of the sentence, this must be because the word is 
meaningful. (Consider, for example, the effect of adding or removing the word ‘not’ from 
the sentence ‘I do [not] love you.’) Since it is meaningful, the word must stand for an idea in 
the mind of the speaker. This is an especially problematic consequence of ST for it would 
entail that logical connectives and prepositions must stand for ideas. If this were true, then it 
would follow that syncategorematic terms like ‘and’ and ‘is’ have meanings all by themselves, 
in virtue of the ideas they stand for, in exactly the same way the word ‘cat’ is meaningful 
even when uttered in isolation. Historically, this has been a non-starter, and Locke 
                                                
19 See Essay III.i.1. 
20 Essay I.i.1. 
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recognizes this. Later in Essay Book III, he writes:  
[T]here are a great many others (i.e., words) that are made use of, to signify the 
connexion that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Propositions, one with another. … The Words, 
whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several Affirmations and 
Negations, that it unites in one continued Reasoning or Narration, are generally call’d 
Particles …21 
 
These particles however, “are not truly, by themselves, the names of any Ideas.”22 It would 
seem then that either Locke rejects that particles are meaningful (since on ST this would 
mean that they stand for ideas), or that he does not hold ST as strictly as it first appears. 
Some commentators choose to interpret Locke as implicitly restricting ST to exclude 
syncategorematic terms. According to Ott, ST is restricted to categorematic terms; “on 
[Locke’s] view, … the copula signifies not an idea but a mental act that unites the ideas in a 
mental proposition.”23 This is perhaps a less-than-desirable interpretation, for Locke is not 
shy about claiming ST holds for all ideas; “all words, as I have shewn, signify nothing 
immediately, but the Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker.”24 However, there may be a way 
through the horns of this dilemma. Recently, D. Kenneth Brown has defended a strict 
compositionalist interpretation of Locke’s theory of ideas.25 On Brown’s interpretation of 
Locke, all ideas are either absolutely simple or complex, and all complex ideas are 
(theoretically) analyzable into absolutely simple ideas. All complex ideas are the products of 
some operation(s) of the mind. According to Brown, these operations produce complex 
                                                
21 Essay III.vii.1-2. 
22 Essay III.vii.2. 
23 Ott (2004) 34. See the rest of Ott (2004), chapter 2 as well. 
24 Essay, III.iv.1, my emphasis. 
25 Brown (2006), The Strict Interpretation of Locke’s Theory of Ideas, dissertation submitted to the University of 
California, Irvine. See especially chapter 3.  
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ideas by adding new simple ideas of reflection; indeed, the addition of a simple idea to the 
resulting complex just is an operation. So, for example, to remember something is for the 
mind to produce a new complex idea by adding to an existing idea (either simple or 
complex) a simple idea of memory marking the new complex as remembered. Now, mental 
propositions, “wherein the Ideas in our Understanding are without the use of Words put together 
or separated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging of their Agreement, or Disagreement,”26 are 
necessarily complex and therefore involve one or more operations of the mind.  On Brown’s 
view, though, an operation of the mind just is the production of a complex via the addition 
of a simple idea. So, while Ott is right that the copula, for example, stands for the mental act 
(operation) that unites ideas, he is wrong that it does not also signify an idea itself. For since, 
on Brown’s interpretation, the operation is exhausted by the addition of an idea to a new 
complex, the copula can stands for an operation only if it also stands for the simple idea 
thereby added. Brown’s strict interpretation allows us to preserve ST even with respect to 
syncategoremata. So, even particles can signify ideas, even if they are not, strictly speaking, 
“names” for them.  
  The second potentially problematic consequence of ST is equally straightforward. 
Consider these two sentences: 
  A: The cat ate the goldfish 
  B: The goldfish ate the cat. 
Since both A and B contain exactly the same words, someone uttering A signifies exactly the 
same ideas they would signify if they uttered B. But since A and B are strikingly different in 
meaning, given PT and ST, this difference must be explained by some difference in the non-
contentual features of the ideas, say, in the representational structure or ordering of the ideas 
                                                
26 Essay, IV.v.5. 
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in the mind of the speaker. Perhaps the difference is temporal (the cat idea is signified first in 
uttering A, second in uttering B) or, if ideas are images, it may even be spatial. Regardless, 
PT and ST combined commit Locke to some kind of isomorphism between the grammar of 
speech and the “grammar” of thought. Locke himself offers no account of the isomorphism. 
As we will see, however, one of the most problematic details of Locke’s philosophy of 
language depends upon the assumption of some kind of isomorphism and Berkeley exploits 
this flaw to great effect. 
 
1.3: SIGNIFICATION 
 The view of language I am here reconstructing relies centrally on the concept of 
signification. Exactly what signification is, though, is not entirely clear—for Locke, Berkeley, 
or Berkeley’s understanding of Locke. We have so far only substituted for signification the 
equally unclear concept of ‘standing for’; a word signifies an idea just in case it ‘stands for’ 
said idea. According to Ott, Locke’s notion of signification is in line with a tradition running 
from the Port-Royalians through his near predecessor Thomas Hobbes.27 On this 
conception, a word signifies—that is, is a sign for—an idea insofar as it indicates or serves as 
evidence for the idea.28 Such indication or evidence can then serve as the grounds for certain 
inferences. Dark clouds indicate on-coming rain, and so one can infer the likelihood of rain 
from the sign of dark clouds. Likewise, a word is a sign of a speaker’s idea just in case a word 
indicates the presence of such an idea; that is, just in case the speaker has the idea in her 
mind when speaking the word.  
 This last might seem too fast. Must one really have an idea in mind when speaking a 
                                                
27 Ott, (2004), 13-21. 
28 Ibid., 24. 
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corresponding word in order for that word to signify that idea?29 After all, dark clouds are 
not always concomitant with rain, nor rain with dark clouds. Dark clouds are reliable but not 
infallible indicators of rain, but they remain a sign of rain nonetheless. Likewise, might not a 
word be a reliable but not infallible indicator of an idea, the utterance typically (but not 
always) coinciding with the idea’s occurrent perception? It seems not for Locke.  
First, temporal coincidence of word and idea would seem to be necessary. Given Locke’s 
acceptance of PT, thought is logically prior to language. That is, one cannot meaningfully say 
what one cannot already think.  
A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things, or of 
Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has 
some Ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the Conceptions 
of another Man; nor can he use any Signs for them: For thus they would be the Signs 
of he knows not what, which is in Truth to be the Signs of nothing.30 
 
But of all the thoughts a mature language user can think, which thoughts are signified by a 
given utterance? The answer cannot be “whichever thoughts the words used have, by 
convention, been made to stand for” since this only begs the question of how the 
convention was established if not by temporal association. Since words are not linked to the 
ideas they signify “by any natural connexion,” such as a resemblance, the choice of sign is 
arbitrary.31 There was nothing special about the symbol ‘cat’ that English users chose it over 
‘gatto’ (or ‘ghl!tm’) to mean cat.  But the sign, once chosen, could not be wholly temporally 
disconnected to the occurrence of the speaker’s idea of a cat. If this were possible, then 
Locke would be committed to a view of language on which a person could be said to mean 
something by the noise ‘cat’ even if the noise were days, months, or even years removed 
                                                
29 This is not surprisingly one of Berkeley’s worries, as we will soon see. 
30 Essay, III.ii.2. 
31 Essay, III.ii.1. 
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from the speaker’s thinking of a cat, presumably even if the speaker were talking in her sleep, 
or even if the speaker had only once thought of a cat and had long since then lost any trace 
of the idea. Unless signification required some temporal relation between word and idea, 
Locke’s theory would lack any resources for fixing the significatum of a word.  
 Given what Locke says, we have reason to think the temporal relation is quite strong. 
He writes: 
Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but 
the Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker32 
 
Locke’s use of ‘idea’ is notoriously slippery, a fact he apologizes for.33 Nevertheless, even in 
the widest sense of the term, it denotes “whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when 
a Man thinks.”34 That is, in the strict sense there are no ideas that are not occurrently 
perceived. Locke even explicitly rejects the notion that previously perceived ideas are stored, 
unperceived, in the memory as mere metaphor:  
[O]ur Ideas being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any 
thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the 
Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in 
many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional 
Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that 
our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where.35 
 
We have good reasons then to conclude that on Locke’s view, words are meaningful just in 
case they stand for the speaker’s presently perceived ideas; words and the ideas they stand 
for must be (more or less) cotemporaneous. More importantly for our purposes, though, as 
we will see, this is how Berkeley understands Locke.  
                                                
32 Essay, III.ii.4. 
33 Essay, I.i.8, emphasis mine. 
34 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
35 Essay, II.x.2. 
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1.4: IDEAS AS IMAGES 
One remaining feature of Locke’s philosophy of language needs to be discussed 
before we can turn to Berkeley and his criticisms. Some of Berkeley’s most biting criticisms 
of Locke assume that Lockean ideas are images; as it were, little pictures (or other sensory 
analogues) before the mind. Berkeley was in good company in attacking (what he took to be) 
Locke’s imagism.36 While there is debate among Locke scholars on this question, this is not 
the place to enter into or mediate that dispute.37 Regardless, Berkeley is not unreasonable in 
reading Locke as an imagist, for much of what Locke writes suggests as much and his 
notorious imprecision does much to obscure the matter.  
Though the distinction between “rationalists” and “empiricists” is hackneyed and 
over-simplified, Locke and Berkeley both reject the faculty of the pure intellect that plays a 
significant role in the systems of Descartes and other canonical rationalists.38 When, in the 
Second Meditation, Descartes investigates the nature of a piece of wax, he comes to 
understand that it is indefinitely mutable despite his being unable to imagine all the possible 
ways the wax could change. He concludes his understanding of the indefinitely changeable 
nature of the wax is “not achieved by the faculty of the imagination,” but “through the mind 
alone.”39 This opens the door for yet another Cartesian dualism; ideas of imagination and 
ideas of intellect, only the former being imagistic. Later, Descartes returns to the distinction, 
                                                
36 Leibniz, for example, also attacks Locke as an imagist. See Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding, Book 
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38 See Garrett (1997) 11-21 for a survey of the place of the intellect in the early modern period. 
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noting that while he can imagine triangles or pentagons, “if I desire to think of a chiliagon, I 
certainly conceive truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides, just as easily as I 
conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides only; but I cannot in any way imagine 
the thousand sides of a chiliagon.”40 
Lockean ideas come in four kinds as a result of two crosscutting distinctions. The first 
is a distinction between the two sources of ideas. Having mounted arguments against the 
possibility of innate ideas or principles in Book I of the Essay, Locke introduces the bedrock 
principle of his empiricist program: that all the materials of reason and knowledge derive from 
experience, either of external, sensible objects (sensation) or of the operations of our own 
minds (reflection).41 Orthogonal to this distinction is the (much debated) distinction between 
simple and complex ideas.42 Thus Lockean ideas are all either simple ideas (of sensation or 
reflection) or complex ideas (of sensation or reflection), and all complex ideas, “however 
compounded, and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple Ideas.”43 But even these 
Lockean simple ideas, it seems, can be considered imagistically; as it were, early modern 
analogues of sense data. Locke scholars continue to discuss this point.44 It is then at least not 
unfair to suppose that Berkeley likewise read Locke as holding that ideas are images. 
 Thus far, I have identified a number of the major commitments of (what Berkeley 
took to be) Locke’s semantic theory: the Priority Thesis, the Significance thesis, and the 
thesis that ideas are sensory images. In what follows, I hope to show that though he breaks 
                                                
40 Ibid., AT 72 
41 Essay. II.i.2. 
42 This issue is discussed fully in Brown (2006), especially chapter 6. 
43 Essay, II.xxii.9. 
44 See, for example, Ott (2004) 4; Bennett (2000) 11-15.  
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from Locke’s view on language in interesting and important ways, Berkeley nevertheless 
maintains versions of each of these theses. It is Berkeley revision of Lockean semantics—and 
not his total abandonment—that will help shed light on the major themes of his system.   
 
1.5: BERKELEY’S SHORT-LIVED LOCKEAN PERIOD 
 On Saturday, November 19, 1707, a 22-year-old George Berkeley—newly minted as 
a Junior Fellow of Trinity College Dublin the previous June—delivered a short, critical paper 
entitled Of Infinites to the Dublin Philosophical Society. It was his first philosophical work 
and in it, Berkeley espoused a resoundingly Lockean view about language. “’Tis plain to me,” 
he writes, “we ought use no sign without an idea answering it.”45 It is equally plain to 
Berkeley that we have no idea of an infinitely small line—indeed, that an idea of anything as 
infinite is impossible—and therefore all talk of infinitely small quantities or extensions is, at 
bottom, meaningless.  
This very brief argument is remarkable for two reasons. The first is that Berkeley’s 
confidence in the legitimacy of the Lockean view is equaled only by the esteem with which 
he lauds Locke. He writes of the “incomparable Mr. Locke’s treatise,” where Locke handles 
the “subject of infinity with that judgement & clearness wch is so peculiar to him”.46 The 
second remarkable thing about the argument from Of Infinites is that Berkeley would come to 
publicly reject the Lockean view on which it depends in less than two months. By January 
1708 when he delivered his first public sermon, he was expounding the notion that Heaven 
is “wt the eye hath not seen nor ear heard neither hath it enter’d into the heart of man to 
conceive,” an unimaginable paradise that, “we narrow-sighted mortals wretchedly point out 
                                                
45 “Of Infinites,” in Works 4:236. 
46 Ibid., 4:235. 
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to our selves by green meadows, fragrant groves, refreshing shades, crystal streams & wt 
other pleasant ideas our fancys can glean up.”47  
Exactly what precipitated Berkeley’s abrupt rejection of the strict Lockean view that 
every word stands for an idea is unclear. It likely had something to do with the reaction Of 
Infinites received from two prominent clergymen who belonged to the Dublin Philosophical 
Society at the time: Peter Browne, and William King.48 We can only speculate as to what 
went on at the meeting, but we know from Berkeley’s notebooks that, around that time, he 
warned himself “to use utmost Caution not to give the least Handle of offence to the 
Church or Churchmen.”49  
David Berman offers a plausible explanation of how the Lockean view of Of Infinites 
would have offended Browne, King, and other “Churchmen.” The strict Lockean view holds 
that words that do not stand for ideas are meaningless. (Since ideas are, almost by definition, 
consciously perceived and therefore cognitively accessible, Berman describes this theory as 
“cognitivist.”) Berkeley argues that there is no such idea attending ‘infinite’, ergo, it is 
meaningless. But then so too are claims that God is infinite, or that the joys of Heaven are 
infinite. These implications, according to Berman, would have reminded Browne and King 
of a dangerous heretical view advanced a few years before by John Toland, and incited a 
vigorous reaction to the young Berkeley’s paper.50  
Whatever the particular impetus, Berkeley took his first important step away from 
                                                
47 Works 7:12. 
48 Browne was Provost of Trinity College. King was (Anglican) Archbishop of Dublin. David Berman offers 
the most detailed account of what likely happened between Berkeley, Browne and King to explain the abrupt 
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the strict cognitivist Lockean view of language shortly after delivering Of Infinites. This step 
was to limit his cognitivist account of meaning only to philosophical contexts, thereby 
exempting religious claims. This division is codified in his notebooks: 
When I say I will reject all Propositions wherein I know not … fully & adequately & 
clearly … This is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of 
Matters of Reason & Philosophy not Revelation[.]51 
 
That Berkeley initially exempted religious discourse from his Lockean (cognitivist) standards 
is clear. It is a matter of some dispute, however, how complete was Berkeley’s move away 
from cognitivism. Later, we will look at the case for reading Berkeley as a rejecting entirely 
any ideational theory of semantics. For present purposes, let us continue to follow Berkeley’s 
departure from the basic Lockean view. 
 
1.6: ABSTRACT IDEAS 
 There is no zealot like a convert, and there are few things about which converts are 
more zealous than attacking the views they have given up. In November 1707, Berkeley was 
a straightforward Lockean about meaning. By the next January, he was no longer. If Berman 
is right that the principal reason Berkeley moved away from the strict Lockean view was 
because of its troubling religious implications, then this too was relatively short-lived. By the 
time Berkeley wrote his A Treatise concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge—better known 
as the Principles—the Lockean view was nothing less than the source of all philosophical 
error.52  
 The title of the Principles is, one might think, a kind of practical joke. The principles 
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52 The Principles was first published in 1710, and it appears that Berkeley had been working on it from about 
1708.  
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that Berkeley concerns himself with are not those that lead to human knowledge, but rather 
those that stand as obstacles to human knowledge. His purpose, he writes early on in the 
Introduction, “is to try if I can discover what those principles are, which have introduced all 
that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions into the several sects 
of philosophy.”53 The reader then promptly discovers that one such principle is “the opinion 
that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things,” an opinion 
Berkeley tells us concerns the “nature and abuse of language.”54  
 What is an abstract idea, and why would someone think there are such things? 
Abstract ideas, as far as Berkeley understands them, are supposed to be the ideas by which 
the mind thinks about, primarily, qualities that many different particular things may embody 
(say, redness) or kinds to which many particular things may belong (say, dogs or cats). 
Allegedly, abstract ideas are produced by considering the idea of a particular thing (say, a red 
apple) and then distilling or deleting information contained in that idea so as to produce an 
idea of only a quality (say, shape) which is not an idea of any particular shape. This “mental 
separation” is allegedly how we come to such ideas as the idea of ‘man’: 
[T]he mind having observed that Peter, James, and John, resemble each other, in 
certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex 
or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which 
is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and so makes an abstract 
idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting 
off all those circumstances and differences, which might determine it to any 
particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of 
man or, if you please, humanity or human nature[.]55 
 
Nonsense, Berkeley argues; no such process of abstracting does exist, and no such idea could 
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exist. 
[T]he ideas of man that I frame to my self, must be either of a white, or a black, or a 
tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by 
any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described.56 
 
There is some question as to what exactly is Berkeley’s objection to the putative abstract idea 
of ‘man’. Winkler argues that Berkeley’s principal objection is that the idea represents 
something impossible and would require us to have the power to conceive of something that 
even God is incapable of creating.57 Since nothing can exceed the power of God, there can 
be no such power and no such idea. Bennett offers a different and (I think) more compelling 
line: the idea itself is impossible. Either argument would likely satisfy Berkeley, though the 
latter seems to be the stronger. It requires, though, that Berkeley is thinking of ideas 
imagistically.  
That Berkeley thinks of ideas as images is supported strongly by his response to 
response to one of Locke’s most embarrassing gaffes, the “general idea of a triangle,” which 
is quoted at length in the Introduction to the Principles. According to Locke, “the general Idea 
of a Triangle … must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor 
Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot 
exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put 
together.”58 But an idea of a triangle that is neither equilateral, equicrural, or scalene is not 
obviously impossible or even absurd if by idea one means something like a Cartesian idea of 
intellect or even something more like a concept. Yet Berkeley clearly thinks such an idea is 
an impossibility and this, along with his mention of the idea “corresponding to a description,” 
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I think show he thought of such ideas as images. For if the general idea of a triangle is 
supposed to be an image of a triangle, and in particular a triangle that is neither equilateral, 
equicrural, or scalene, then such an image (and idea) is indeed impossible, and the 
impossibility of forming such an idea in the mind easily demonstrable to anyone who tries. 
And this is precisely Berkeley’s challenge: “All I desire is, that the reader would fully and 
certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no.”59 
 All this only explains what abstract ideas are supposed to be. We will not fully see 
until Chapter 4 just why Berkeley finds the doctrine of abstraction so pernicious. But why is 
there a doctrine of abstraction: why would anyone have thought there were such things as 
abstract ideas in the first place? Berkeley’s answer to this question brings us round again to 
issues more central to the sympathetic interpretation. 
 As Berkeley understood him, Locke posited abstract ideas to solve an empirical 
puzzle: what is it that explains how human being can use language but other animals cannot? 
Locke’s answer is that the use of language requires the use of general terms. The use of 
general terms, Locke claims, requires the existence of general—i.e., abstract—ideas.60 Here 
we see the Priority Thesis and the Significance Thesis in play. More importantly, however, is 
Locke’s assumption of a kind of isomorphism between the semantics of a word and the 
content of the idea for which it allegedly stands. According to Locke, “Words become 
general, by being made the signs of general Ideas; and Ideas become general, by separating 
from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas that may determine 
them to this or that particular Existence.”61 An idea becomes general, that is, by being made 
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abstract—by having some of its content deleted—so as to “[represent] more Individuals 
than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract Idea, is (as we call it) of 
that sort.”62 It is because ‘triangle’ stands for an abstract idea of a triangle, which idea bears a 
resemblance to all triangles and yet is not an idea of any particular triangle, that the word 
refers to all triangles generally.  
 Of course, if there can be no such general idea of a triangle, then this story about the 
meaning of general terms must be wrong. But this mistaken story is motivated by deeper 
views about language, and it is at these views that Berkeley then takes aim. He identifies two 
such “received opinions”:  
(A) that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas 
(B) that every significant name stands for an idea 
Berkeley rejects both of these. The impossibility of the relevant kind of abstract ideas is 
damning evidence against (B) by itself, but he raises additional data against it as well. “May 
we not,” he writes, “be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea 
of what it is?”  
If any one shall join ever so little reflection of his own to what has been said, I 
believe it will evidently appear to him, that general names are often used in propriety 
of language without the speaker’s designing them for marks of ideas in his own, 
which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer.”63 
 
It is not hard to imagine that Berkeley is here recalling his note to himself that religious 
language is to be excused from the Lockean demand to produce an idea or be considered 
meaningless. His “promise of a good thing,” might as well have been a promise of the 
Heaven he called (just two years before) “wt the eye hath not seen nor ear heard neither hath 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 PHK Intro §20. 
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it enter’d into the heart of man to conceive.”64 
 
1.7: THE END(S) OF LANGUAGE  
 If there are cases where language used in “propriety” without signifying ideas, then 
something must be wrong with the assumption that language has no other purpose than to 
communicate ideas.  
There are other ends [of language], as the raising of some passion, the exciting to, or 
deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to 
which the former [i.e., communicating ideas] is in many cases barely subservient, and 
sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth 
not infrequently happen.65 
 
Berkeley’s pluralism about the ends of language seems to imply a corresponding pluralism 
about the criteria for linguistic success including, in particular, pragmatic criteria. This is a 
major shift from Locke’s view on which success in communication seems to consist in 
nothing but a kind of correspondence between the thoughts in the mind of the speaker and 
those in the mind of the hearer.66 Berkeley himself maintained something similar in his early 
Lockean period: “Let [the reader] not regard my Words any otherwise than as occasions of 
bringing into his mind determin’d significations so far as they fail of this they are Gibberish, 
Jargon & deserve not the name of Language.”67  
With the Principles, this strict demand that every meaningful utterance must have a 
clear signification is exploded. Not only is religious language exempted, but now all manner 
of speech acts can be, in a way, meaningful without producing any particular, determinate 
                                                
64 See Works 7:12 and above fn. 42. 
65 PHK Intro §20. 
66 See Essay III.ii.1-6. 
67 NB A696.  
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ideas in the mind of the hearer. For these other linguistic practices to be successful then is 
for the intended result to occur. To be sure, in order to bring about the desired result, it may 
require that the hearer first bring to mind the ideas typically signified by the words used. So, 
to raise her team’s passion a coach might remind them of a time when they were badly 
beaten. “Think back to when we lost to them the last time,” she might say, thereby 
prompting her players to remember an upsetting defeat. Or she might simply enjoin them to, 
“Fight like hell!” where her words manage only to provoke an emotional response. For 
Berkeley, both speech acts are legitimate, both practically useful—both meaningful though 
only the former is, strictly speaking, significant. 
 
1.8: A PRELIMINARY SUMMARY  
By the end of the Introduction to the Principles, Berkeley’s thoughts about language 
can be roughly summed up as follows. There are many different ends for which language 
may used. Not all of these uses require the communication of ideas. Words do not always 
signify the same idea(s) in every instance. Indeed, not all words do or can signify ideas at all 
(e.g., “Heaven”). Later on in the body of the Principles, Berkeley adds to these anti-Lockean 
views. He argues that, since our entirely inactive ideas cannot represent an active substance 
such as spirit, the names of spirits and their operations do not signify ideas either; rather, 
they signify notions.68 
                                                
68 Notions are introduced in the second edition of Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous as Berkeley’s 
technical term for thoughts about ourselves, God, relations, and acts of the mind. One can speculate that 
Berkeley adverted to (or just plain invented) notions as a way of rescuing his system from the charge that, since 
ideas are in their own nature entirely passive, that we have “no idea” of God. Berkeley writes, “I own I have 
properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things 
perfectly inert as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know, that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as 
certainly, as I know my ideas exist. … However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to 
furnish me with an idea, that is, an image, or likeness of God, though indeed extremely inadequate. For all the 
notion I have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own soul heightening its powers, and removing its 
imperfections.” Dialogues 2:231-2. 
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Each of these views represents a break in some way from Locke. It might seem, in 
fact, that there is little left to connect the two. Might Berkeley have rejected entirely any 
variety of ideational semantics? Before we can get clear on Berkeley’s account of his 
philosophy of language, we must consider this possibility. 
 
1.9: HOW FAR DOES HE GO? 
According to the naïve Lockean view developed earlier, words derive their meaning 
by signifying specific ideas in each instance of their use. If the semantic function of two 
words differ, this must stem from their signifying different ideas. And the sole purpose for 
language is to communicate such ideas. Taken seriously, Berkeley thinks, this rigid ideational 
semantic picture necessarily results in the positing of abstract ideas.  
Berkeley argues against such abstract ideas on phenomenological and epistemological 
grounds. If we look for such ideas, we will fail to find any. Moreover, there couldn’t be such 
ideas anyway, since so many of them would be impossible inconsistent mental images—an 
image of a triangle that is not an image of any particular triangle. If abstract ideas are out of 
the question, then something must be wrong with the Lockean view that leads to and relies 
upon them. We have already identified the way in which Berkeley saw Locke’s semantic 
theory to lead to abstract ideas, and the ways in which Berkeley rejected the basic Lockean 
picture. Thus far, though, Berkeley’s criticisms of the Lockean ideational theory do not 
depend on Berkeley’s holding a competing ideational theory.  
 It might seem that Berkeley’s attack on Lockean semantics is evidence of his total 
rejection of any ideational theory of meaning. This interpretation has been proposed recently 
by John Russell Roberts. According to Roberts, since Berkeley recognizes the ideational 
theory of meaning as the source of the doctrine of abstraction, it would uncharitable to then 
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read Berkeley as himself holding a different ideational theory. Instead, we should read 
Berkeley as an early proponent of a use theory of meaning on which words acquire meaning 
by the roles they play in practical activities. Grasping the meaning of words, according to 
Roberts, “is a matter of the mastery of the employment of signs.”69 
 There is something to be said for this proposal. As already mentioned, Berkeley 
adopts a pluralistic view about the purposes of language, and for some purposes, a pragmatic 
criteria for success. To “understand”, for example, an appeal to authority is just to be 
disposed to accept the opinion upon being told to, even if no clear ideas are brought to 
mind.  
[W]hen a Schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to 
dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom 
has annexed to that name. And this effect may be so instantly produced in the minds 
of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to the authority of that 
philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation 
should go before.70 
 
And this nascent use-theoretic account of meaning appears again in Berkeley’s most mature 
thoughts on language in his longest and most well received work, Alciphron, or The Minute 
Philosopher.71 A series of seven dialogues written while Berkeley lived in Rhode Island, it 
catalogues a lively debate between the eponymous Alciphron, a travelling “free-thinker”, and 
Euphranor, a humble gentleman farmer. In the final dialogue, Alciphron attempts one last 
time to show that the Christian faith is meaningless, relying on a straightforward Lockean 
account of semantics. 
                                                
69 Roberts (2007) 64. 
70 PHK Intro §20. 
71 Published in February 1732. According to Luce and Jessop, the Queen publicly commended it shortly after 
its release. This is in sharp contrast to Berkeley’s earlier works, especially the Principles which Berkeley’s friend 
John Percival could manage to convince no one to read. Incidentally, the Queen in question was Caroline of 
Ansbach (wife of King George II) who was no poseur on the topic of philosophy, having served as the 
intermediary (and sometimes referee) of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence.  
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“Words are signs: they do or should stand for ideas, which so far as they suggest they 
are significant. But words that suggest no ideas are insignificant. He who annexeth a 
clear idea to every word he makes use of speaks sense; but where such ideas are 
wanting, the speaker utters nonsense.”72 
 
Alciphron takes particular aim at the Christian concept of grace, which he finds himself 
“altogether unable to understand … or frame any distinct idea of it.”73 Berkeley’s 
mouthpiece Euphranor replies that words are indeed signs, “yet … those signs may be 
significant, though they should not suggest ideas represented by them, provided they serve to 
regulate and influence our wills, passions, or conduct.”74 Even mathematical language is 
granted by Euphranor to be useful in this practical sense in spite of the inability to produce 
coherent ideas for which they stand: “for instance, the algebraic mark, which denotes the 
root of a negative square, hath its use in logistic operations, although it be impossible to 
form an idea of any such quantity.”75 
 Beyond the textual support, this reading allows Roberts to claim that there is just 
“one Berkeley” on the matter of language. If we attribute to Berkeley a same-for-all-cases 
account of how language becomes meaningful, then this has the virtue of interpretive 
simplicity. It would seem then that there are good reasons for reading Berkeley as an early, 
committed use theorist about meaning. 
 
1.10: “… AT BOTTOM THEY HAVE NO MEANING IN THEM.” 
 While it is true that Berkeley does not rely on a competing ideational theory in his 
                                                
72 Works 3:287. 
73 Ibid. 7:290. 
74 Ibid. 7:296-7, emphasis added. 
75 Ibid. 7:307. 
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critique of Locke’s view, this is not enough to show the Berkeley does not rely on a 
competing version nonetheless. Nor is interpretive simplicity grounds enough for 
concluding that he does not, unless it can be shown that there are no instances where 
Berkeley’s arguments turn on a requirement that words signify determinate ideas. 
 For all that can be said in favor of Roberts’s use-theoretical interpretation of 
Berkeley, it cannot account for the ubiquitous Berkeleian mantra that the claims of his 
opponents are ultimately meaningless.76 “Strictly speaking,” Berkeley writes, “to believe that 
which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible.” He continues: 
In one sense indeed, men may be said to believe that matter exists, that is, they act as 
if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment and is 
so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But that they 
should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a 
settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only 
instance wherein men impose upon themselves by imagining they believe those 
propositions they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in 
them.77 
 
It seems here that Berkeley is precisely distinguishing the pragmatic sense in which one might 
be said to believe that “matter exists” from the strict, philosophical sense of the claim. “Matter 
exists” has a use: presumably, people will utter it; they will behave in particular ways in 
response to utterances of it; very likely, they will be prepared to make other, related 
utterances. But if this happens, their behavior will be influenced by words “which at bottom 
have no meaning.” If Berkeley is a thoroughgoing early use-theorist about meaning, there 
can be no such distinction; a statement that has practical effects cannot be meaningless. 
Since this is exactly what Berkeley here denies, it cannot be true that he held a full-blown use 
theory of meaning.  
                                                
76 See, for example, PHK §§17, 24, 45, 54, 72, 79. 
77 PHK §54. 
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 Here then is something of a puzzle. As we have seen, Berkeley apparently does 
acknowledge purely pragmatic speech acts that can be meaningful even when they do not 
(and cannot) signify clear ideas. And yet, in some cases, he clearly denies that certain claims 
are meaningful, in spite of the fact that they have practical consequences. Berkeley appears 
to be playing both sides of the debate.  
 There is, however, a coherent way to reconcile this apparent tension. The key is 
Berkeley’s view about the development of language and his pluralism about the ends to 
which it can be put. Contrary to Locke’s view that language developed so that “the Thoughts 
of Men’s Minds be conveyed from one to another,” Berkeley has a more organic conception. 
Language was, “framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common 
actions of life, without any regard to speculation.”78 As he claims in Alciphron, “the true end 
of speech … in all its degrees, is not merely, or principally, or always, the imparting or 
acquiring of ideas, but rather something of an active operative nature, tending to a conceived 
good.”79 
Because language developed for practical and not theoretical purposes, a significant 
amount of looseness of speech could be accommodated without significant costs. This loose 
speech is still exhibited by the Vulgar (Berkeley’s name for the uneducated, the “illiterate 
bulk of mankind”).80 Writes Berkeley, “words as Used by the Vulgar are taken in some 
Latitude, their signification is confused.”81 And so, natural language is “suited to the received 
                                                
78 See also 3D 2:182, Works 2:282, NTV §120, and PHK §52.  
79 Works 3:307. 
80 See PHK Intro §1. 
81 Berkeley, Notebooks, A §544. 
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opinions, which are not always the truest.”82 
 In virtue of its practical heritage, natural language is an inefficient tool for strict and 
speculative inquiry, that is, for philosophy, which Berkeley describes as “nothing else but the 
study of wisdom and truth.”83 And it is in this linguistic application where Berkeley’s Lockean 
lineage exerts its influence, for while it is important to note Berkeley’s innovation in 
recognizing purely pragmatic speech acts, it is equally important to see that he retains, as one 
legitimate end of language, the mere “communication of ideas.”  
When language is put to the end of speculative philosophy—simply for 
communicating ideas—the end can only be achieved if the hearer, as it were, “gets the 
message”; i.e., if the hearer comes to think of clear, determinate ideas. This requires that the 
speaker herself uses words that, as much as possible, suggest such clear, determinate ideas. 
This in turn requires that the speaker has clear, determinate ideas in mind—that she has first 
clearly thought what she intends to relay by means of words. It is true, in most cases, that it 
is not necessary that the hearer to bring these ideas to mind at every instance of a word. Like 
counters in a card game, it is enough to manipulate the words themselves without referring 
to the ideas at every moment. But like counters, words must have cash value; at the end of the 
discussion, words to which the hearer can connect no clear ideas are no better than counters 
for which the card player can receive no money—they are worthless, counterfeit—“they 
have at bottom no meaning.” 
 
1.11: THE HYBRID IDEATIONAL THEORY 
 This is a kind of ideational theory of meaning, but it is not wholly an ideational 
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theory of meaning. It is, rather, a hybrid ideational theory, according to which different linguistic 
practices employ different standards for meaning. Where “truth and strictness of speech” are 
of paramount concern, Berkeley retains the demand that language be offered only as signs of 
coherent thoughts. It is not true then that Berkeley rejects entirely the Lockean picture that 
words are meaningful in virtue of the ideas they stand as signs for. As we have seen though, 
Berkeley does break from the basic Lockean view in other fundamental ways. These uniquely 
Berkeleian modifications will be crucially important in what follows. Here then is a summary 
of the hybrid ideational theory with the relevant qualifications:  
(HIT) When language is used to communicate ideas—which is not always—, words 
are meaningful just in case they can signify coherent ideas; however … 
1. A word need not signify an idea each time it is used. 
2. The same word need not signify the same idea each time it signifies. 
3. The ideas signified must be determinate in content; they may not be 
abstract. 
The hybrid ideational theory is, perhaps, an inelegant view to attribute to Berkeley. Counting 
heavily in its favor, though, is the fact that scholars have consistently read Berkeley as a 
proponent of an ideational theory of meaning, with Roberts being the lone exception, and it 
is strongly supported by Berkeley’s texts.84 Yet the best support that can be provided for 
attributing the hybrid ideational theory to Berkeley is the power the interpretation has to 
solve (or dissolve) problems scholars have had in interpreting Berkeley; as it were, the proof 
of the attribution is in the power of the interpretation. This is the ultimate aim of this 
dissertation. In what follows, I will apply this account of Berkeley’s philosophy of language 
                                                
84 Notable examples of scholars who also attribute an ideational theory of meaning to Berkeley are Bennett 
(1971), Pitcher (1977), and Winkler (1989). 
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to a trio of interpretive puzzles; the immediate perception of sensible objects, the so-called 
problem of continuity, and Berkeley’s alleged defense of commonsense. Each of these areas 
of Berkeley’s thought has received considerable attention. Regarding each, scholars can be 
roughly divided into two interpretive camps which, I think, each fall short in important ways. 
I will argue that the shortcomings of these interpretations can be traced to a failure to hew 
strictly to Berkeley’s thoughts about language. I will then try to show how a strict 
interpretation can ameliorate the apparent problems these other interpretations face without 
incurring additional ones. 
CHAPTER 2: BERKELEY’S RADICAL NOMINALISM  
 “Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind,” Berkeley writes, “that a man 
need only open his eyes to see them.”85 What did Berkeley think was so clear and obvious? 
That a thinking mind knows it exists as it is thinking? That God exists? Either one of these 
claims would have been accepted by a large number of Berkeley’s contemporaries, and 
accepted as obvious by almost as many of them. But Berkeley’s claim wasn’t about either of 
these. What he claims is so near and obvious to the mind is that “all the choir of heaven and 
furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, 
have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known.”86 
This is Berkeley’s Idealism, the view that everything is either a perceiver or perceived, and 
the latter has no existence independent of the former; the esse of the sensible world is 
percipi.87 
 Not only is Idealism obviously true to Berkeley, but its main metaphysical rival, 
materialism, is obviously dangerous. Just why Berkeley is so worried about materialism will 
concern us in Chapter 4. For present purposes, we need to better understand what 
Berkeley’s Idealism is, and in particular, what it has to say about the nature of that part of 
our world that is perceived and not perceiver. I hope to show that Berkeley is not guilty of 
overwrought rhetoric in claiming that his Idealism is near and obvious to the mind, 
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87 The phrase “esse is percipi” is Berkeley’s own, first appearing in PHK §3.  
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at least according to his own principles. The key to this will be an application and expansion 
of the hybrid ideational theory of language developed in the previous chapter.  
 
2.1: A MATTER OF MATTER, IN BRIEF 
 Berkeley’s claim that the mind-dependence of the physical world is obvious to anyone 
who cares to examine the matter is, at the very least, worthy of a raised eyebrow. He does, 
after all, note that “the contrary opinion”—that the things we perceive “have an existence 
natural or real, distinct from their being perceived”—is one “strangely [i.e., very much] 
prevailing amongst men.”88 The most pernicious version of this popular but mistaken view 
maintains that sensible objects are material objects. Here, it would be difficult and 
unnecessary to go into great detail. Berkeley entertains a host of different versions of 
materialism and rejects all of them. As a quick gloss, the versions of materialism Berkeley 
considers share a common structural core: sensible objects are, at the ultimate metaphysical 
level, material substances which interact with our minds to produce in us our sensory 
experiences, i.e., our sensory ideas. What is central to each version of materialism—and to 
Berkeley’s objections to each—is that according to materialism, the objects themselves are, 
strictly speaking, unperceivable. All that is perceived (and here we are shifting to the 
epistemological consequences attending the metaphysical view) are our own ideas, which are 
somehow caused by, or resemblances of, or otherwise necessarily connected to the 
interaction of our perceptual systems with matter. But as Berkeley understood it, matter 
itself is unsensed—indeed, insensible; a something-we-know-not-what.  
                                                
88 I follow Winkler in this reading. Berkeley uses this same obsolete meaning of ‘strangely’ elsewhere. See 
Winkler (1989) 5. 
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 Because we never perceive matter itself, we can have no ideas of it. This is Berkeley’s 
principal argument against it. Any putative idea “idea of matter” would be either (a) 
impermissibly abstract, or (b) some idea of a sensible quality (e.g., an idea of heat, color, 
shape, extension, etc.). But matter is alleged to be something distinct from any sensible 
quality; it is supposed to be that which supports and unites such qualities. A particular 
sensible object then is a particular material substance in which certain qualities (or powers to 
produce ideas) inhere. 
 
2.2: HOUSES, MOUNTAINS, AND RIVERS 
 The specifics of Berkeley’s rejection of any materialist account of sensible objects are 
largely beyond my purposes here. More to the point is Berkeley’s own immaterialist Idealist 
account of sensible objects. Berkeley says clearly and often that sensible objects are not 
material substances but rather collections of ideas.89 “It is evident,” he writes, “that [the 
objects of human knowledge] are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such 
as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas 
formed by help of memory and imagination.”90  
And as several of these [ideas] are observed to accompany each other, they come to 
be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a 
certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go 
together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple.91 
 
                                                
89 The large preponderance of Berkeley scholars agree that this is his official view. I can think of only two who 
explicitly reject this line. Winkler argues for a phenomenalist interpretation on which it is more accurate to say 
that, “objects supervene on ideas, instead of standing in the relation of identity to distinct collections of them.” 
See Winkler (1989) 198-9. In a very different vein, Marc Hight argues that, “the tables and chairs that we 
perceive are considered by us to be single ideas that signify collections of sensory ideas.” See Hight (2007) 105. 
90 PHK §1. 
91 Ibid. 
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These ideas, he maintains, cannot exist without the mind. He even claims this is “what every 
body will allow.”92 So, very early on in the Principles, Berkeley is prepared to assert of 
“houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects,” that they are merely “the 
things we perceive by sense,” and that we perceive nothing “besides our own ideas or 
sensations.”93  
 This brief sketch of an Idealist account of sensible objects raises a number of issues, 
however. Sensible objects are collections of ideas—but collections of which ideas? Whose 
ideas? How do these ideas get collected? And who does the collecting? These are difficult 
questions to answer; Berkeley’s positive account of sensible objects is woefully 
underdeveloped. As we will see, there are two popular ways of interpreting Berkeley on these 
issues. Both ways, I think, fall short as interpretations of Berkeley’s texts and fail to respect 
his philosophical commitments. By far the more popular interpretation, versions of which I 
call variants of the “collection theory,” answer the above questions in a similar way. Sensible 
objects are collections of innumerably many sensible ideas perceived by innumerably many 
minds—your ideas, my ideas, God’s ideas, my cats’ ideas, etc.—all of which are somehow 
linked together by God’s activity or perception (depending on the interpretation) and which 
we learn to associate with one another.  
This type of response, while it provides answers to the questions about the 
membership of the collections and their coming to be collected, is surprisingly ill suited as an 
interpretation of Berkeley. For while he affirms that sensible objects are collections of ideas, 
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93 PHK §4. 
 45 
Berkeley also says very often that we immediately perceive sensible objects.94 Among 
collection theorists, there is genuine disagreement over whether this is his preferred view. 
George Pappas and Michael Ayers, for example, want to read Berkeley’s statements about 
immediate perception as literally true. Margaret Atherton and George Pitcher, on the other 
hand, hold that on Berkeley’s considered view, our perception of sensible objects involves 
too much of a contribution from the mind to count as immediate perception and instead 
counts as mediate perception, or more accurately, perception by suggestion. Let us call this 
issue—whether sensible objects are perceived immediately or mediately—the Puzzle of 
Immediacy.  
 
2.3: THE PUZZLE OF IMMEDIACY 
 Much of the debate over the Puzzle of Immediacy concerns what exactly Berkeley means 
by ‘perceive’ when applied to sensible objects and, somewhat less so, about what it means to 
perceive something immediately. So it seems to be agreed on both sides that to perceive an 
idea immediately is to perceive it without the aid of an intermediate idea—that is, without 
the idea being suggested to the mind by some other idea—and without any kind of 
inference.95 And it seems agreed on both sides that some perception—in particular, 
perception of some members of collections—is immediate.96 What is in dispute, then, is 
whether the immediate perception of some members of a collection of ideas (that is, a 
                                                
94 The list is extensive. See, for example, NB 427a; TVV §§9, 11; PHK §38, 95; Dialogues pp. 174-5, 180, 183, 
194, 203, 209, 215, 230, 262.  
95 Both Pappas and Atherton seem to understand immediacy in this way. Moreover, they share a similar view 
about the membership of collections. Yet they differ on the question of whether collections are immediately 
perceived. See, for example, Pappas (2000, 11) and Atherton (2008, 110-1). I will discuss the 
mediate/immediate perception distinction more fully shortly.  
96 See, for example, Atherton (2008, 108) and Pappas (2000, 191).  
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sensible object) is sufficient for the immediate perception of the collection (object) itself, 
since it is universally accepted that such collections contain as members more ideas than 
those which are immediately perceived at a given time, by a given mind.  
 Pappas thinks immediate perception of some sufficient number of members of a 
collection is sufficient for immediate perception of the collection itself; or rather, that 
immediate perception of some members is enough to count as immediate perception of the 
collection.97 For Pappas, “if S immediately perceives a cluster of ideas O, and the ideas in the 
cluster are constituents of the physical object R, then S will also immediately perceive R.”98 
So, even though right now I am only immediately perceiving the front of my computer 
monitor, since the ideas I perceive immediately are constituents of the entire collection that 
is the computer monitor, I am thereby immediately perceiving the monitor itself.  
 Atherton, however, has given good reasons to think that nothing is immediately 
perceived beyond what Berkeley calls the “proper objects” of perception. Proper perception 
is invoked by Berkeley primarily in his works on vision in order to distinguish the ways in 
which we can be said to see, for example, colors and distance. “The proper immediate 
objects of vision,” Berkeley writes, “is light, in all its modes and variations, various colours in 
kind, in degree, in quantity.”99 A man born blind and made to see as an adult—one of 
Berkeley’s favorite tropes—would perceive these colors immediately but would not perceive 
them as being at a distance or as being signs of tangible objects at a distance; “he would 
neither perceive nor imagine any resemblance or connexion between these visible objects 
                                                
97 See Pappas (2000, p. 176). See also Pappas (1985, p. 204) and (1982, p. 7). 
98 Ibid., p. 12.  
99 TVV §44, 1:266. 
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and those perceived by feeling.”100 These connections he would only learn later through 
repeated experience. The proper objects of perception then are those that would still have 
been perceived by some sense had that sense been “first conferred on us.”101 But since we 
only learn through experience that the proper objects of perception are reliably connected 
with other sensible ideas—that is, since we only learn through experience that the ideas 
immediately perceived are constituents in larger collections of ideas—we do not immediately 
perceive physical objects.102  
 It is hard to be satisfied with either interpretation. Atherton’s account, though subtle and 
almost certainly correct about the objects of immediate perception being the proper objects 
of perception, runs directly afoul of too many texts where Berkeley asserts unambiguously 
that sensible objects are immediately perceived. Pappas’s account is superior on that point, 
but only by an ad hoc extension of immediate perception according to which immediate 
perception of some members of a collection counts as immediate perception of the collection. 
Unfortunately for Pappas, Berkeley nowhere says that one’s immediate perception of some 
members of a collection is sufficient to count as immediate perception of the whole 
collection (most of whose members one does not perceive immediately, if at all).  
 Unlike Atherton and Pappas, however, I think the solution to this puzzle is not to be 
found by looking into what Berkeley means by ‘perceive’ when applied to sensible objects, 
but by looking more closely at what Berkeley means by ‘sensible objects.’ As Jonathan 
Bennett notes, if we go by an ordinary understanding of ‘perceive’ and ‘collection’, we’re led 
                                                
100 Ibid. See also NTV §§110 and 128 and DHP 204. 
101 Atherton (2008, p. 113). See DHP 204.  
102 Atherton (2008, p. 114-5). The term “physical object” is Atherton’s, which I gather she intends to be 
synonymous with Berkeley’s “sensible object”. 
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to the answer that to perceive a collection is to perceive every member of it; likewise, to 
immediately perceive a collection of ideas is to immediately perceive every member of it.103 Of 
course, neither Bennett nor Pappas nor Atherton is prepared to accept that as Berkeley’s 
view. Both Atherton and Pappas agree, “even the most dedicated realist does not suppose 
that we are perceiving absolutely all of a physical object whenever we look at it.”   
 I want to argue, however, that Berkeley is just such an über-dedicated realist about 
sensible objects, at least when we properly understand what he means by ‘sensible objects’. 
We should not take Berkeley’s claims about immediate perception as a hurdle over which an 
account of Berkeleian sensible objects must pass, but as a guide to what Berkeley thinks 
“sensible objects” are in the first place.  
 What I propose and defend in the remainder of this chapter is an alternative view 
neglected by both Atherton and Pappas: that sensible objects are both collections of ideas 
and immediately perceived in the strict sense. That is, the collections of ideas that are sensible 
objects are collections of just those immediately perceived ideas—those ideas, in particular, 
that are signified by particular sensible object name-tokens.  
 
2.4: A SIMPLE CASE OF MODUS PONENS 
 I have already mentioned that Berkeley frequently asserts that we immediately perceive 
sensible objects. Here are the best examples of his doing so:  
“By a sensible object I understand that which is properly perceived by sense. Things 
properly perceived by sense are immediately perceived.” 
 
“The objects of sense, being things immediately perceived, are otherwise called 
ideas.” 
 
                                                
103 Bennett (2001, p. 172) 
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PHILONOUS: “[S]ensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by 
sense. … [Sensible things] are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or 
combinations of sensible qualities.” 
 
PHILONOUS: “Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; …”104 
 
Atherton claims that Berkeley’s texts are ambiguous on the question of whether we 
immediately perceive sensible objects such that “no single ‘smoking gun’ quotation can settle 
the matter.”105 One smoking gun text may not settle the matter, but I think this small arsenal 
of them does. Berkeley does think sensible objects are immediately perceived. What then does 
it mean to perceive something immediately?106 
 On this, Berkeley is more liable to cite examples than to provide a definition. Only 
sounds are immediately perceived by hearing.107 Only light and colors are immediately 
perceived by sight.108 What Berkeley calls “tangible qualities” are the immediate objects of 
the tactile sense.109 To the extent that Berkeley offers a definition, it is cast in largely negative 
terms. We are told that non-immediate perception—hereafter mediate perception—“must be 
by the means of some other idea,” but the notion of immediate perception is left 
undefined.110 Here too Berkeley prefers an example:  
“[F]or instance, the passions which are in the mind of another are of themselves to 
me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by sight, though not immediately, yet 
by means of the colours they produce in the countenance. We often see the shame 
                                                
104 Respectively, TVV §9, §11; 3D 175, 209. 
105 Atherton (2008a) 108. 
106 I will follow Atherton’s (2008a) treatment closely here since I think she characterizes immediate perception 
exactly right, but combines this with the wrong account of sensible objects and concludes that Berkeley denies 
sensible objects are immediately perceived.  
107 TVV §9.  
108 NTV §128. 
109 3D 2:175. See also NTV §45. 
110 NTV §9.  
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or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or 
pale.”111 
  
So I may say I “see” the shame or fear another person feels even though, being an emotion 
“to me invisible,” the shame or fear itself is not perceived by sight. Rather, it is suggested to 
the mind by visually perceived cues.112 Unlike the visual perception of colors and light, 
however, this perception (of the emotion) by suggestion has to be learned through 
experience. According to Berkeley, there is no necessary connection between the color and 
the emotion (or between the sensation of one’s eyes turning and focusing and the idea of 
distance that these sensations suggest). Rather, because red face-perceptions are observed to 
regularly accompany thoughts about angry emotions, “there has grown an habitual or 
customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas, so that the mind no sooner 
perceives [the one]… but it withal perceives [the other] which was wont to be connected 
with that sensation: just as upon hearing a certain sound, the idea is immediately suggested to 
the understanding which custom had united with it.”113 Given these texts, a first 
approximation at a definition of immediate perception is this:  
Immediate perception is perception of an idea(s) that occurs without an 
intermediary. 
 
Seeing color, hearing sound, and feeling warmth are all examples of immediate perception 
since, paradigmatically, our seeing (or hearing, or feeling) is not necessarily preceded or 
attended by another perception. This is to be distinguished from mediate perception; cases 
                                                
111 Ibid. 
112 This leaves open the question of exactly what is thereby suggested. One possibility is that Berkeley holds a 
sort of proto-Humean account of sympathy on which the perception of another person’s red face triggers the 
production of the emotions of anger or fear in the perceiver. Another reading is that the perception of another 
person’s red face suggests to the mind an imagination of the red-faced person, say, shouting or otherwise 
behaving angrily. My own sense is that the latter is the more plausible Berkeleian view, but Berkeley’s texts are 
disappointingly mute on the matter.  
113 NTV §17. I take this to be more evidence that Berkeley holds the hybrid ideational theory. 
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in which, by the immediate perception of, say, the blush of color on someone’s face, another 
idea—say, an emotion—is suggested to the mind. In such a case, we say we see the anger or 
shame, but strictly speaking, all we see is the color of the visage. 
 What in our experience would count as immediately perceived, and what not? Here again 
Atherton is very helpful for she points us to what she calls the “first conferred” criterion. 
Ideas that are immediately perceived by a given sense are those only that “would have been 
perceived, in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us.”114 Although the 
“first conferred” criterion appears only once and in the Dialogues, perhaps the best way of 
seeing it at work in Berkeley’s philosophy is to look back at the New Theory of Vision. There, 
Berkeley introduces the thought experiment of the man born blind and made to see as an 
adult. It is crucial to Berkeley’s account of vision that the man born blind would not, at first 
sight, “see” anything at a distance.115 Nor would he “see” which of two objects was a cube 
and which a sphere, despite knowing how to distinguish them by touch.116  
 It is not that the man born blind would not perceive the same visual ideas that any 
normally sighted person in his position would. In a perfectly natural sense, the man born 
blind and made to see as an adult sees exactly what we all see. Rather, what he lacks is the 
ability to appropriately associate the new visual ideas he perceives with the tactile ideas he is 
already familiar with. In Berkeley’s parlance, he has yet to learn that his visual ideas are signs 
of tactile ideas—he does not understand the “tangible meaning” of his visual ideas.117 So, as 
familiar as he is with the words “sphere” and “cube”, and with the tactile ideas that he uses 
                                                
114 3D 2:204. See also Atherton (2008a) 113. 
115 NTV §41. 
116 This is Berkeley’s (and Locke’s) answer to the famous Molyneux problem, likely the inspiration for the trope 
of the man born blind.  
117 See Atherton (2008a) 114. 
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these words to describe, he as yet does not know how these words apply to visual 
phenomena. Thus, Berkeley: 
[A] man blind from his birth would not, at first sight, denominate any thing he saw 
by the names he had been used to appropriate to ideas of touch[.] Cube, sphere, 
table are words he has known applied to things perceivable by touch, but to things 
perfectly intangible he never knew them applied.118 
 
It is in this sense—insofar as he is unable to apply the words “sphere” and “cube” to his 
visual ideas or connect together his visual ideas with their tactile meanings—that the man 
born blind and made to see still fails to “see” the sphere or the cube. 
 To the man born blind and made to see, the visible world is at first a blooming, buzzing 
confusion. But it is no less blooming or buzzing for us, it is merely less confusing. The man 
born blind and made to see is confronted with all the same visual ideas that normally sighted 
people perceive. This passes the “first conferred” criteria, so such ideas are the proper 
objects of sight and are immediately perceived. Occurrently perceived visual ideas are 
immediately perceived. The ideas that these visual ideas stand as signs for—a tactile cube or 
sphere, say—are then only mediately perceived by sight.  
 Up to this point, Atherton and I are (I think) in complete agreement. We agree on what 
it means for ideas to be perceived immediately. We agree that in any case of perceiving a 
sensible object, some of the members of the collection of ideas that is the object are perceived 
immediately. And we both agree (I think) that the man born blind and made to see does 
indeed perceive immediately some visual ideas that other people would perceive as members 
of sphere- or cube-collections—that is, ideas that other people would call by the names 
“sphere” or “cube”—, but that he fails to apprehend their tactile associations and remains 
ignorant, at first sight, of how to apply the names “sphere” or “cube” to what he sees. 
                                                
118 NTV §135. 
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Where we part company is on the membership of the collections that make up sensible 
objects.  
 I want to take Berkeley at his word and use what he says about immediate perception to 
better understand what his account of sensible objects is. If we take at face value Berkeley’s 
claims that sensible objects—which are nothing but collections of ideas—are immediately 
perceived, and if we accept that only the proper objects of sense—colors and light, in the 
case of vision—are immediately perceived, then we have a strong prima facie case that the 
collections of ideas that Berkeley calls sensible objects do not contain any ideas that are not 
immediately perceived, regardless of what other ideas these may suggest to the mind. If we 
take what Berkeley says on these two matters seriously, then it follows rather simply that 
sensible objects are perceived immediately, though it does require that we understand the 
collections of ideas that Berkeley calls “sensible objects” in a dramatically different way than 
scholars have done so traditionally. 
 But Atherton sees modus tollens in what looks (to me) to be a simple case of modus ponens, 
for she concludes that if we accept her view of immediate perception, “the conclusion is 
unavoidable that physical objects are not immediately perceived because we cannot perceive 
physical objects when our senses are first conferred upon us.” As I’ve already mentioned, in 
a sense she is right: the man born blind and made to see cannot, at first sight, “see” the sphere 
or the cube. But it is unclear whether this sense in which we cannot perceive sensible objects 
when our sense are first conferred on us is a sense that threatens Berkeley’s claims that we 
nevertheless perceive objects immediately. I will argue that it is not. 
 Here is the premise that motivates Atherton’s modus tollens:  
The ideas that belong in the collection that constitute wood, fire, water, etc. are the 
ones that we reliably come to expect will be present, when we have been presented 
with an initial subset of these ideas. It is this set of reliable expectations that 
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constitutes the meaning suggested by immediate perceptions and that results in our 
calling these collections by one name.119 
 
If it is true that the collections of ideas that Berkeley calls sensible objects include ideas other 
than those immediately perceived, then I think Atherton is right that we cannot be said to 
perceive objects immediately. I will even concede the point for the purposes of this paper: if 
the collections of ideas that Berkeley calls sensible objects include ideas that are not 
immediately perceived, then it is false that that object is perceived immediately, and therefore 
false that “sensible objects are all immediately perceivable.” But why should we think this is 
true? It is not because Berkeley anywhere clearly says as much. 
 As already noted, Berkeley says disappointingly little about the collections of ideas he 
identifies with sensible objects. It is as a result of this, I think, that nearly every scholar has 
succumbed to the temptation to infer an account of these collections from what they already 
somehow “know” about the “nature” of “sensible objects.” So, for example, suppose Alice 
and Betty are standing in the Louvre in Paris, admiring the Venus de Milo. Since it’s just 
commonsense that Alice and Betty are seeing the very same sculpture, and that the sculpture 
is (in Berkeleian terms) just a collection of ideas, we should conclude that Alice and Betty 
each perceive the very same collection of ideas; i.e., the collection includes ideas perceived by 
both Alice and Betty.120 By parity of reasoning, we can make similar inferences about the 
diachronic re-identification of collections, their membership, and of course, their continuity. 
The result would be the standard collection theory, as described above by Atherton. Here 
also is how Pitcher sums up such a view: “Berkeley presumably holds that the collection of 
ideas that constitutes a so-called physical object (an apple, say) includes not only appropriate 
                                                
119 Atherton (2008a) 114. 
120 Even this approach leaves open the question of whether the collection includes ideas perceived privately by 
each of Alice and Betty, or whether they both perceive in common some members of the collection.   
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ideas of sense that exist, or may exist, in one’s own mind, but also ideas of sense that exist, 
or may exist, in other people’s (or animals’) minds.”121 No explicit argument is given for the 
claim that the collection of ideas that is the apple includes ideas perceived by various minds 
at various times (as well as ideas that only might be perceived). But it doesn’t seem unfair to 
read Pitcher’s “presumably” as shorthand for the kind of reasoning I am describing here.122 
 It is a mistake, however, to assume that Berkeley shared our way of thinking about these 
things. For one, what we—21st century philosophers—might think about sensible objects is 
no sure guide to what Berkeley himself may have thought on the matter. More importantly, 
however, if we read Berkeley as proceeding from the familiar (“sensible objects”) to the 
relatively obscure (collections), he leaves his audience knowing nothing more about the 
nature of sensible objects than they started out with. But Berkeley is trying to teach his 
audience something that they do not already know. And the principal lesson he hopes his 
audience will learn about sensible objects is that they are not what his materialist 
contemporaries claim they are. Sensible objects are not the perceptually independent, 
materially substantial things of academic philosophers. They are mind-dependent; their esse is 
percipi; they are immediately perceived, not the unperceived causes of our perceptions; they 
are, in fact, words in a divine language. As Berkeley writes, he is, “not for changing things 
into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception … I take 
to be the real things themselves.”123 So, between “facts” about sensible objects given in 
ordinary language and what his theory of ideas reveals about the nature of our experience, 
                                                
121 Pitcher (1986, 102). 
122 And at any rate, it is not hard to suppose this type of reasoning is at work in the background of numerous 
interpretations. 
123 3D, 2: 244.  
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Berkeley takes the latter to be prior, leaving the former to be interpreted within the 
constraints of the theory. The task for us, then, is not to learn how this thing as I normally think 
of it is perceived immediately, but to learn how to think of this thing given what Berkeley tells us 
about immediate perception. 
 
2.5: SENSIBLE OBJECTS AS ‘SENSIBLE OBJECTS’ 
 For Berkeley, ‘sensible object’ is a term of art. What kind of thing does Berkeley mean to 
pick out with it? Here is a quick summary of claims Berkeley makes about them. ‘Sensible 
objects’ are collections of ideas.124 They are immediately perceived.125 Their constituent 
members—ideas of the different sense modalities—are of “entirely distinct and 
heterogeneous” kinds, meaning that there are neither causal relations between them, nor any 
necessary epistemological relations.126 The connections between, say, a given visual idea and 
a tactile idea are fundamentally arbitrary.127 As a result of this, the collections themselves are 
(to some degree) the product of the mind’s activity, which products we can suppose to differ 
from mind to mind owing to different learned associations.128 These heterogeneous ideas, 
which we have learned to associate with each other, are then collectively marked by one 
name and thereby “reputed” or “accounted” one unified thing. Thus Berkeley: 
[A]s several of these [ideas of sense] are observed to accompany each other, they 
come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a 
                                                
124 PHK §1. 
125 See, for example, NB 427a; TVV §§9, 11; PHK §38, 95; Dialogues pp. 174-5, 180, 183, 194, 203, 209, 215, 
230, 262. 
126 See PHK 44 and throughout NTV and TVV.  
127 NTV §§39-40, 43.  
128 See especially NTV 110-111. 
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certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go 
together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name ‘apple’.  
 
[A] cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas 
perceived by various senses: which are united into one thing (or have one name given them) 
by the mind; because they are observed to attend each other.129 
 
What these and other passages make clear is that the collections of ideas that are called 
sensible objects are collections of fundamentally distinct ideas that are collected together and 
attributed a kind of unity by the perceiving mind. Just as importantly, this attribution of unity 
is deeply tied to the use of sensible object names. How this is so will become clearer shortly. 
 This last point about names, though, should seem odd already to anyone who is prone to 
think of Berkeleian sensible objects in “commonsense” terms.130 Surely what a sensible 
object is is prior to what we call it! And yet it seems to be Berkeley’s position that these 
collections are what they are in virtue of the names given to them. 
[A]s several of these [ideas of sense] are observed to accompany each other, they 
come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a 
certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go 
together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name ‘apple’.  
 
[A] cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas 
perceived by various senses: which are united into one thing (or have one name given them) 
by the mind; because they are observed to attend each other.131 
 
I think it is natural to read both passages as asserting that the act of naming just is the 
collection’s being “reputed as” or “united into” one thing. This is the first sense in which 
Berkeley’s account of sensible objects is nominalist. 
                                                
129 Respectively, PHK 1 2:41, 3D 2:249; my emphasis in each. 
130 Here I mean commonsense by contemporary standards, where the conception called to mind by the term 
“sensible object” is a conception of a hunk of matter, composed of millions of tiny atoms, all of which exists 
independently of our perceptions. However, I think it is very tempting and common for scholars to import 
some of this contemporary commonsense notion of sensible objects backwards onto Berkeley. More on this in 
Chapter 4.  
131 Respectively, PHK 1 2:41, 3D 2:249; emphasis added in each. 
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 The proponent of the collections account might attempt to take this claim on board 
without trouble. Surely, even if the attribution of a name somehow makes the collection into 
a unit, this still means that the collections must contain more than just those immediately 
perceived ideas! If ‘Venus de Milo’ names a collection of ideas, it names only one such 
collection! There is, after all, only one Venus de Milo.  
 But just as it is a mistake to presume Berkeleian ‘sensible objects’ are like what we might 
think physical objects are, it would be a mistake to presume that Berkeleian names work like 
we might think names do. In particular, when Berkeley writes that sensible objects are 
“marked by one name,” it would be a mistake to presume that he means one name-type—
‘Venus de Milo’—such that every time an instance of the name is used, it names the same 
one thing. For Berkeley, there is no one name ‘Venus de Milo’, in this sense, and so no one 
collection which each use of ‘Venus de Milo’ names. This is the sense in which Berkeley’s 
nominalism is radical. 
 Names and other words, Berkeley says, are modifications of light or sound, arbitrarily 
appointed by humans to be signs of “their several meanings.”132 Here, it would be easy to 
think that the semantic unit of Berkeley’s concern is the word-type and that the infinitely 
various word-types each have “their several meanings.” But this cannot be what Berkeley 
means, for three reasons. First, we can make no sense of the claim that words are 
modifications of light or sound if we take Berkeley to mean word-types here. The word-type 
‘table’ is not a modification of light or sound—only particular tokens of the word-type are 
uttered (a modification of sound) or inscribed (a modification of light).  
 Even if we were to accept that Berkeley means, “word(-types) are (types of) 
modifications of light or sound,” Berkeley’s anti-abstractionism gives us a deeper reason to 
                                                
132 TVV 40, 1:265. See also Winkler (2005, 128).  
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read him as being concerned with word-tokens, not word-types. There is nothing in the least 
bit problematic about work-tokens. Indeed, as modifications of light or sound, they are 
themselves just unusual sensible objects. A word-type, however, could only be an abstraction 
in Berkeley’s system.133 The closest one might come to something like a word-type, for 
Berkeley, would be a word-token with what we might call general signification. I might say, 
for example, “the word ‘table’ can be used to denote flat-surfaced pieces of furniture or sets 
of data.” In Berkeleian terms, this particular token of ‘table’ is meant to signify a number of 
ideas; furniture-table ideas as well as data-table ideas. If upon hearing or reading the sample 
sentence, the hearer or reader is brought to think of both furniture-tables and data-tables in 
association with the token ‘table’, then all is more or less fine from a semantic standpoint. 
Note, however, that this story requires nothing more than particular word-tokens and token 
ideas. We do not need to take on board either word- or idea-types.  
 Finally, Berkeley’s own illustration, intended to help us understand how “words become 
general,” is an illustration of how a particular concrete example of dividing a line equally can 
be employed to cover similar but distinct (particular) cases. The geometer draws a line of a 
certain length, “which in itself is a particular line is nevertheless with regard to its signification 
general.”134 It is because this particular line can suggest to the mind an indefinite number of 
other particular lines that the demonstration becomes general. Likewise, what we might 
describe as a putatively “general” word is, for Berkeley a particular word-token that is, “made 
                                                
133 Berkeley is self-consciously aware of this subtle point, for he notes that names of sensible objects are used as 
names of themselves. “It is customary,” Berkeley writes at NTV §140, “to call written words, and the things they 
signify, by the same name: For words not being regarded in their own nature, or otherwise than as they are 
marks of things, it had been superfluous, and beside the design of language, to have given them names distinct 
from those of the things marked by them.” 
134 PHK Intro 12, emphasis added. 
 60 
to represent or stand for other particular ideas.”135 By way of this general signification, 
“things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal.”136 
Again, it is clear that Berkeley is talking about work-tokens here; only a word-token, 
inscribed or spoken, can be “in its own nature particular” and yet made general by signifying 
any number of other particular ideas. Generality of the sort that one might advert to word-
types to explain is, for Berkeley, cashed out in terms of token-token(s) signification.  
 This general signification needs to be clarified. At first glance, one might take Berkeley 
here to mean that a word or a sign with general signification actually signifies generally—that 
is, actually stands for an indefinite number of particular ideas—as it is used; that a word with 
general signification signifies, somehow, a recall set of associated ideas. But this can’t be, 
since it would be psychologically impossible for the mind to actually consider the indefinite 
number of particular ideas that might be suggested by a word, nor is a recall set anything 
more than another kind of abstraction. Rather, we must understand this general signification 
as follows: though a word might signify any of an indefinite number of ideas, a particular 
word with general signification in fact only signifies some one particular idea of this larger 
class.  
 If this is right, it points us to a radical new understanding of what Berkeley means when 
he says that sensible objects are united into one thing by the attribution of a name, for it 
suggests that the collections of ideas that are called sensible objects are just those ideas that 
are signified by sensible object name-tokens. Let us see how this suggestion can be employed 
in a particular case. 
 
                                                
135 PHK Intro 12, 2:32. 
136 PHK Intro 15, 2:34.   
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2.6: RADICAL NOMINALISM IN ACTION 
 One of the most difficult passages that concerns the perception of sensible objects, and 
one that is used to support the view that Berkeleian sensible objects are not immediately 
perceived, is the famous coach passage from the New Theory of Vision. Here it is:  
Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the casement 
and see it; I walk out and enter into it; thus, common speech would incline one to 
think I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless 
certain, the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different and distinct from 
each other; but having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of 
as one and the same thing.137 
 
At first glance, it appears that Berkeley is telling us that the coach is a collection of ideas 
perceived at different times by sight, touch and hearing. But the point of the passage seems 
clearly to be that, despite what “common speech” might incline us to think, we certainly do not 
perceive one thing—i.e., one collection—by sight, hearing, and touch. So much so that, “if 
we take a close and accurate view of things, it must be acknowledged that we never see and 
feel one and the same object.”138  
 If the ideas we perceive by sight and touch are indeed fundamentally distinct, why does 
common speech incline us to think (falsely) that they are the same? I submit that the answer 
relies on the radically nominalist account. Berkeley hears something, i.e., he immediately 
perceives some auditory ideas. He signifies these auditory ideas like so: “I hear a coach drive 
along the street.” Later, he sees something, i.e., he immediately perceives some visual ideas. 
He signifies these visual ideas like so: “I look through the casement and see [the coach].” 
Shortly afterward, Berkeley feels something, i.e., he immediately perceives some tactile ideas 
that he signifies like so: “I walk out and enter into [the coach].” Each of these episodes of 
                                                
137 NTV §46. 
138 NTV §48. 
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perception is distinct. In each case, the ideas Berkeley perceives he perceives immediately. In 
each case, what Berkeley signifies by the name ‘the coach’ are just some ideas perceived 
immediately, and so in each case, what is so signified is thereby reputed to be one thing, one 
‘sensible object’. And it is because, in common speech, “the same name” is used to signify 
these different objects that we are inclined to think of these distinct collections of 
immediately perceived ideas—these different sensible objects—as somehow one. But it is 
“nevertheless certain” that these collections, these objects, are “widely different and distinct 
from each other”. This will have to do for now; I will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
 Two issues need to be addressed: (1) how the mind comes to collect together and signify 
some of the ideas it immediately perceives with a name-token, and (2) how and why the 
mind comes to use similar name-tokens to signify distinct collections of immediately 
perceived ideas. 
 The first of these is, for lack of a better description, Berkeley’s Kantian problem, and it is 
indeed a problem. Our sensory ideas are “perpetually fleeting and variable,” and yet 
somehow we convert this experiential flux into order. It might seem at first that a standard 
view such as Atherton’s has as good an answer to this problem as Berkeley can give. We 
experience a flux of sensory ideas. Over time, we come to pick out regularities in the flux, 
and begin attaching names to those regularities. These regularities are the result of the laws 
of nature—God’s willing that finite minds perceive a somewhat orderly flux of sensory ideas. 
But this is no answer to the Kantian problem since it presupposes exactly the type of ability 
that is at question. In order to recognize regularities within the sensory flux, it cannot be a 
purely undifferentiated flux; it must be, in some way, already encapsulated. A judgment that 
this is the same as (or otherwise related to) that presupposes an ability to pick out this and that 
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from the flux. And it is precisely this ability that Berkeley does not explain. But this is a 
problem for any interpretation of Berkeley and cuts equally against Atherton’s view as mine.  
 While this story about perceived regularities fails as an answer to the Kantian problem, it 
does provide an answer to the second question, namely, how and why the mind comes to 
use similar name-tokens to signify distinct collections of immediately perceived ideas. 
However we manage to first pick out units from the perceptual flux, we soon learn how 
these fleeting and distinct collections are related together, spatially, temporally, or by 
resemblance. But giving each distinct collection its own unique name would result in an 
“endless number or confusion of names [and] render language impracticable.”139  
“Therefore to avoid this as well as other inconveniencies which are obvious upon a 
little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or 
by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed to 
have some connexion in Nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all 
which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing.”140 
 
This passage might appear to be a proof-text against the radically nominalist account. Isn’t 
Berkeley plainly saying that ideas perceived at different times by different senses are part of 
one thing—one collection—signified by one name?  
I think not; appearances, like language, can be deceiving. The larger context of the passage is 
perfectly in line with the radically nominalist account. The passage begins with Berkeley 
precisely denying that we see the same object that we feel, even denying that we see the same 
object with the naked eye as we do with a microscope. It concludes in much the same way: 
“Hence it follows that when I examine by my other senses a thing I have seen, it is 
not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one 
sense not being perceived by the other senses. And when I look through a 
microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes, 
                                                
139 3D 2:245. See also Draft Introduction to the Principles, Works, 2:128. 
140 Ibid. 
 64 
the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former.” 
 
Here, as with the coach passage, I take Berkeley to be making the same point. The objects 
we perceive by sense—‘sensible objects’—are collections of constantly changing immediately 
perceived ideas, and so there are innumerably many such collections each perceived only for 
a moment. But for pragmatic purposes, we use tokens of the “same” name—“one” name—
to pick out many different collections: we call the round thing we see, the smooth thing we 
feel, and the sweet thing we taste each of them ‘apple’. So, though we might be tempted by 
common ways of speech to regard these similarly-named collections as somehow one, if we 
pay attention not to the signs but the ideas thereby signified, we will see that they are 
nevertheless distinct collections of ideas immediately perceived.  
 I conclude that Berkeley is best understood as holding this radically nominalist 
account of sensible objects. If we accept that the collections of ideas that Berkeley calls 
sensible objects are collections of immediately perceived ideas, then it follows 
straightforwardly that sensible objects are immediately perceived. We can acknowledge that 
the man born blind and made to see fails to “see” the sphere or the cube without admitting 
that perception of the sphere and cube fails the “first conferred” criterion. As we have 
already seen, the man born blind perceives all the visual ideas that a normally sighted person 
perceives. His only failure is the ability to apply names to his visual ideas, not a failure to 
perceive them. However, since there is nothing to the collection of ideas that a normally 
sighted person would call “sphere” beyond the ideas the man born blind also perceives when 
his sense is first conferred upon him, there is no reason to think that the collection is not 
likewise perceived immediately and in exactly the same sense that the proper objects of 
perception are perceived immediately. On this reading, Berkeley’s claims that we immediately 
perceive sensible objects are strictly true (which Atherton must deny), and true univocally of 
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sensible objects as well as the proper objects of perception (which Pappas and Ayers deny). 
 Not only does the radically nominalist interpretation mesh with the hybrid ideational 
theory and allow us to take Berkeley at face value in claiming that sensible objects are 
immediately perceived, it provides the resources for finally cutting through the Gordian 
Knot of Berkeley’s metaphysics. For if the being of sensible objects is nothing but their 
being perceived, what are we to think about putative objects that are unperceived? Do they 
simply cease to exist? As with the Puzzle of Immediacy, the so-called Problem of Continuity 
has generated a rough dichotomy among scholars, between proponents of some version of 
the collection theory and those (such as Winkler) who read Berkeley as a sort of 
phenomenalist with respect to unperceived sensible objects. In the next chapter, we will 
explore the Problem of Continuity, some of its proposed solutions, and see how the radically 
nominalist account of sensible objects can be used to dissolve the problem.  
CHAPTER 3: THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY 
 
 Every beginner philosophy student learns that Berkeley denies the existence of matter 
and holds instead that the existence of sensible objects consists in being perceived. She also 
learns that Berkeley holds that sensible objects exist continuously, even during periods where 
no finite mind perceives them, since God always perceives them. It is such a commonplace 
that few scholars think the basic issue worthy of much consideration. In this paper, however, 
I argue that this story about Berkeley is fundamentally wrong. The business about God 
preserving objects in existence by eternally perceiving them is an answer Berkeley does not 
give to a question that he does not ask.  
 The interpretive story that I mean to be challenging here is not told only to beginning 
students. 141 Scholarly commentaries offer more detailed accounts of how sensible objects 
continue to exist, sometimes claiming unperceived existence is a lesser form of existence, 
sometimes downplaying God’s perception. But interpretations that call into question the 
basic view that Berkeleian sensible objects do (obviously!) exist continuously in the gaps 
between the episodes of their being perceived by finite minds are exceedingly rare.142 On the 
                                                
141 Though, the prevalence and naïveté of this view among non-scholars is quite striking. Take, for example, 
this very brief “intellectual biography” from a Berkeley fan page on Facebook: “Bishop of the Church of 
Ireland, Berkeley was an influential philosopher, famous for his theory summed up in ‘esse est percipi’, ‘to be is 
to be perceived.’ Believing that we can only know directly the ideas of objects, and not abstractions thereof, 
such as matter. This leads to Berkeley’s ‘Great Perceiver’ argument, which states that in order for the world to 
exist, there must be one who sees everything all of the time. This being, for Berkeley, is God.” 
142 Only Jonathan Bennett comes to mind. In his Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (1971, 171), he argues 
that Berkeley, “does not regularly assume that objects exist when no human perceives them; he is not much 
interested in whether they do” (my emphasis). The claims that Berkeley does not assume sensible objects exist 
continuously or that he does not assume this regularly are, of course, consistent with his maintaining they do so 
anyway. Bennett rehearses this same line in his (2001, 180-188, esp. 181).  
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contrary, anything containing a summary of Berkeley’s philosophy is likely to contain a 
passage something like this:  
 
Berkeley does not deny that there are bodies or that they continue to exist when he 
stops perceiving them; but his belief in their continued existence clearly depends on 
his belief that other perceivers exist, and especially on his belief that there is an 
infinite spirit who perceives all the bodies that compose the universe.143 
 
Or, again:  
Without a doubt then Berkeley’s official teaching on existence in the mind is that 
objects of sense may go in and out of the small circle of the mind of man, but do not 
thereby go in and out of existence; for they are conserved in the great circle of the 
mind of God. Therefore, the furniture in the room is not reduced to nothing when I 
shut my eyes.144  
 
Both passages seem to express the following line of thought: 
1-A. Bodies are collections of ideas, which exist when and only when they are 
perceived by some mind. 
 
2-A. God always perceives certain ideas (bodies).  
So even though: 
3-A. Some ideas (bodies) are not always perceived by any finite mind. 
It still follows that: 
4-A. Existing bodies need not be perceived by any finite mind; bodies typically 
enjoy a continuous existence even when unperceived by any finite mind.  
 
Let us call the conclusion that bodies continue to exist even when not perceived by any finite 
mind the continuity thesis (CT). More precisely, since bodies are collections of ideas, and since 
Berkeley countenances no infinite minds other than God, let us reformulate the thesis as 
follows: 
                                                
143 McCracken (2002, 446). 
144 Luce (1968, 291-2). 
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CT: Bodies continue to exist even when not perceived by any finite mind because 
they are always perceived by God. 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the view outlined above and expressed in the argument I have 
constructed is not Berkeley’s because Berkeley does not hold CT. As I interpret his texts, 
Berkeley is not committed to CT. It would serve no philosophical purpose for him and 
indeed, his holding it is in many ways inconsistent with the main thrust of his immaterialism 
and other views he does clearly hold.  
 
3.1: A GUIDED TOUR OF THE PROBLEM 
 The CT is a curt expression of three separable theses: that sensible objects exist 
continuously when unperceived by finite minds; that God always perceives sensible objects; 
and that it is because of God’s ever-watchful perception that sensible objects exist 
continuously.145 
 Let us call the first of these the Bare Continuity Thesis (BCT). The thesis that God 
always perceives sensible objects we will call the Omni-Perception Thesis (OPT). We will 
call the thesis that it is because of God’s ever-watchful perception alone that sensible objects 
exist continuously the Perceptual Dependence Thesis (PDT).  
 The most prominent standard interpretations—which fall under what I will call the 
collection theory—and the naïve version of this view prevalent among students accept all 
three. On the collection theory, sensible objects are collections of a huge number of ideas 
perceived by various different minds (including God) at various different times, including 
(depending on the particular interpretation) ideas possibly (but not actually) perceived by 
actual (and possible) minds. For a sensible object to exist is for this collection to exist. But 
                                                
145 These are not carefully distinguished in the secondary literature. My treatment of these owes much to Ken 
Winkler’s comments on an earlier version of this paper.  
 69 
since most of the members of the collection do not exist at any given time, the existence of 
the collection cannot be tied to the existence of all of its members; rather, the collection 
exists if some sufficient number of its members exist, i.e., are perceived by some mind.146 
And an object exists continuously from t1 to t3 just in case a sufficient number of the 
members of the collection that constitutes the object are perceived at all times from t1 to t3. 
If both OPT and PDT are true, then BCT follows straightforwardly.  
 There appear to be texts to support this reading, perhaps none better than this from the 
Third Dialogue: 
When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in 
particular, but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind 
… There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals 
between the times of my perceiving them … And as the same is true, with regard to 
all other finite created spirits; it necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, 
which knows and comprehends all things.147 
 
Both BCT and OPT find expression here, and PDT seems the most likely way to connect 
the two. It would seem then that the standard collection theory and even the naïve view are 
more or less on the right track. 
 The standard line is not without difficult problems, however. One of these problems 
stems from OPT, for there is some reason to think that, in fact, Berkeley’s God doesn’t 
perceive at all. To be sure, there are places where Berkeley writes about God perceiving, 
though it must be noted that the passage above is not one of them. Earlier in the Second 
                                                
146 Just what counts as a sufficient number of members is, as far as I can tell, not explored in detail in the 
secondary literature.  
147 3D 2:230-1. All references to Berkeley’s works correspond to the nine volume The Works of George Berkeley 
Bishop of Cloyne, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1948-57). For 
works such as the Principles and An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision which are divided into sections, 
references hereafter will include the abbreviation and section number followed by the volume and page 
numbers (e.g., PHK 1, 2:41, or NTV 10, 1:173). References to the Three Dialogues will include just the dialogue, 
volume and page numbers (e.g., 3D 2:227). References to the Notebooks will include notebook (A or B), entry 
number, volume and page number (e.g., NB B165, 1:23). References to Alciphron will include abbreviation, 
dialogue, section number, volume and page number (e.g. A VII:2,  3: 287). 
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Dialogue, however, Philonous distinguishes his view from the materialist’s by invoking just 
such perception language: 
Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they 
believe the being of a God, whereas I on the other side, immediately and necessarily 
conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him.148 
 
However clear this statement might be, a closer look shows that Berkeley is not entirely 
comfortable speaking of God’s perception. There are actually only a handful of places where 
Berkeley uses the term “perceive” or one of its cognates to describe God, and all of these 
occur in the more casually written Three Dialogues.149 He much prefers to speak of God’s 
“knowing” (as he does here) or “comprehending” or merely “having” ideas, without saying 
that these ideas are “perceived.”150 (Moreover, the passages where he does invoke divine 
perception each occur in contexts where Berkeley is trying to respond to claims that his 
philosophy is dangerously heterodoxical. George Thomas takes this apologetic context to 
weaken the case for reading these as explicit endorsements of divine perception.151) 
 Berkeley has a good reason, internal to his philosophy, to resist endorsing the view that 
God perceives, at least not without serious qualification. Perception, he writes, consists in 
the “passive reception of ideas.”152 God, however, is “an impassive, indivisible, purely active 
being” (which is largely why no idea, being purely passive, can represent God).153 For God to 
                                                
148 3D 2:212. 
149 In sections 70-71 of the Principles, Berkeley does indeed mention God’s perception, but only in the process 
of laying out and then criticizing a response to his attacks on matter. Thus, this is not an instance of Berkeley 
invoking (for his own purposes) God’s perception.  
150 See, for example: NB 675; 3D 2:212, 231, 235-6, 248.   
151 See Thomas (1976, 166). 
152 NB 301. See also NB 378, 756.  
153 3D 2:213-4. See also 3D 2:231 and Berkeley’s Nov. 25, 1729 letter to Johnson, Works 2:280. 
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perceive (strictly speaking) would be for God to be in some way passive, which Berkeley 
denies and which would be theologically dangerous to assert. Yet it would be equally 
theologically problematic to deny that God has knowledge of everything and at all times. So, 
Berkeley maintains that God “has” ideas—that he “knows and comprehends” all things—
but it would seem too strong of a move for him to assert strictly that God perceives His 
ideas. If God can’t be said to perceive His ideas, then it cannot be true that He always 
perceives sensible objects (as opposed to knowing them). So, there is a case to be made that 
OPT is not Berkeley’s settled view.154  
 This case against divine perception probably overstates the matter; the view that 
Berkeley’s God does not perceive at all is certainly a minority opinion. But even allowing that 
the relationship between God and whatever ideas He has can be called one of perception, 
this is not enough to ensure OPT or the standard view that sensible objects exist 
continuously in virtue of God’s perception of them. There are two reasons for this. First, 
Berkeley is quite clear that sensible objects are collections of sensible ideas, or more precisely, 
that they are collections of ideas which are only perceived by sense. This is the subject of a 
rather lengthy exchange in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, the conclusion 
of which is that, “sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by 
sense.”155 But Berkeley is equally explicit that God “perceives nothing by sense,” both 
because God has no body, and so no sensory organs, and because to perceive by sense is 
again paradigmatic of the passive reception of ideas.156 So it seems to follow 
                                                
154 The best case against attributing OPT to Berkeley can be found in Thomas (1976).  
155 3D 2:175. 
156 3D 2:241.  
 72 
straightforwardly that God does not perceive sensible objects, whatever other ideas he might 
perceive.  
 One might respond, however, that though God might not perceive ideas by sense, He 
might still perceive ideas of sense, i.e., what Berkeley typically calls sensible qualities; tastes, 
smells, colors, etc. If this were the case, then God might easily be said to perceive sensible 
objects, just not sensorily. This is an intriguing suggestion, however, I do not see that 
Berkeley himself actually considered the view, and moreover, he appears to be committed to 
its denial. First, if “sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense,” 
and if “God perceives nothing by sense,” it seems straightforward that God does not perceive 
sensible objects or ideas, especially given Berkeley’s tendency to use ‘thing’ to refer not just 
to objects, which are collections of ideas, but to single ideas.157 Secondly, a good portion of 
the First Dialogue is aimed at convincing Hylas (and the reader) that sensible qualities such 
as heat and sound are as mind-dependent as sensations of pleasure and pain by arguing that 
such qualities are inseparable from such sensations. Philonous asserts, “this same simple idea 
is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; … the intense heat immediately 
perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.”158 This would have no direct 
bearing on the issue of God’s perception were it not for Berkeley’s explicit denial that God is 
capable of suffering pain.  
[T]hat God, though he knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can 
Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. … [I]t is evident, such a being as this can 
suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at 
all. … God is a pure spirit[.] No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations 
of pain or pleasure in his mind. To know every thing knowable is certainly a 
perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel any thing by sense, is an imperfection.159 
                                                
157 See, for example, NB 644, 656, 657a, and 658. 
158 3D 176, my emphasis. 
159 3D 240-1, my emphasis. 
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If God cannot suffer—that is, feel—pain, and if pain is inseparable from the perception of 
other sensible ideas, then I see no way to maintain that God can nevertheless perceive 
sensible objects which include such sensible ideas as constituents.160  
 There is a second reason that granting that God perceives His ideas in some way will not 
secure BCT, even if one overlooks the problem of how God can perceive sensible objects in 
the first place. For, among the ideas in God’s mind are those of objects and events that do 
not ever actually exist. This seems to generate a dilemma. If being perceived by God is 
sufficient to preserve an actual sensible object in its existence independent of the perception 
of finite minds, then it should be sufficient to ensure the actual existence of all “merely 
possible objects” as well. And if merely possible objects do not exist (in the strict sense) 
despite being ideas in God’s mind, then it is not clear how being perceived by God is enough 
to ensure the continuous existence of actual sensible objects. As George Pitcher writes, on 
the standard line “the kind of existence that Berkeley accords to unperceived objects of this 
world … is precisely the kind that objects in merely possible, but non-actual worlds, have—
e.g., the kind and amount that a purple man with three heads has.”161 It is hard to see, 
though, how anyone concerned about the continuity of unperceived sensible objects would 
be satisfied with the response that they exist in the same manner as three-headed purple 
men. What this suggests is that even if OPT is true, PDT is false; since God perceives ideas 
of both actual and merely possible objects, it cannot be in virtue of His perception alone that 
actual sensible objects continue to exist.  
                                                
160 At any rate, the burden of proof is on the one who claims God perceives sensible ideas even if not by sense. 
For my purposes here, it is enough that Berkeley does not explicitly endorse the view that God perceives sensible 
ideas, whatever other ideas he might perceive.  
161 Pitcher ( 1977, 171-2). See also Winkler (1986, 91-4). 
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 Though divine perception alone may be insufficient for continuity, this does not show 
that it is irrelevant to the matter. As Kenneth Winkler has shown, Berkeley denies that God 
is a blind agent; i.e. for Berkeley, volition presupposes perception. According to Winkler, 
“every volition has an object, content, or specification, and it is this object or specification 
that differentiates between my willing one thing and my willing something else.”162 So, one 
way to distinguish actual sensible objects from merely possible ones is by appealing, not to 
God’s ideas, but to his will. Both actual and merely possible objects are perceived (or known, 
or comprehended) by God, but only the former are willed by God to be perceivable by finite 
minds in particular circumstances. On this line, then, actual sensible objects—“real 
things”—exist independently of finite minds because God wills that finite minds do or would 
perceive them under such and such conditions. This is the phenomenalist interpretation 
championed most notably by Winkler.   
 We have reached the phenomenalist interpretation via a consideration of the faults of the 
standard collection theory. The standard view relies too heavily on divine perception and 
guarantees BCT only by maintaining both OPT and PDT. Of these latter theses OPT may 
be granted, albeit carefully qualified, but the phenomenalist interpretation (rightly) rejects 
PDT. Instead, the phenomenalist maintains that only divine activity is sufficient for the 
existence of sensible objects, both perceived and finitely unperceived. A real sensible object 
exists just in case either God wills that some finite mind does perceive it or that some finite 
mind would perceive it under such and such circumstances. Actual sensible objects can be 
said to exist unperceived just in case a conditional of this latter kind is true, whereas these 
conditionals are false for merely possible sensible objects. And, because of the denial of 
blind agency, when an actual sensible object exists unperceived by finite minds, it is indeed 
                                                
162 Winkler (1986, 85).  
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perceived by the divine mind, since God’s willing that some finite mind would perceive it 
under certain circumstances requires God’s perception of (the object of) his willing. The 
phenomenalist interpretation then accepts BCT and OPT but denies PDT.163 In place of 
PDT, the phenomenalist interpretation accepts that an object exists if and only if God intends 
to cause certain object-ideas in the minds of finite spirits. Let us call this the Volitional 
Dependence Thesis (VDT).  
 To an extent, I think the phenomenalist line is right. There is a good deal of textual 
support in its favor. Berkeley apparently relies on just this sort of phenomenalist line in 
response to questions about the Mosaic story of creation. Presented with the challenge that 
if God perceives the sensible world, He perceives it eternally and so no sense can be made of 
its creation in time, Philonous responds thus: 
“May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that 
things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, 
when God decreed that they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures[?]”164  
 
Not only does Berkeley here hinge the creation of sensible objects on their becoming 
perceptible (and not simply perceived) by finite minds, but this change in perceptibility turns 
on a feature of God’s will—His decreeing it so (or His having decreed it to be so). This is 
just as the phenomenalist would have it.  
 This is not, however, how Berkeley would have it. While the phenomenalist 
interpretation avoids the issues involved with taking God’s perception of sensible objects 
alone to be necessary and sufficient for their continuous existence, it does so at the cost of 
textual fidelity. On the phenomenalist view, a sensible object exists continuously even 
                                                
163 The version of the phenomenalist interpretation I present here is roughly Winkler’s. However, one might 
hold a phenomenalist interpretation without accepting the denial of blind agency. I think accepting the denial 
of blind agency makes the phenomenalist interpretation as compelling as possible, and so I will not deal with 
other versions here. 
164 3D 2:253. 
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though unperceived by any finite mind just in case God wills that a finite mind would 
perceive certain object-ideas under certain circumstances, i.e., if God intends to cause certain 
ideas in finite minds. As Winkler notes, “because God’s intentions do not depend on the 
existence of finite spirits, objects can exist even if we do not.”165 God’s intentions surely 
involve divine ideas, but as we already noted, it is not merely the perception of the ideas that 
guarantees the continuous-while-unperceived-(by finite minds) existence of sensible objects. 
But this shift of focus from divine ideas to divine will correlates with a shift in the 
conception of sensible objects. According to the phenomenalist interpretation, Berkeleian 
sensible objects are not collections of ideas. In Winkler’s own words, “phenomenalism 
dispenses with natural objects without putting anything in their place.”166 He writes: 
Instead of identifying the table in my study with my idea, your idea, God’s idea, or a 
collection of ideas that somehow embraces them all—instead of supplying a 
denotation for the expression ‘the table in my study’—the phenomenalist 
concentrates on statements about the table, and treats them as statements that demand 
no more for their truth than the actual and possible perception of ideas.167 
 
The problem with this approach is that, for Berkeley, sensible objects are precisely collections 
of ideas. The phenomenalist interpretation simply crushes under the weight of the texts 
where Berkeley identifies objects with ideas or collections thereof.168 Most damaging is the 
famous cherry passage: 
I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it:  and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or 
tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, 
tartness, and you take away the cherry. Since it is not a being distinct from 
sensations; a cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas 
                                                
165 Winkler (1986, 95). 
166 Ibid. 83. 
167 Ibid., original emphasis. 
168 See, for starters, PHK 3, 4, 33, 38; 3D 2:235, 262. 
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perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name 
given them) by the mind; because they are observed to attend each other.169  
 
The principal difficulty for the phenomenalist line is that in emphasizing God’s activity and 
grounding the existence of sensible objects in His intentions, it generates an account of 
sensible objects that no longer accommodates Berkeley’s insistence that the esse of sensible 
objects is percipi. On VDT, a sensible object exists just in case God intends that a finite mind 
does (or would) perceive certain ideas under certain circumstances. But then it is false that to 
take away the sensations is to take away the cherry. As the phenomenalist maintains, 
“because God’s intentions do not depend on the existence of finite spirits, objects can exist 
even if we do not.” That is, God can intend to produce ideas without actually so producing 
them. So, there is no reason that sensible objects such as a cherry cannot exist even when no 
minds perceive sensations of softness, redness, tartness, etc. But if that is true, the 
phenomenalist will be hard pressed to explain Philonous’ remarks about the cherry.   
 One might expect the proponent of the phenomenalist interpretation to turn again to the 
denial of blind agency and point out that, so long as God intends to cause cherry-
perceptions in finite minds under certain circumstances, God Himself perceives the cherry. 
Philonous’ claim that if you take away the sensations, you take away the cherry is true; it’s 
just that God perceives the sensations as a necessary concomitant of his intending to 
produce the same ideas in finite minds. So (on this response), it’s not true that the 
phenomenalist account allows for sensible objects to exist in a way that violates the esse is 
percipi thesis.  
 Notice, though, that this response essentially turns the phenomenalist position back into 
the standard view, for it is now God’s perception of the cherry-ideas that He intends to 
                                                
169 3D 2: 249, my emphasis. 
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produce in other minds that is operating to diffuse the objection. It is not because God 
intends to produce cherry-ideas in finite minds that squares the phenomenalist interpretation 
with the cherry passage. It is only because, in intending to produce the sensations, God also 
perceives them that makes sense of Philonous’ claim about the cherry’s nature as a congeries 
of sensations. What is worse for the phenomenalist, he is now forced to deal with the same 
issues of God’s perception that motivated a move away from the standard view in the first 
place. The principal virtue of the phenomenalist interpretation is its putative ability to ignore 
questions about divine ideas. But to accommodate the numerous passages where Berkeley 
identifies sensible objects with collections or congeries of ideas, whose esse is percipi, the 
phenomenalist must take into account not simply God’s intentions, but His perception as 
well.  
 Let us take stock. An enduring question for Berkeley scholarship is, if the being of 
sensible objects consists in their being perceived, what are we to say about sensible objects 
that exist unperceived (at least by finite minds)? The standard view maintains that God 
continuously perceives sensible objects, and that His perception alone preserves the object in 
existence during periods when no finite mind perceives it. But we have seen not only that 
Berkeley has reservations about God’s perception in general, but also that God’s 
perception—even if unproblematic—is insufficient to secure continuity since God perceives 
equally both actual objects and possible  but non-actual objects. The phenomenalist view, on 
the other hand, appears ready-made to deal with this issue. According to the phenomenalist 
interpretation, sensible objects exist just in case God intends to produce ideas in finite minds 
under certain circumstances. A sensible object then exists continuously at times when no 
finite mind actually perceives it just in case, during that time, God intends to produce the 
relevant ideas should any finite minds happen to be in the right circumstances. But on this 
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account, the esse of sensible objects is no longer percipi, since God’s intentions do not require 
the actual finite perception of any of the ideas he intends to produce. There are also 
numerous texts that show Berkeley identified sensible objects with the collections of ideas 
that the phenomenalist interpretation discards. And, if the phenomenalist invokes the denial 
of blind agency and points to God’s perception of the ideas he intends to produce, the 
phenomenalist account degenerates into the standard view.  
 The problems for both types of view, I think, stem from the same source, namely the 
presupposition that Berkeley thought of sensible objects as having a continuous existence in 
the first place. Both views take continuity as a given, necessary datum to be accounted for by 
Berkeley’s metaphysics of sensible objects. The standard view and the phenomenalist 
interpretation both deliver accounts of sensible objects that are, in part, aimed precisely at 
accounting for continuity. As we have seen, both accounts fall short as interpretations of 
Berkeley, either philosophically, textually, or both. 
  At this point, one might have the sense that the problem lies not in our interpretations, 
but in Berkeley himself. Perhaps there is no coherent view about sensible objects or 
continuity to be found in Berkeley’s works. Berkeley was, no doubt, a very gifted 
philosopher, but his life was dominated by other concerns; his philosophical career was 
furious but brief when compared to the decades-long work of Leibniz or Kant. Should we 
not simply accept that, in some places, Berkeley writes as if God perceives sensible objects 
when no one else does, and in others, he writes as if he accepted a form of 
phenomenalism—and that there really is no systematic way to read him on the matter? Of 
course, this is always a possibility that one must consider, but we should only consider it as a 
last resort. Before doing so, I want to consider a different possibility. 
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3.2: RADICAL NOMINALISM REDUX 
 As we have seen, the standard collection theory and the phenomenalist interpretation 
both assume that sensible objects do enjoy a continuous existence irrespective of the 
perception of finite minds. As we have also seen, both accounts fall short in some measure. 
If we want to know whether Berkeleian sensible objects exist continuously during times 
when no finite mind perceives them—and, if so, in what way—, we need to have a clearer 
idea of just what Berkeleian sensible objects are, how they are related to the minds that 
perceive them and the mind that produces them. The radically nominalist account of 
sensible objects introduced in the previous chapter   
 Let us look at a more detailed application of the radically nominalist account and 
compare it to a model of the standard view. Take, again, the notoriously difficult coach 
passages, versions of which appear in both the New Theory of Vision and the Dialogues. Here is 
the original version: 
Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; I look through the casement 
and see it; I walk out and enter it; thus, common speech would incline one to think, I 
heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain, 
the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different, and distinct from each other; 
but having been observed constantly to go together, they are spoken of as one and 
the same thing.170 
 
We might model these three brief episodes referred to as “perceiving the coach” on the 




                                                
170 NTV §46. The parallel passage occurs in 3D 2: 204. 
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Figure 1: “Trickle-down” approach to the standard view 
 
Let Vn, An, Tn, On, and Gn stand for visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory ideas 
perceived by a particular mind at some time tn. Let the arrow-ended bubble represent the 
entire collection of ideas that constitutes the coach, noting that some but not all of the ideas 
perceived by a particular mind at times t1-t3 are included in the collection. In Figure 1.1, the 
collection of ideas that Berkeley identifies with the coach is constituted by an indefinite 
number of ideas of each of the five sensory modalities, perceived at an indefinite number of 
times by an indefinite number of minds, of which Berkeley himself only perceives a small 
number. Berkeley hears something at t1.171 He looks out the window and sees a coach, i.e., 
                                                
171171 The point of both versions of the coach passage seems to be that the sound of the coach merely suggests 
the coach and is not, as it were, a constituent of the coach itself. I am willing to grant this as an amendment to 
the standard view as I present it here. However, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the collections of 
ideas that are sensible objects do contain as members ideas perceived by each of the sensory modalities. 
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he perceives certain visual ideas that are members of the coach-collection at t2. He walks 
outside and enters the coach, i.e., he perceives certain visual and tactile ideas that are likewise 
members of the coach-collection at t3.  
 When we inquire into just how each of Berkeley’s three uses of ‘the coach’ (or terms 
anaphoric for ‘the coach’, i.e., ‘it’ at t2 and t3) manage to signify the entire collection, the 
standard view has no ready answer. Two responses suggest themselves. One might take the 
term ‘coach’ to signify the entire collection directly in each instance of its use, without appeal 
to the perception of any particular members of the collection at any particular time. This is 
roughly modeled in Figure 1.1. On this line of thought, the significatory relationship between 
‘coach’ and the entire collection is brute, and each use of ‘coach’ manages to signify the ideas 
perceived at those times by “trickling down” from the entire collection; ‘coach’ signifies, first 
and foremost, the entire collection and particular uses of ‘coach’ signify some subset of the 
members of the collection in a derivative way. 
 Alternatively, one might think ‘coach’ manages to signify the entire collection only by 
first coming to signify some occurrently perceived members of the collection. This can be 









Figure 2: “Bubble-up” approach to the standard view 
 
On the view represented in Figure 1.2, instances of ‘coach’ signify, first and foremost, some 
occurrently perceived ideas—what Berkeley hears, or sees, or sees and feels—and come to 
signify the entire collection to which these ideas belong by “bubbling up” from the 
occurrently perceived ideas.  
 There are a number of features of these models to note. First, while either model of the 
standard view allows us to say, literally, the same thing was perceived at t1, t2, and t3, this is 
a “commonsensical” consequence Berkeley himself did not care to draw. In fact, he claims 
exactly the opposite: “common speech would incline one to think, I heard, saw, and touched 
the same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain, the ideas intromitted by each sense 
are widely different, and distinct from each other[.]”172 If the standard view is right in considering 
                                                
172 NTV §46, my emphasis. 
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the coach as a collection of ideas that contains ideas of different sense modalities, then it is 
puzzling why Berkeley pointedly highlights the heterogeneity of these ideas. Second, the 
standard view is highly complex, and as a result, faces difficult epistemological questions. So 
again, the same thing was perceived at t1, t2, and t3—but how does one know this? How 
does one know that the coach-collection contains members other than the ones perceived at 
t1-t3, especially if the large bulk of these putative members are perceived by other minds? 
Berkeley suggests the basis for speaking of the seen coach and the sat-in coach as the same 
things is that such visual and tactile ideas are “observed constantly to go together,” but this 
is true only of the ideas any one mind perceives. It is very hard to see how an appeal to an 
observed correlation between visual and tactile ideas can ground the claim that the coach-
collection contains ideas beyond those actually perceived by the particular mind in question.  
 Perhaps just as problematically, on either model of the standard view, it is very difficult 
to say that sensible objects are perceived immediately. All that is immediately perceived are a 
few members of a much larger collection; the rest of the collection is merely suggested to the 
mind by the ideas immediately perceived. This is of great import, for it is Berkeley’s principal 
complaint against representative realism that such a view entails insurmountable skeptical 
problems, problems Berkeley himself intends to avoid by defending a view on which 
sensible objects are immediately perceived.173 
 Though both views are problematic, the view modeled in Figure 1.2 has an advantage in 
that we have a better explanation for how the term ‘coach’ connects to the putative 
collection it names. The bubble-up approach to the standard view also fits better with 
Berkeley’s idiosyncratic philosophy of language on which he explicitly rejects the view that a 
                                                
173 Pappas shows quite clearly, I think, the importance of immediate perception to Berkeley in his (2000). 
However, Pappas is a proponent of a version of the standard view, which presents his interpretation with 
considerable difficulties that are detailed nicely in Atherton (2008).  
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word in each instance of its use must signify the same idea(s).174 Once one accepts that the 
bubble-up approach is superior to the trickle-down approach, however, the way to an even 
better account is paved. The coach episodes can be modeled much more simply on the 
Radically Nominalist account, taking advantage of the insight of the bubble-up approach 
while dispensing with the conception of the collection of ideas that complicates the standard 
view. 
 
Figure 3: Radically Nominalist account 
 
 On the Radically Nominalist account, what Berkeley signifies with by ‘coach’ at t1 just is 
what he hears—auditory ideas A1—, and so in a very straightforward sense, Berkeley hears 
the coach. At t2, what Berkeley signifies by ‘coach’ is just what he sees and hears—visual 
idea V2 and auditory ideas A2—, and so Berkeley sees and hears the coach. At t3, ‘coach’ 
                                                
174 See PHK Intro 18. 
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signifies those visual, tactile, and auditory ideas Berkeley perceives as he walks out and enters 
the coach. At each time, what Berkeley perceives are some sensory ideas that are collected 
together by the mind and given one name—‘coach’. As Berkeley himself notes, however, 
these ideas are completely heterogenous and distinct; what he perceives at t1 is 
metaphysically different from what he perceives at t2 or at t3. 
 One might object that, on this account, there are as many coaches as there are utterances 
and inscriptions of ‘coach’ and that this consequence would be absurd, even for Berkeley—
surely there is only one coach. If this objection is not read as straightforwardly begging the 
question against Berkeley’s metaphysics, it is hard to see what is absurd in the view. It is 
certainly unorthodox, but the appearance of absurdity is only generated by a failure on our 
part to look past the trappings of language. We are, as Berkeley writes, under the “embarrass 
and delusion of words.” We need only “draw the curtain of words”; to do as Berkeley’s 
predecessors attempted (and failed) to do, to “[lay aside] all use of words … and 
contemplate [our] bare ideas.”175  
 More to the point: first, it is not Berkeley’s view that every utterance or inscription 
signifies anything, so it is false that there are as many coach-collections as there are instances 
of the name. Second, it is not at all absurd to think that there are as many perceptions “of” the 
coach as there are perceivers “of” the coach.176 Of course, these numerous distinct 
perceptions are coordinated by God’s reliably and regularly willing them in various minds, 
but this common source cannot be supposed to make them perceptions “of” one thing, 
since all our sensory ideas have the same source. So if, as I am arguing, Berkeley identifies 
                                                
175 PHK Intro 23-24, 2: 39-40 
176 And perhaps many more perceptions than perceivers if we consider individual perceptions to be extremely 
brief or instantaneous, as opposed to temporally extended to a significant degree. Also, I intentionally hedge on 
the use of ‘of’ here since, as Berkeley himself noted explicitly, its use can be misleading. In this case, it can too 
easily suggest that there is some (one) thing, independent of any perception, of which one perceives. See NB 660. 
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‘sensible objects’ with the immediately perceived ideas signified by instances of sensible 
object names, then there isn’t anything absurd in the interpretation at all. Finally, Berkeley 
himself denies that any sensible object is one in more than name only, for however one 
interprets the collections of ideas that are sensible objects, they are collections of 
metaphysically heterogeneous and distinct ideas.177 What makes a collection one thing as 
opposed to many things is the way it is considered by the mind, which is to say, the words 
used to signify the ideas. Berkeley himself is quite plain on the matter: 
[N]umber … is intirely the creature of the mind, considering, either an idea by it self, 
or any combination of ideas to which it gives one name, and so makes it pass for an unit. 
According as the mind variously combines its ideas, the unit varies; and as the unit, 
so the number, which is only a collection of units, doth also vary. We call a window 
one, a chimney one, and yet a house in which there are many windows, and many 
chimneys, hath an equal right to be called one, and many houses go to the making of 
one city. In these and the like instances, it is evident the unit constantly relates to the 
particular draughts the mind makes of its ideas, to which it affixes names, and 
wherein it includes more or less, as best suits its own ends and purposes.178 
 
Here then is a summary of the Radically Nominalist account: sensible objects are both 
collections of sensible ideas and immediately perceived, because they are collections of just 
those sensible ideas that are immediately perceived and signified by a token of a sensible 
object name. The membership of any given collection is determined by those ideas signified 
by a given name-token.  
 It should be clear by now that Berkeleian sensible objects are, metaphysically, completely 
unlike what we might pre-theoretically consider them to be. They are not temporally 
persistent, mind-independent, publicly perceivable, unified things at all. Indeed, the only 
feature that the sensible objects of Berkeley’s metaphysics have in common with the sensible 
objects of our pre-theoretical experience is in being called “sensible objects.”  
                                                
177 See again NTV 46, 108, 137, 149; PHK 44; TVV 41. 
178 NTV 109, my emphasis.  
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3.3: REGULARITIES IN THE GAPS 
 There is much more that needs to be said in defense of the Radically Nominalist account 
as an interpretation of Berkeley, especially as it regards the issue of whether and how 
sensible objects exist continuously throughout periods where (we suppose) no finite minds 
perceive them. If, as I have argued, Berkeley thought of sensible objects as collections of 
ideas that are immediately perceived by individual minds and signified by sensible object 
name-tokens, then one might object that I read Berkeley as being committed to a kind of 
radical discontinuity. This is (so it might be argued) patently absurd as a philosophical view 
and, a fortiori, as an interpretation of Berkeley. 
 There is, of course, nothing absurd in the observation that ordinarily when you close 
your eyes you no longer see anything in front of you. Our experience “of” sensible objects is 
undeniably gappy; we blink, we shift our eyes, we fidget in our seats, we go to sleep for 
hours at a time, and in every instance, our perceptions of the world and the objects in it 
change continuously or go away altogether. What I see now will disappear in a moment 
when I blink. If I sleep dreamlessly, there is nothing absurd in noting that I perceived 
nothing at all for several hours. And while more controversial, there is certainly nothing 
absurd in thinking that this gappy experience of the sensible world is our sole source of 
information about it. Indeed, this is just what it is to be a strict empiricist, whether in the 18th 
or 21st centuries, and Berkeley is one such empiricist. So it is hard to see what could be 
absurd about a view on which (what Berkeley calls) sensible objects are no more than what 
they are perceived (between the gaps) to be. Certainly nothing in one’s sensory experience could 
ever count against such a view. 
 What I am arguing is that Berkeley makes no distinction between the sensible world and 
the world of our (discontinuous) experience. As with the coach, what we might call our 
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experience “of a sensible object” is, speaking more strictly, a number of discontinuous 
experiences, each episode of which might be called “seeing (or hearing, or riding in) the 
coach.” The appearance that there is a sensible object equally seen, heard, and ridden in is 
generated—not by our experience of a sensible object—but by our linguistic habit of using the 
same (or, strictly speaking, similar) words for each discrete episode. As Berkeley notes: 
“Strictly speaking, … we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same 
object perceived by the microscope, which was by the naked eye. But in case every 
variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the endless 
number or confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore to 
avoid this as well as other inconveniences … men combine together several ideas, 
apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different 
circumstances, but observed however to have some connexion in Nature, either with 
respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider 
as one thing.”179 
 
Strictly speaking then—that is, at the level of ideas—the collections of sensible ideas that 
Berkeley calls “sensible objects” are no more continuous than our experience, since they are 
just collections of ideas that are immediately perceived in our (discontinuous) experience.  
None of this is absurd; indeed, it can be appreciated as a rather simple, straightforward point 
given what everyone agrees are his commitments. 
 But there is another sense in which sensible objects obviously do exist continuously, and 
that is insofar as it is natural and useful to speak of them as such. That is, in language it is 
practicable and indeed often necessary to speak of sensible objects as enduring continuously in 
between episodes of perception, as being publicly perceivable, or as being mind-
independent. This is because our experience, though discontinuous, is equally regular and 
well ordered. God wills in a regular way that sensory ideas be perceived by finite minds. 
These ideas of sense individually come to be called “real things” (i.e., sensible objects) in 
                                                
179 3D, 2: 245. 
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virtue of their strength, orderliness, and coherence.180 The regularity of sensory ideas, along 
with their resistance to the will of the perceiver, “speak themselves the effects of a mind 
more powerful and wise than human spirits.”181 The law-like regularity of the perceived world 
is in fact a divine language through which God instructs “how to regulate our actions, in 
order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our 
bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful or destructive of them.”182 
 This discussion of God’s regular activity brings us close again to the phenomenalist 
interpretation, however. Recall that the phenomenalist reads Berkeley as holding that a 
sensible object—say, a table—exists continuously even when unperceived just in case God 
wills that, if a finite mind were in the right circumstances, it would perceive the table. This 
would be a problem for the view developed above on which sensible objects are just 
collections of ideas perceived immediately and signified by name-tokens, since we would 
have to add to this account a story about subjunctive counterfactuals grounded in the divine 
will. 
 There are passages where Berkeley offers what might appear to be a phenomenalist 
analysis of claims of continuous, unperceived existence. A fine example of this is Principles 3:  
The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my 
study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might 
perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. 
 
It is indeed tempting to read the second half of this sentence as an affirmation of a 
phenomenalist framework. It seems as if Berkeley means to offer as translation of the verbal 
claim “my table exists” (when uttered outside his study) either of two statements; the 
                                                
180 PHK 33. 
181 PHK 36. 
182 NTV 147. 
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counterfactual “if I was in my study I might perceive it,” or the speculative “some other 
spirit actually does perceive it.” Winkler reads the passage in just this way: “[t]o say that a 
table exists is sometimes to say that it would be perceived if certain conditions were 
fulfilled.”183  
 In a sense, this is correct, but it remains incomplete. Berkeley is indeed telling us what it 
means, in a particular case, to say that his table exists. The problem for Winkler and the 
phenomenalist interpretation is that propositions—such as the unanalyzed “if I was in my 
study I might perceive it”—aren’t to be had for free. Statements in ordinary language 
become meaningful, for Berkeley, in virtue of the ideas they signify.184 Berkeley’s 
epistemology places severe restrictions on the kinds of ideas that might thereby be signified; 
in particular, these ideas are all concrete, determinate, non-abstract ideas. To know what a 
particular utterance means requires knowing which concrete, determinate, non-abstract ideas 
are signified in that instance. The problem with appealing to counterfactuals to explain the 
meaning of a statement is that it is not at all clear what concrete, determinate, non-abstract 
ideas are thereby signified. Put another way, if we follow Winkler in reading PHK 3 as 
offering “if I was in my study I might perceive [my table]” as an explication of the meaning 
of “my table exists” (when uttered outside Berkeley’s study), we would still be left with the 
question: what does it mean to say “if I was in my study I might perceive [my table]”?  
 Even if a good Berkeleian account of counterfactuals were to be had, it is not clear what 
value such counterfactuals would have to Berkeley. As counterfactuals, they concern 
circumstances that never actually obtain, and so absent other a priori arguments, an empiricist 
                                                
183 Winkler (1986, 177). See also Ibid. 199. 
184 There are several caveats here, laid out nicely in Winkler (1986, ch. 1). However, none of these caveats 
undermine the central point, namely, that linguistic meaning arises from the level of ideas and cannot be 
determined solely by an investigation of the surface grammar of an utterance. To my knowledge, the only 
interpretation that entirely rejects this basic picture of language in Berkeley is Roberts’ (2007).   
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such as Berkeley cannot assert their truth as evidence in favor of a view. This is not to say that 
one cannot make well-supported conjectures about the truth of counterfactuals on empiricist 
grounds, of course, but however well supported, their truth will always be underdetermined 
by evidence. One might easily determine the truth of the claim “when I return to my study, I 
will perceive my table.” In Berkeley’s system, the fact that such predictive conditionals are so 
often true is essentially the argument for God’s existence. And because they so reliably turn 
out to be true, such conditionals might well lead one to imagine non-actual scenarios and 
feel confident about what they would perceive in such cases. This confidence, however, has 
no bearing on whether the counterfactuals in question are true. A person living in a world 
where all actual experiences are divinely ordered in the right way would have every reason to 
make confident conjectures about the truth of counterfactuals even if they were all false.  
 A better way to understand PHK 3 is as Berkeley’s attempt at giving us exactly what is 
needed to understand the claim “my table exists” (when uttered outside his study), namely, 
an account of the ideas being immediately signified at the time of the utterance. We should 
read what follows his “meaning thereby” as a description of the ideas signified by the 
utterance, not as a translation of the prior sentence. In so doing, we can apply the Radically 
Nominalist account to this case as well. Berkeley says, “The table I write on exists.” What he 
“means thereby”—i.e., the ideas he signifies—is his seeing and feeling it, i.e., the visual and 
tactile ideas he perceives at the time of his utterance. Here, as with the coach passage, the 
word ‘table’ signifies a collection of ideas perceived immediately.  
 The same is true for “my table exists” when uttered outside of Berkeley’s study. What 
Berkeley signifies are some ideas he perceives. But since he is not, ex hypothesi, perceiving any 
ideas of sense that would normally be considered “the table”, what ideas might he be 
signifying? I contend they are ideas in Berkeley’s imagination. In telling us what he “means 
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thereby” in this second utterance, Berkeley is providing a description of what he might 
imagine when saying “my table exists” even though he is not in his study to perceive it. In 
saying “my table exists,” he might imagine himself being in his study at some time in the 
future, perceiving his table. Or he might imagine someone else being in his study perceiving 
his table. In either case, what Berkeley signifies by ‘table’ signifies a collection of ideas 
perceived immediately.  
 On this account, we can make sense of Berkeley’s statements, which on the surface 
might appear to be endorsements of the Continuity Thesis, without appealing to either 
divine ideas or unanalyzed counterfactuals. In so doing, we would actually be following the 
advice Berkeley gives his readers at the end of the Introduction to the Principles: 
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my 
words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of 
thoughts in reading, that I had in writing them.185 
 
So yes, Berkeley does in several places say that sensible objects exist continuously even when 
not perceived by finite minds. But if we follow Berkeley’s own advice and consider what 
such statements mean—i.e., what ideas are thereby signified—we can see that these 
statements do not commit Berkeley to any thesis about divine perception or specious 
counterfactual conditionals. Nor do they commit Berkeley to a view on which sensible 
objects are “really” more than they are perceived to be, i.e., collections of ideas over and 
above those perceived by particular minds and signified by particular name-tokens. 
Berkeley’s statements in ordinary language about sensible objects existing continuously are 
perfectly consistent with his metaphysical views on which the collections of sensible ideas 
that are called sensible objects are—as is all of our experience—divinely ordered and 
unproblematically discontinuous. 
                                                
185 PHK Intro 25, 2:40. 
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3.4: PUTTING THE ‘PROBLEM’ TO REST 
 Berkeley’s philosophy has always invited questions about continuity. It is not unfair to 
say that Berkeley does not take the issue of continuity very seriously, or at least, not as 
seriously as commentators think he should have. It is because Berkeley wrote so little about 
the matter that scholars have had such a difficult time finding a clean, textually appropriate 
account of how Berkeleian objects can exist continuously but it is, I think, almost 
unquestioned that an interpretation on which Berkeley can be said to maintain a thick sense 
of continuity is for that reason a desirable one. But let us ask this question: why exactly 
would it be a problem for Berkeley if his metaphysics allowed, at the level of ideas, for sensible 
objects to have a discontinuous existence when unperceived by finite minds?   
 An obvious response is that the matter is important to combating skepticism. Berkeley 
mentions his anti-skeptical project in the preface to both the Principles and the Dialogues. 
What is unclear, however, is how a metaphysics that involves some kind of discontinuity is 
dangerously skeptical, at least in the sense of skepticism that Berkeley is worried about. His 
definition of a skeptic is “one who doubted of every thing … or who denies the reality and 
truth of things.”186 We know that Berkeley views himself as no such skeptic about either 
sensible objects or God, of both which there can be “no more reason to doubt, than of our 
own being.”187  
 It is skepticism about the perceived world—and the dangers this poses for faith—that 
concerns Berkeley. The metaphysical issue of continuity has no bearing on either, nor could 
it. Berkeley thought that it was “evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of 
                                                
186 3D, 2:173. 
187 See PHK 40 and 3D, 2:257. 
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human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses” or such 
objects of knowledge as we get from an introspective accounting of the operations of the 
mind. Whether gotten from the senses or from introspection, however, all the objects of 
human knowledge are gotten by experience. Berkeley is the arch empiricist in this regard. Yet 
the continuous existence of a sensible object when unperceived by any finite mind is not—
and could not possibly be—discovered by experience, and so beliefs in the continuous 
existence of sensible objects would necessarily be unjustified. No possible experience could 
ever count as evidence that the tree is in the quad when no one perceives it, for any evidence 
of a thing’s existence would have to be given in experience. Thus, the only possible evidence 
for any sensible thing’s existence is evidence for its perceived existence. For Berkeley to hold 
the Continuity Thesis would be for him to hold a thesis that, by his own lights, cannot in 
principle be supported by any possible appeal to experience: “I do not see how the 
testimony of sense can be alleged, as a proof for the existence of any thing, which is not 
perceived by sense.”188 
 I conclude that the so-called Problem of Continuity is no real problem at all. It is 
certainly not a problem that Berkeley saw as such, which explains why his own discussion of 
continuity in PHK 45-48 is short, cagey, and dismissive. He does not—there or anywhere—
take the opportunity to lay out clearly his metaphysical account of how sensible objects exist 
continuously. This fact should be nearly inexplicable if the matter of continuity were of the 
first importance. Rather, the Problem of Continuity is a problem of our own making, one 
that results from succumbing to the (tempting!) practice of thinking of Berkeleian sensible 
objects as more than they are perceived to be, i.e., more than collections of ideas perceived 
immediately and signified by name-tokens. We should stop up vexing ourselves over 
                                                
188 PHK 40. 
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Berkeley’s “Problem” of Continuity, for like Berkeleian ideas themselves, it will be a problem 
only so long as we perceive it to be. 
CHAPTER 4: BERKELEY’S ‘DEFENSE’ OF ‘COMMONSENSE’ 
 
 Throughout this work, I have pointedly avoided discussing an issue that looms large in 
Berkeley scholarship. This is the issue of if, how, and to what extent Berkeley’s philosophy is 
a defense of commonsense. I have so far avoided the issue so that the interpretation 
developed thus far would be insulated, as much as possible, from the pressures that come 
with thinking of Berkeley as a commonsense philosopher. As we saw in the previous two 
chapters, thinking of Berkeleian sensible objects in “commonsensical” terms leads to 
problems; we are led to the collection theory or a kind of phenomenalist reading, both of 
which either run afoul of Berkeley’s texts or sit uncomfortably with his philosophical 
commitments. Still, for any interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy to be accepted, it must 
address Berkeley’s repeated though often ambivalent claims of affinity with commonsense 
and common people. The interpretation developed so far is, to put it mildly, unconventional 
even if it does have strong textual support. It is now time to see whether the hybrid 
ideational theory of language and the corresponding radically nominalist account of sensible 
objects can be squared with Berkeley’s claims that his philosophy is somehow on the side of 
commonsense. 
 Berkeley scholars can hardly resist dealing with the question of how his philosophy 
relates to commonsense. It is an irresistible question because it first appears that to have a 
sensational answer. On the one hand, Berkeley claims to “side in all things with the Mob,” 
and on the other, his denial of the existence of matter seems as contrary to commonsense as 
any philosophical view can be. The articles, chapters, books and conference papers on this 
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one aspect of Berkeley’s philosophy alone could make a sizeable bibliography. 
Interpretations run the gamut, from A. A. Luce’s judgment that Berkeley’s account of the 
sensible is commonsense itself, to Jonathan Bennett’s pronouncement that Berkeley’s 
attitude toward commonsense objects is disrespectful.189 Some commentators interpret 
Berkeley as “stressing the inviolable nature of our common-sense beliefs,”190 or as a 
philosopher with a, “passionate devotion to commonsense.”191 Others see him as “Janus-
faced”, variably siding with and deriding the opinions of the common run of man.192 Still for 
others, when Berkeley claims his philosophy accords with commonsense, “according to 
commonsense turns out to be roughly synonymous with in agreement with me, or … in agreement 
with those views for which I can offer (what I take to be) conclusive arguments.”193 On this view, 
Berkeley’s claims that his philosophy is more in line with commonsense is simply a rhetorical 
device carrying no philosophical weight.  
 Luce excepted, most scholars agree that despite Berkeley’s ambition, his philosophical 
system is at best a poor defense of commonsense and at worst recipe for full-blown 
skepticism. Hume was one of the first to judge it this way: “all [Berkeley’s] arguments, 
though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical.”194 To some, Berkeley’s system is 
such a poor defense of commonsense that they conclude he could not seriously mean what 
he says. Quoting Bennett:  
                                                
189 See A. A. Luce (1968) 82, and Jonathan Bennett (2001) 177. 
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In his published works, I contend, Berkeley had little interest in rescuing the plain 
person’s beliefs about sensible things. He did not want to connect them rigorously 
with his ontology, or even to show that this could in principle be done. … Berkeley’s 
fundamental attitude to the plain person’s trees and stones, in the deployment of his 
philosophy, was this disrespectful one.195 
 
Depending on whom you read, Berkeley is either foolishly optimistic or knowingly 
dissembling, but (nearly) everyone agrees his is no defense of commonsense. 
 These are disappointing verdicts. Berkeley is too direct and insistent that his philosophy 
is in some way either a defense of, or consistent with, or at least friendly to commonsense 
for us to be satisfied with an interpretation that concludes these statements are little more 
than rhetoric. And he is too keen a philosopher—and from all biographical accounts, too 
sensible a person—for us to accept that he simply failed to see how far apart his philosophy 
is from commonsense. What is desirable, then, is an account that (1) makes clear the 
importance to Berkeley of commonsense such that it is worth defending, (2) explains in what 
way his system relates to it, and (3) makes it credible to take seriously his claims to have 
achieved some success in this endeavor.  
 In what follows, I lay out an interpretation that I think satisfies these three desiderata by 
giving new answers to two old questions: what does Berkeley think he is defending in the 
defense of commonsense, and how does he go about defending it? The answers to these 
questions show that Berkeley’s approach to defending commonsense has been 
misunderstood. I then examine a pair of competing accounts of how Berkeley’s defense of 
commonsense is to be understood and show, in virtue of their shared and mistaken 
assumption about the structure of this defense, that these nevertheless fail to satisfy the 
three criteria laid out here.  
                                                
195 Bennett (2001) 177. 
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4.1: WHAT IS BERKELEY DEFENDING? 
 Berkeley’s attitude toward commonsense is prima facie ambiguous. He writes in his 
notebooks that he, “sides in all things with the Mob,” and yet he tells Percival that public 
rejection of an opinion, “may … pass for an agreement of its truth.”196 In that same letter, he 
explains his decision not to mention his immaterialism before the body of his Principles, “so 
the notion might steal unawares on the reader, who possibly would never have meddled with 
a book that he had known contained such paradoxes.” Yet he advertises his Three Dialogues as 
an effort to recast the material of the Principles in a new light, proclaiming that, “if the 
principles, which I here endeavour to propagate, are admitted for true […] atheism and 
scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, 
several useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced 
from paradoxes to common sense.”197  
 Since he has much less reason to be dissembling in his letter to Percival than in the 
advertisements for his published works, it would be easy to judge that Berkeley’s real view is 
that his philosophy is openly in conflict with commonsense. We would then have to take the 
proclamations to the contrary in his published works as a disingenuous campaign to sell 
idealism to his readers. This would be unsatisfying since the whole conceit of the Dialogues is 
a debate over which of two views—Berkeley’s idealism or a Lockean style materialism—is, 
“most agreeable to common sense, and remote from skepticism.”198 Of course Berkeley’s 
verdict is that it is his views which are closer to commonsense than materialism. So, we’d 
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have to take the entirety of the Dialogues as an intentional misrepresentation of idealism on 
Berkeley’s part. This would be a distasteful reading, if for no other reason than that he is not 
prone to dissembling without later disclosing his deceit, which he never does in this case.199  
 Berkeley’s verdict in the Dialogues is made all the more perplexing when we see just how 
often he explicitly disagrees with what he recognizes as views of the Vulgar. He is perfectly 
happy to label some beliefs as “vulgar errors,” such as the belief that tangible objects exist 
independently of our minds or that ideas of sight and touch can be ideas of one single 
thing.200 And he is well aware of the weakness of argumentum ad populum, to the point of 
considering a view’s popularity as a mark against it. Berkeley writes:  
[T]hough we should grant a notion to be ever so universally and stedfastly adhered 
to, yet this is but a weak argument of its truth, to whoever considers what a vast 
number of prejudices and false opinions are every where embraced with the utmost 
tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind.201 
 
 As already noted, Berkeley is clearly conscious that his own views depart from the views 
of most people. Here, in more context, from his letter to Percival: 
The common crys being against any opinion seems to me so far from proving it false 
that it may with as good reason pass for an agreement of its truth. However I 
imagine whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need been 
introduced with great caution into the world. For this reason it was I omitted all 
mention of the non-existence of matter in the title-page, dedication, preface, and 
introduction, that so the notion might steal unawares on the reader, who possibly 
would never have meddled with a book that he had known contained such 
paradoxes.202 
                                                
199 In at least two cases, Berkeley made a conscious effort to conceal the full implications of his views, and in 
both cases he later admitted it. In his An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, Berkeley granted that objects of 
touch have a mind-dependent existence, noting later in the Principles that this “vulgar error” was, “beside my 
purpose to examine and refute … in a discourse concerning vision” (PHK §44). Similarly, he tells Percival of 
his decision to omit mention of his immaterialism in “the title-page, dedication, preface, and introduction [of 
the Principles], that so the notion might steal unawares on the reader” (Letter to Percival, Works vol. 8, 36).  
200 See, respectively, PHK §44 and Alciphron IV, Works vol. 3, 161. 
201 Berkeley, PHK §55. 
202 Berkeley, Letter to Percival, Works vol. 8, 36. 
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 Acknowledgements of his heterodoxy are not restricted to Berkeley’s private writings. In 
the Preface to PHK, he makes no apology for the “novelty and singularity” of his views, 
“newly known and contrary to the prejudices of mankind.”203 At PHK 4, he says of the 
“opinion strangely [i.e., very greatly] prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, 
and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being 
perceived,” that it involves a manifest contradiction.204 Clearly, a belief’s being commonly 
held is, by itself, of little worth in Berkeley’s eyes, especially when it comes to views that run 
counter to his own philosophy. This is perhaps why Bennett and others find it more 
plausible to completely disregard Berkeley’s claims to be defending commonsense and why 
others see him as simply labeling his own philosophy ‘commonsense’ for rhetorical points. 
 In light of the texts we have already seen, it is actually somewhat surprising that Berkeley 
is so often taken to be defending common opinions as such. The case for such a reading him 
as doing so is surely overstated. (Just how overstated will become very clear in the next 
section.) Berkeley’s notebook comment that he sides “in all things with the Mob” is most 
often quoted in isolation from the first sentence of the entry: “All things in Scripture wch 
side with the Vulgar against the Learned side with me also.”205 In context, it is much less 
clear that Berkeley sides with the Vulgar in all things. (For what if scripture sides against the 
Vulgar? Whose side would Bishop Berkeley take?)  
 If we are to take seriously Berkeley’s claims that his philosophy is a defense of 
commonsense, we must be prepared to entertain the as-yet-unexplored possibility that 
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Berkeley’s defense of commonsense has very little to do with providing a philosophical 
defense of vulgar beliefs, and much more to do with responding to a philosophical attack on 
vulgar beliefs that, in Berkeley’s opinion, would replace those beliefs with something even 
less acceptable. What little concern Berkeley does have for (a very few) commonly held 
beliefs arises not from a sense of respect for their being commonly held but from his 
realization of their importance to his anti-skeptical project. To see how and why this is, we 
must understand what Berkeley thought of the Vulgar. 
 In those passages where Berkeley talks explicitly about the Vulgar, he characterizes them 
as being of an entirely different intellectual mold than the Learned. They are ignorant of 
philosophical speculation and uninterested in it. They are “simple & illiterate,” 
“unreflecting,” their minds “not yet debauched by learning.”206 Remarkably though, they are 
“for the most part easy and undisturbed”:  
To them nothing that’s familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. 
They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger 
of becoming sceptics.207  
 
 The Learned, on the other hand, are surprisingly vexed by skeptical worries. Although “it 
may with reason be expected, that those who have spent most time and pains in [philosophy] 
should […] be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men,” it is the 
philosopher herself who is “drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies,” 
and who ends up in a “forlorn scepticism.”208 
 This skeptical tendency of the Learned is said to stem from their recognition of the 
inherent limitations of our understanding. So, one might also say that the Vulgar are only out 
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of danger of becoming skeptics because they are completely ignorant of their own 
limitations; the Learned know enough to know that they know very little. Berkeley gives 
such sentiments short shrift: 
We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men, than to 
give them a strong desire for that knowledge, which He had placed quite out of their 
reach. … Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, 
of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the 
way to knowledge, are entirely owing to our selves. That we have first raised a dust, 
and then complain, we cannot see.209 
 
 It is not that the Learned know better than the Vulgar the limitations of human 
knowledge. What the Learned claim to know of the limitations of knowledge are the 
“doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions,” which result from the 
acceptance by the Learned of a set of bad philosophical principles.210  
 Berkeley doesn’t explicitly state the principles he has in mind here, at least not as 
principles per se. It is clear though that foremost in his mind are what he calls the doctrine of 
abstraction and problematic views on language. These are related. Berkeley credits a bad 
view on how words achieve their meaning with giving rise to the thought that there must be 
abstract ideas. It is said to follow from the supposition, “that the making use of words, 
implies the having of general ideas … that men who use language are able to abstract or 
generalize their ideas.”211  
’[T]is thought that every name hath, or ought to have, one only precise and settled 
signification, which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas, 
which constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name.212 
 
                                                
209 Ibid., 3.  
210 Berkeley, PHK Intro. §4. I do not mean to imply, in opposing the Learned and the Vulgar, that the Vulgar 
accept a set of good philosophical principles. 
211 Berkeley, PHK Intro. §11. 
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 Berkeley has Locke in mind here as the proponent of such a view. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to mediate the debate as to whether Berkeley is fair to Locke in thinking so. To 
be sure, there are passages in Locke Essay that strongly suggest the views that concern 
Berkeley here. Locke does say that “all Words … signify nothing immediately, but the Ideas 
in the Mind of the Speaker,” which can be read as suggesting that each word signifies some 
idea.213 And Locke does seem to say that the semantic power of individual words is derived 
directly from the content of the ideas each word stands for such that general terms must 
stand for ideas with generalized content.  
… one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences: Which 
advantageous use of Sounds was obtain’d by the difference of the Ideas they were 
made signs of. Those names becoming general, which are made to stand for general 
Ideas, and those remaining particular, where the Ideas they are used for are 
particular.214 
 
 These are the principles—that each word signifies an idea, and that the semantic power 
of a word derives from the content of the idea it signifies—that Berkeley takes to lead 
philosophers to the doctrine that there are (indeed, must be) abstract ideas.215 
 The doctrine of abstraction is the signature difference between the Learned and the 
vulgar, but not in perhaps the way one might expect. Whereas the Learned propound an 
erroneous view, it can’t clearly be said that the Vulgar accept and propound the correct one 
since it can’t clearly be said that the Vulgar—illiterate, unreflecting, not yet debauched by 
learning—have any views on the matter in the first place. Recall, Berkeley describes the 
Vulgar as utterly ignorant about and devoid of basic philosophical concepts in general, and 
                                                
213 John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding [Essay], ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
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abstract ideas specifically. The “abstract Idea of Being or Existence” is unknown to them, 
and when they use the words ‘being’ or ‘existence,’ they do not use them to stand for 
abstract ideas.216 Consider too the following excerpts from Berkeley’s notebooks:  
Abstract Ideas [are] only to be had amongst the Learned. The Vulgar never think 
they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & Species & 
abstract Ideas are terms unknown to them.217 
 
Existence, Extension etc are abstract i.e. no ideas. they are words unknown & useless 
to the Vulgar.218 
 
The Will & Volition are words not used by the Vulgar, the Learned are banter’d by 
their meaning abstract Ideas.219 
 
 In light of these texts, it would be a stretch to say that the Vulgar, as Berkeley conceives 
of them, hold any views about abstract ideas; they simply know nothing of them. 
 The Vulgar’s ignorance of abstract ideas is related to another way in which they differ 
from the Learned, already hinted at in the quotes above: the Vulgar engage in different 
linguistic practices than the Learned, and don’t employ philosophical terms such as ‘being’, 
‘extension’, and ‘will’. There is nothing surprising in Berkeley’s claim that the Vulgar lack 
abstract ideas; on his view genuinely abstract ideas are impossible. The difference is really 
that the Vulgar do without abstract ideas and do so in untroubled ignorance whereas the 
Learned “pretend” not only to have them, but pretend to need them for all manner of 
philosophical and scientific inquiry.220 Locke goes so far as to make “the having of general 
ideas … that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes,” a claim so overstated 
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that Berkeley cannot resist quoting it in the Introduction to the Principles.221  
 The Vulgar’s untroubled use of language without abstract ideas is damning evidence 
against the purported Lockean view of language. According to Berkeley, language was 
created “by, and for the use of the Vulgar.”222 It is “accommodated to the common notions 
and prejudices of men,”223 “suited to the received opinions, which are not always the 
truest,”224 and “framed by the Vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common 
actions of life, without any regard to speculation.”225 Because of this, “it is scarce possible to 
deliver the naked and precise truth, without great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an 
unwary reader) seeming contradictions.” The reason is that the Vulgar use words in loose 
ways, not always making clear just what they mean to communicate. Writes Berkeley, “words 
as Used by the Vulgar are taken in some Latitude, their signification is confused.”226 None of 
this could be true, however, if it were true that each word must stand for some specific idea 
and that general terms signify abstract ideas. The Vulgar have no knowledge or want of 
abstract ideas and yet, not only do they use language, they created it. 
 Later we will see how Berkeley’s view on language developed in response to problems 
with (his understanding of) the Lockean view, and how it uniquely accounts for vulgar 
linguistic practices. For now, it is worth noting that while Berkeley is happy to admit that 
vulgar opinions are sometimes erroneous or often just not strictly true, he is equally happy to 
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allow the Vulgar to continue their ways of speaking. “I am not for disputing about the 
propriety, but the truth of the expression,” Berkeley writes. “If therefore you agree with me 
that we eat and drink, and are clad with the immediate objects of sense which cannot exist 
unperceived or without the mind: I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to 
custom, that they should be called things rather than ideas.”227 Most famously, there is this:  
[I]t will … be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural 
causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no 
longer say upon these [i.e., Lockean] principles that fire heats, or water cools, but 
that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who 
should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to 
think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar. They who … are convinced of the truth 
of the Copernican system, do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun sets … : and if 
they affected a contrary style in common talk, it would without doubt appear very 
ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it manifest, that the 
common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from 
the admission of our tenets.228 
 
 All of this—the Vulgar’s trouble-free ignorance of abstract ideas, their imprecise 
linguistic practices, and Berkeley’s concern to leave the latter undisturbed—is related to the 
Vulgar’s aforementioned resistance to skepticism. 
 The Vulgar’s resistance to skepticism is crucially important. It is clear that Berkeley takes 
the doctrine of abstraction to contribute to materialism, and it is clear that Berkeley sees 
materialism as giving rise to skeptical worries.229 In the prefaces to both the Principles and the 
Dialogues, Berkeley makes it clear that one of his chief aims is the defeat of skepticism, so if 
the Vulgar are naturally resistant to it, he has reason to value this. Their resistance is mostly 
explained by their ignorance of and lack of interest in philosophical speculation, but not 
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entirely. We might imagine someone who was both uninterested in philosophy and yet 
constantly puzzled by the world around them. The Vulgar are not so puzzled, and this fact is 
due to their tendency to be “governed by the dictates of nature,” which leaves them “for the 
most part easy and undisturbed.” What does it mean to be “governed by the dictates of 
nature?” I contend it means just this: the Vulgar naturally and unreflectively believe that the 
perceived world is the real world; to the Vulgar, the sensed and sensible world is the real 
world, and not some copy of a yet-more-real world behind it.230 
 This reading has strong textual support, especially in the Dialogues. In the Third Dialogue, 
after much haranguing over different versions of materialism, Berkeley, through Philonous, 
asks this: 
Now give me leave to ask you, … [whether] it be not the wisest way to follow Nature, 
trust your senses, and laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or 
substances, admit with the vulgar those for real things, which are perceived by the senses?231 
 
 Most importantly, Berkeley echoes this refrain in his closing remarks of the Dialogues:  
I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite 
and place in a clearer light that truth, which was before shared between the vulgar 
and the philosophers: the former being of opinion, that those things they immediately 
perceive are the real things; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived, are ideas which 
exist only in the mind. Which two notions put together, do in effect constitute the 
substance of what I advance.232 
                                                
230 I use the term belief here with some reservation. What exactly a belief is, for Berkeley, is quite unclear. 
Berkeley certainly did not hold anything like a propositional attitude account of belief, for on his theory of 
language a proposition could be nothing but an abstraction. Rather, like all thoughts in Berkeley’s system, 
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into particular, determinate (i.e., non-abstract) perceptions. To say that the Vulgar believe that the perceived 
world is the real world is then to talk loosely when, more strictly, such terms as “the perceived world” and “the 
real world” are abstractions and have to be treated as general terms signifying some particular, non-abstract 
idea(s). More fruitful, perhaps, is to say that when the Vulgar perceive or think of a particular object—say an 
apple—, they perceive or think of certain sensed qualities (a red color, a round shape, a sweet taste) and identify 
the object with those qualities—the apple is the red, round, sweet thing they see, feel, and taste. Importantly, 
this identification is the Vulgar’s natural default; they do not first consider and reject the alternative that the 
object is something distinct from the sensed qualities. Of course, even this is only a rough approximation; there 
is much work to be done to make clearer just what belief amounts to in Berkeley’s epistemology.  
231 Berkeley, Dialogues, Works, vol. 2, 246, my emphasis. 
232 Ibid. 2:262, original emphasis. 
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 It is the Vulgar’s unreflective belief that the perceived world is the real world, combined 
with their ignorance and lack of interest for speculation, that makes them so resistant to 
skepticism and therefore esteemed in Berkeley’s eyes.  
 We can see now that Berkeley’s defense of commonsense has very little to do with 
commonly held beliefs. Indeed, Berkeley only seems concerned with one such belief, and 
what’s more, his focus on this belief has nothing to do with its being commonly held as 
such. Rather, his concern to defend this belief stems from its anti-skeptical virtue. The 
Vulgar receive special attention from Berkeley because their untroubled ignorance and 
fidelity is evidence of the anti-skeptical virtue of following the dictates of nature. It is this 
natural and anti-skeptical belief that the Vulgar best exemplify that Berkeley seeks to defend 
with his immaterialism.233 
 
4.2: HOW IS BERKELEY DEFENDING ‘COMMONSENSE’? 
 Berkeley’s defense of commonsense qua commonsense is typically viewed as a 
philosophical defense of (some) commonly held beliefs. We have seen in what very limited 
sense this is true. We must now inquire into exactly how this defense is supposed to be 
achieved. To do this, we need to look more closely at why Berkeley thought the Vulgar were 
in need of such a defense in the first place. 
 Berkeley sees materialism as a root cause of skepticism and Locke as representative of 
materialists. The notion that an unthinking, unsensed, and insensible something lay behind 
our experience and forever beyond our reach is philosophically poisonous to innocent minds. 
                                                
233 The anti-skeptical consequences of this belief also provide a clear answer to the question of why Berkeley 
cares to defend commonsense in the first place; because on this reading, commonsense is intrinsically anti-
skeptical. As we will see later, interpretations that take Berkeley to be defending commonsense qua commonly 
held opinions have trouble answering this question.  
 111 
Berkeley writes:  
This which … hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the 
very root of scepticism; for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without 
the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable 
to real things, it follows, they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at 
all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformable to 
those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?234 
 
 Materialism amounts to exactly this type of separation between the real and the 
perceived. The problem is exacerbated by the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities, a doctrine that many scholars think Berkeley misunderstands.235 Still, his 
misunderstanding is instructive for our purposes. According to (Berkeley’s version of) the 
Lockean materialist, a sensible object produces in us numerous ideas of sense. Some of these 
such as extension, figure, and solidity are said to be “patterns or images” of the object 
existing outside our minds. Other ideas of sense such as colors, sounds and tastes are 
“acknowledge[d] not to be the resemblances of any thing existing without the mind.”236 That 
is, on Berkeley’s understanding of materialism, the redness and sweetness perceived when 
eating an apple are not truly features of the apple itself.237 
 Berkeley thinks he has arguments to show that ideas of primary and secondary qualities 
are all on par. Locke holds that the primary qualities are those that are “utterly inseparable 
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from the Body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it 
suffers, … it constantly keeps.”238 Divide a grain of wheat as much as you like, says Locke, 
you will never cause it to lose solidity, extension or figure. Berkeley’s response is essentially 
that you will never cause it to lose some color or other either. Now Berkeley is happy to 
accept Locke’s arguments that ideas of secondary qualities are mind-dependent. No one will 
assert that pain is a quality of fire, though they will say that warmth is. But “the Sensation of 
Warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different Sensation of Pain.”239 So, 
the sensation of warmth must be as much dependent on our minds as the sensation of pain. 
Berkeley is quick to argue, though, that what goes for secondary qualities goes for primary 
qualities. Our perceptions of the size, shape and motion of an object are just as inter- and 
intra-personally variable as are our perceptions of flavors and colors. Thus, if secondary 
qualities are not resemblances of any thing existing without the mind, neither are primary 
qualities. Consequently, Berkeley takes Locke to be committed to the view that not only are 
apples not really red, sweet, or fragrant, they’re not really round or smooth either. Instead, 
apples and all other sensible objects are really just material substances, unknown and 
unknowable to us. “Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the 
existence of things from their being perceived,” Berkeley writes. “And we are taught to 
distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise scepticism and 
paradoxes.”240 
 As Berkeley understands it, materialism implies that the Vulgar are wrong to accept the 
perceived world as the real world. Just as bad is that on Locke’s view of language, the Vulgar 
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are constantly speaking falsehoods and absurdities. Recall that as Berkeley understands it, 
Locke holds that words are meaningful exactly when they signify an idea; for every 
meaningful word there is a corresponding idea. Yet since the Lockean holds that the real 
apple is a thing entirely distinct from our sensory ideas of it, and since the corresponding 
view of language holds that each word signifies some idea, ordinary expressions such as 
“This apple is red” have to be given wild analyses. On the Lockean picture, the word ‘apple’ 
must signify some idea, and indeed, the same idea each and every time it is uttered. Either it 
signifies some sensory ideas, such as ideas of roundness, redness, or sweetness, or it signifies 
some other idea distinct from these. We have already seen that Berkeley thinks Locke is 
committed to the view that no idea of a sensible quality is an idea of the real apple. Thus, 
Berkeley takes Locke to be committed to the view that the apple itself is not really round, 
red, sweet, fragrant or possessing any sensible quality at all. But since the apple itself is 
neither round, nor red, nor sweet, nor fragrant, ideas of roundness, redness, etc. cannot 
serve to be the significatum of the name ‘apple.’ The name ‘apple,’ it seems, must signify the 
idea of the “real” apple, the unsensed, insensible, something-we-know-not-what that causes 
or supports our sensible ideas. That is, the name ‘apple’ must stand for an abstract idea of 
material substance that Berkeley so abhors. For the Vulgar to then say that apples are red, on 
Berkeley’s understanding of the Lockean picture, is for them to predicate a sensible quality 
to a substance that has no sensible qualities whatsoever. 
 I have argued that Berkeley regards the Vulgar as being naturally resistant to skepticism; 
resistant, but not immune. It is the “general opinion of the world … that the end of 
speculation be practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions.”241 So, 
one would expect that those who are most involved in philosophical inquiry will know better 
                                                
241 Ibid.  
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than those who are not and serve as a good examples for those not as well educated. Yet it is 
the philosophers who are most prone to skepticism, and due to their privileged status, this is 
especially dangerous to the otherwise credulous, faithful Vulgar. Materialist philosophers are, 
as it were, vectors of a dangerous intellectual disease.  
 One might wonder, though, how exactly the Vulgar are threatened by bad philosophy if 
Berkeley thinks the Vulgar have nothing to do with speculation.242  Berkeley does say, after 
all, that the Vulgar are, “out of all danger of becoming sceptics.”243 If this is true, why would 
they need or benefit from Berkeley’s defensive efforts? If materialists are the vectors of an 
intellectual disease, how is this potentially transmitted to the Vulgar? And, if Berkeley is 
primarily interested in defending the Vulgar, how is this accomplished by writing works 
addressed to the Learned? 
 These are interesting issues, some of which it seems Berkeley simply did not write clearly 
about. It is clear that Berkeley thought there was some method of transmission. Both the 
Principles and the Three Dialogues open with suggestive comparisons of the Vulgar and the 
Learned.244 In the Dialogues, he ramps up this suggestion into an explicit worry about the 
effects that people who “pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most 
extravagant things in the world” have on society writ large.  
“This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after 
them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth 
here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their 
whole time in the pursuits of knowledge, professing an entire ignorance of all things, 
or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received 
                                                
242 My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
243 Berkeley, PHK Intro., §1. 
244 See Berkeley, PHK Intro., §1 and Dialogues, Works vol. 2, 171. 
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principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most 
important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.”245 
 
This passage shows two things. First, it shows that Berkeley thinks that there is some 
method by which these dangerous beliefs can spread to “men of less leisure.”246 Whether this 
is a result of the Vulgar passively taking the word of their supposed intellectual betters or of 
trying to more actively emulate the Learned is unclear.247 Second, this passage also shows 
that Berkeley is concerned about these kinds of beliefs because of the potential effects on 
those of less leisure, namely tempting them to entertain suspicions about the most important 
truths. Were it not for the “consequences of general disadvantage to mankind,” these kinds 
of extravagant opinions “might be borne.”  
 This passage also helps explain why, though his larger aim is to prevent the corruption of 
the Vulgar, they are not his intended audience. Berkeley writes in the Preface to the Dialogues 
that he aims to convince skeptics and infidels.248 Elsewhere he speaks of “recalling” or 
“reducing” men to commonsense.249 To be sure, Berkeley is writing to the Learned, his 
colleagues in the schools and the church. They are the ones who have already taken steps 
away from the “high-road of plain, common sense”, and they are who Berkeley hopes to 
recall from their confusion. But they are also his opponents, and his attitude toward them is 
                                                
245 Berkeley, Dialogues, Works vol. 2, 172.  
246 One might wonder whether by “men of less leisure” Berkeley really means the Vulgar or some subset of the 
Learned. This passage is a very close parallel of PHK Intro. §1. There, Berkeley is explicitly comparing the 
Vulgar to the Learned. In light of the similarities of the two passages, I think it is a safe assumption that he is 
referring to the Vulgar here too. 
247 There might be a variety of routes of transmission. Berkeley, of course, well knows the power of the pulpit, 
so perhaps he worries about the effects of skepticism on the priestly class, and thereby on their congregants. 
Perhaps he was concerned about skeptical public intellectuals such as the titular character of Alciphron. Precisely 
how Berkeley thinks this transmission happens is, for our purposes, less important than that he thinks it happens 
and what he thinks of the consequences of its happening.  
248 Berkeley, Dialogues, Works vol. 2, 168. 
249 See Berkeley, Notebooks A §751 and Dialogues Preface, Works vol. 2, 168. 
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primarily antagonistic. The reason for this is suggested by the passage above; his opponents’ 
views might be tolerated were it not for the effects they have in corrupting the Vulgar in 
those matters of greatest importance.250 
 We are now in a position to see that Berkeley’s defense of commonsense is quite 
different than previously thought. Standard interpretations take Berkeley to be defending 
commonsense by building a metaphysical system that somehow shows how commonly held 
beliefs are either true or at least justifiable. Berkeley’s project is alleged to be constructive—
to build a better metaphysics and epistemology, one that, as Bennett says, “assures plain folk 
of the existence of the things that they believe in.”251 Or, take Robert Muehlmann’s 
characterization: “[Berkeley] sees his main task to be that of vouchsafing common-sense beliefs 
and he takes it as obvious that we are aware both of our selves and of other real things, of 
rivers, trees, mountains, and so on.”252 
 This assumption about the structure of Berkeley’s defense of commonsense—that it 
involves giving positive philosophical support for commonsense beliefs—is as wrong as it is 
pervasive. I wrote earlier that the case for reading Berkeley as an apologist for commonsense 
beliefs is overstated. Nothing shows this more than a remarkably overlooked fact about 
Berkeley’s texts—Berkeley never uses the word “defend” or any of its cognates in reference 
to commonsense or commonly held opinions.253 What he does write is that he aims to 
                                                
250 That these most important matters are largely religious is clear from the closing of the Principles. Berkeley 
takes himself to have shown, “the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations, which make the chief 
employment of learned men,” a not-insignificant step in showing that, “what deserves the first place in our 
studies, is the consideration of God, and our duty; which to promote … was the main drift and design of my 
labours[.]” See PHK §156. 
251 Bennett (2001) 170.  
252 Muehlmann (1992) 8, my emphasis. 
253 To be sure, he was aware of and used the term to mean a positive case for some viewpoint, having authored 
A Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics. 
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vindicate commonsense, and the difference, though subtle, is crucial. Whereas, in 
philosophical contexts, ‘defend’ is often used to denote a kind of positive justificatory act—
to argue for, to maintain, support, or prove—, to vindicate is to clear from blame or 
accusation—to protect from, to exculpate, exonerate, or acquit.254 
 Consider another context in which defenses are mounted, namely a legal context. An 
attorney might defend her client in one of two very different ways. In one case, she might 
bring witnesses who will vouch for her client’s virtuous character, or provide evidence that 
her client’s actions were justified. In another case, she might grant that her client is a dirty 
rotten scoundrel, previously guilty of dozens of crimes. And yet she still might (we would 
say) defend her client by attacking the prosecution’s case, undercutting their arguments, 
challenging the veracity and motivation of prosecution witnesses, etc. In both cases, what 
the attorney mounts is unambiguously a defense, but the strategy is completely different. 
 Berkeley’s defense of commonsense is a defense of this second sort, better styled a 
vindication than an apology, for he recognizes that there is very little to apologize for among 
commonly held beliefs. However, the central, anti-skeptical tenet of the Vulgar—that the 
perceived world is the real world—is both correct and important, and it is threatened by the 
spread of bad philosophy. Berkeley aims to prevent the corruption of the Vulgar by 
attacking and destroying that which threatens them. Berkeley himself describes his project 
this way by listing those propositions he is attacking rather than those he is embracing:  
That the qualities we perceive, are not on the objects: that we must not believe our 
senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured 
even of their existence: that colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown 
figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there 
                                                
254 Of course, ‘defend’ also has this other exculpatory sense. That commentators consistently view Berkeley’s 
defense of commonsense as a positive project is perhaps just as surprising as the ubiquity of the use of the term 
‘defense’ itself. I continue to use the term only because it is already so well established in the secondary 
literature.  
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are in bodies absolute extension, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a 
thing stupid, thoughtless and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a 
body, contains innumerable extended parts. These are the novelties, these are the 
strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and 
being once admitted, embarrass [i.e., obstruct or hamper] the mind with endless 
doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations, I endeavor to 
vindicate common sense.255 
 
That Berkeley’s strategy is to attack a threat rather than to offer a defense-cum-apology is 
highlighted by his putting the word ‘defense’ (‘defence’) in Hylas’s mouth. Thus, Hylas:  
“The reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of 
matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its 
defence?”256 
 
“I acknowledge you have proved that matter is impossible; nor do I see what more 
can be said in defence of it.”257 
 
“I agree with you. Material substance was no more than an hypothesis, and a false and 
groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it.”258 
 
Here then is the full shape of Berkeley’s defense of commonsense. Berkeley is indeed a 
defender of commonsense insofar as he defends that most basic belief of the Vulgar; that 
the world perceived immediately is the real world. And his defense of commonsense is a 
defense insofar as he is protecting this belief by attacking what he sees as the sharp point of 
abstract ideas in the hands of materialist philosophers who would, without resistance, 
corrupt the easy and undisturbed life of a group otherwise “out of all danger of becoming 
sceptics.”259 But it is not, as others have thought, intended to be a defense in the sense of an 
                                                
255 Berkeley, Dialogues, Works vol. 2,244, emphasis mine.  
256 Ibid., 224. 
257 Ibid., 226. 
258 Ibid., 229. 
259 Berkeley, PHK Intro §1. By now it should be clear that this is an overstatement, but a type of overstatement 
to which Berkeley is prone. The Vulgar are not out of all danger, but nor does Berkeley side in all things with 
the mob. 
 119 
apology for commonsense beliefs. Berkeley is not out to show that every vulgar opinion is 
true, or even justified—he is not writing for them, he is writing on behalf of them. His is not a 
project of divining the mind of the common person so that he can build up a ‘metaphysics 
for the mob.’260 To Berkeley, the mob has no need of a metaphysics. The Vulgar don’t need 
to be convinced not to be skeptics—only people with skeptical tendencies need convincing. 
To Berkeley, the Vulgar are already as far from being skeptics and atheists as they will ever 
be. It is his intention to make sure they stay that way, and his philosophy serves as a 
defense—not as a shield, but as a weapon—against the most significant threat to their 
normal credulity and faith.  
 To see the virtues of this account in their full light, it will be instructive to compare it to 
some competing interpretations. I turn now to an examination of these rival accounts. I 
choose these two accounts because, though remarkably different from each other, they each 
take seriously Berkeley’s claims to be in some way defending commonsense. 
 
4.3: PAPPAS’ PROPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT 
 One of the most well developed competing accounts is George Pappas’.261 He takes 
Berkeley’s claims of being both in agreement with and a defender of commonsense as more 
than merely rhetorical, though he attributes to them less importance than Berkeley seems to 
indicate. In Pappas’ view, the extent to which Berkeley is in agreement with commonsense 
plays a relatively minor role for him, except insofar as this may count as a tiebreaker between 
                                                
260 This is the title of Roberts’ book. We will soon see that Roberts overstates the importance of Berkeley’s 
positive metaphysics to the defense of commonsense. 
261 Pappas has written a number of pieces on commonsense. I will restrict my comments to his most recent 
discussion of the issue his (2000).   
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Berkeley’s views and those of his opponents (which presumably fare worse by this 
measure).262  
 Pappas identifies three ways Berkeley characterizes commonsense; as a disposition for 
forming beliefs, as a group of people of a certain type, and as a list of propositions thought 
to be commonsensical.263 Pappas focuses only on the third sense—commonsense as a set of 
propositions. Berkeley’s defense of commonsense, then, is primarily a defense of these 
propositions.  Pappas notes, however, that Berkeley self-consciously rejects some of the 
propositions he (Pappas) lists as commonsensical.264 This raises three issues. The first is how 
to determine which propositions are commonsensical, and of these, which Berkeley defends. 
The second concerns how to understand Berkeley’s defense of only some of these 
commonsensical propositions alongside his claims to be in accord with commonsense 
simpliciter. The third concerns the question of why, in light of this uneven attitude toward 
commonsensical propositions, Berkeley is concerned to defend commonsense at all in the 
first place. 
 As already mentioned, Pappas downplays the overall importance to Berkeley of 
according with commonsense. So, as regards this second issue, it would be enough to say 
that Berkeley is aligned with commonsense to a greater degree by defending more 
commonsensical propositions than can his opponents. This, though, brings us back to the 
first issue; how to delineate which propositions are commonsensical and, of these, which 
Berkeley defends. For as Pappas notes, if there are indefinitely many commonsensical 
propositions, Berkeley’s ability to defend more of these than can his opponents would count 
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263 Ibid., 210–1. 
264 Ibid., 12–3, 209. 
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little in his favor if, for example, his opponents were more in line than him with regard to 
propositions that are more fundamental.265 This in turn raises the specter of the third 
question: even if Berkeley can claim to be more in line with commonsense than his 
opponents, why does he this count as an advantage of his views? 
 To generate both the metric by which Berkeley’s alignment with commonsense is to be 
judged and to explain why agreement with commonsense should be any mark in Berkeley’s 
favor, Pappas constructs a set of propositions which he takes to be “of most concern to 
Berkeley.”266 To do this, he begins with the class of all commonsensical propositions (C-
propositions). C-proposition are of two types. Ordinary C-propositions are those “that the 
typical person of common sense does believe, a proposition that the person would assent to 
if queried”; reflective C-propositions are those “a typical common sense person would 
believe upon some unbiased reflection on the matter.”267 Of the propositions in each of 
these two sub-classes, some are basic in that “belief in any other proposition in the larger 
[sub-class] presupposes belief in one or more [of these].”268 So there are classes of basic, 
ordinary C-propositions and basic, reflective C-propositions, of which special consideration 
is given to the latter group on account of their reflective status. Having identified a number 
                                                
265 Ibid., 219–20. 
266 Ibid., 217. Perhaps it is more accurate to call it a reconstruction. For Pappas identifies, from select 
quotations, a number of propositions he takes Berkeley to be defending. The procedure he then constructs 
(which I lay out here) is an attempt to give an account of why those propositions in particular appear to matter 
to Berkeley, and they matter (Pappas conjectures) because they can be singled out through this procedure. 
267 Ibid. 214. There is a tension in Pappas’ account on this matter. In distinguishing ordinary from reflective C-
propositions, he claims that the class of reflective C-propositions includes propositions not also included in the 
class of ordinary C-propositions; there are some C-propositions that a typical person of commonsense would 
believe upon reflection that they would not assent to if queried prior to reflection. That is, there are reflective C-
propositions that are not actually believed (and might even be denied) by some typical people of commonsense, 
even if only because they have not appropriately reflected upon them. This would not be a problem save for 
Pappas’ claim that the overall class of C-propositions is “made up of those propositions believed by the whole of 
mankind, by every person of common sense wherever that person may be found.” (Ibid., 216, my emphasis).   
268 Ibid. 216. 
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of propositions of special concern to Berkeley, Pappas conjectures that they are of special 
concern precisely because they fall in the group of basic, reflective C-propositions. These 
propositions form the set C, and there are eleven of them.269 They are as follows: 
C1. There are ordinary (macro) physical objects. 
C2. All (macro) physical objects and at least some of their qualities exist 
independently of and are generally unaffected by perceptions. 
 




C4. No macro physical object has phenomenal individuals (ideas, sensa) as 
constituents. 
 
C5. Macro physical objects and some of their qualities are typically immediately 
perceived. 
 
C6. Macro physical objects are publicly perceivable. 
C7. When macro physical objects are immediately perceived, they are typically 
immediately perceived as they are. 
 
C8. It is false that in every perceptual experience, at least one phenomenal 
individual (ideas, sensa) is immediately perceived. 
 
C9. Human cognizers typically gain immediate, non-inferential perceptual 
knowledge of macro physical objects.  
 
C10. Human cognizers typically gain certain perceptual knowledge of macro physical 
objects. 
 
C11. There is genuine causation between events in the physical world.  
 On Pappas’ interpretation, Berkeley accepts and defends seven of these elements, 
rejecting C2, C4, C8, and C11.270 In Berkeley’s view, however, his materialist opponents can 
                                                
269 Pappas counts only ten propositions in set C: “the seven statements of [Common Sense Realism (CSR)] 
which Berkeley accepts … the two elements from CSR that Berkeley rejects,” and, “the statement that there is 
genuine causation between events in the physical world.” The two rejected elements of CSR are numbers 2 and 
4 on my list. Pappas counts my numbers 9 and 10 as the two constituents of Epistemic Direct Realism (EDR), 
which he says Berkeley wholly accepts. (See Ibid., chapter 7.) I think Pappas is then counting the two elements 
of EDR together as a single statement of CSR, which would explain why we reach different counts of the 
members of set C.   
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only manage to fully accommodate five of the elements of set C, and a sixth, but only 
partially.271 So, Berkeley’s claims to be a defender of commonsense are true, but only to the 
extent that his philosophical system is consistent with more of the basic propositions a 
typical person of common sense would accept upon reflection than are the systems of his 
opponents. And though limited in scope, this confers a small measure of philosophical 
advantage to Berkeley because these propositions are so basic to the worldview of the 
commonsense person. 
 
4.4: PROBLEMS FOR PAPPAS 
 For Pappas, Berkeley’s defense of commonsense is essentially a philosophical defense of 
commonsense propositions. By these, he means propositions which a typical person of 
commonsense either does believe or would come to believe upon some reflection. Berkeley 
can be said to defend these propositions (presumably) just in case they are consistent with 
his positive epistemological and metaphysical theses.272 Of purported special concern are the 
members of set C; basic, reflective C-propositions.  
 Pappas’ account rests on a number of assumptions: (a) that Berkeley “defends”—i.e., 
argues for—the select members of C; (b) that he identifies the select members of C as basic, 
reflective, and commonsensical; (c) that he defends the select members of C because of their 
basic, reflective, commonsensical status; and (d) that his defense of commonsense consists in 
                                                
270 Ibid., 227. 
271 Ibid., 228–32. 
272 It might seem odd to say that Berkeley’s defense of commonsense involves merely being consistent with the 
truth of the members of set C. Consistency is fairly low hurdle to jump. More interesting would be if Berkeley’s 
positive theses entailed members of set C. In some cases (C3, perhaps), this seems to be true. But it is not 
obviously true (and arguably false) that others are entailed by any core Berkeleian thesis. Since Pappas does not 
say explicitly whether Berkeley’s defense of these propositions amounts to showing that they are entailed by his 
views, I will not attribute a view that strong to him.  
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his arguments for commonsensical propositions, among them the select members of C. I 
think all of these are false.  
 I will only briefly address (a). With respect to (a), there is fervent debate over whether 
Berkeley defends even these propositions. For example, the immediate perception of 
sensible objects (and therefore C7) is challenged by Margaret Atherton, Marc Hight, and 
George Pitcher, each for different reasons.273 I agree with Pappas on the issue of immediate 
perception, but for related reasons, I do not think that Berkeley thinks sensible objects are, 
very strictly speaking, publicly perceivable (C6). Let us simply grant (a). 
 Pappas’ account is ultimately driven by assumption (d). Unless one thinks that the 
defense of commonsense consists in arguments for commonsensical propositions, one 
needn’t be concerned with precisely which commonsensical propositions Berkeley defends, 
why he ignores others, and how he decides which propositions to defend and which to ignore. 
An account that assumes (d), however, must deal with each of these issues. Pappas addresses 
each of these, though his account, I think, ultimately proves to be unsuccessful.  
 As Pappas notes, there are indefinitely many commonsensical propositions, both 
ordinary and reflective. Among these are the members of C, but it is also presumably 
commonsensical (for many of Berkeley’s contemporaries) that the Earth does not move. So 
if one thinks Berkeley is defending commonsensical propositions, one must explain why he 
chooses to defend only some of them (Pappas’ set C) and not others (that the Earth does 
not move), why the former but not the latter is of special importance to Berkeley. Pappas’ 
conjecture is that it is “because each of the [members of C] is a reflective, settled, universally 
believed and basic C-proposition, that agreement with that small group of propositions may 
                                                
273 See Atherton (2008a) and (2008b); Hight (2007); and Pitcher (1986).  
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count as evidence for a philosophical theory.”274 Recall also that the elements of set C are 
included therein because each is a basic, reflective C-proposition. Since “that the Earth does 
not move” is not a basic, reflective C-proposition, it is not included in set C and is, 
therefore, not worthy of defense. On Pappas’ view then, the questions of which 
commonsensical propositions Berkeley singles out for defense and why he ignores others are 
answered by the fact that the members of C are basic and reflective. And, since C can be 
generated by an accounting of those reflective C-propositions which are most basic, settled 
and universal, Pappas appears to have resources to answer how Berkeley decides which 
propositions to defend and which to ignore.  
 In fact, however, Pappas’ account fails adequately to answer any of these questions. If 
the question is why Berkeley defends some member of C and not the common view that the 
Earth does not move, Pappas might indeed point to the basic, reflective nature of the former 
as the reason for its special consideration. But Pappas’ account cannot explain why Berkeley 
chooses to defend only some members of set C and not all of them. As far as commonsense is 
concerned, there is as much to be said in favor of the members of set C that Berkeley rejects 
as there is for the members that he defends; each of the members are properly basic, settled, 
universally accepted reflective commonsense propositions. What we still lack is an 
explanation of why Berkeley defends only some of these select C-propositions. Troublingly 
for Pappas, the answer to this question cannot appeal to their status as basic, reflective, or 
commonsensical. That is, it cannot be that Berkeley defends his preferred members of set C 
because they are commonsensical since, from the viewpoint of commonsense, there is no 
reason to prefer any member(s) of C over any other. Membership in C is insufficient to 
explain fully why Berkeley purportedly gives some C-propositions special consideration and 
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ignores others. Without an explanation of why he treats commonsense propositions 
unevenly, we cannot answer how Berkeley discriminates between those he accepts and those 
he rejects. And without some principled account of this discrimination, we must conclude 
that Berkeley’s decision to defend only some commonsense propositions—if we are even 
able to determine which ones—is ultimately ad hoc. 
 
4.5: ROBERTS’ RELIGIOUS IMAGE 
 Recently, John Russell Roberts has produced a novel account of the relationship 
between Berkeley’s philosophy and commonsense. On Roberts’ account, “the fundamental 
link between Berkeley’s philosophy and common sense ultimately runs through his account 
of spirits.”275 Berkeley defends commonsense insofar as his metaphysics is commensurate 
with the metaphysical viewpoint of the mob.  
 Roberts borrows heavily from the work of Wilfrid Sellars, particularly his notions of the 
contrasting ‘scientific’ and ‘manifest images’ of the world.276 These two images are 
conceptual frameworks through which humans conceive of the world and their role in it. 
Quoting Roberts: 
‘[T]he manifest image’ has come to name our view of the world as consisting of the 
sorts of items with which we meet in sense perception. [T]he ontology of the 
manifest image is, as we might put it, ontologically permissive. Reality consists of a 
variety of different kinds of entities, everything from “cabbages to kings.” … This 
image of the world then competes with ‘the scientific image’ of man-in-the-world, 
and vice versa. The latter is our picture of reality as consisting, at most, of only a few 
kinds of things, and these things are the postulated entities of physical theory. 
                                                
275 Roberts (2007) xvii. See also ibid., xx, 36, 128–9. 
276 Roberts (2007) 125. See also Sellars (1963). Interestingly, what Sellars and Roberts call images of the world 
are perhaps best thought of as sets of commonsense propositions of the type that concerns Pappas. My thanks 
to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this connection. 
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Importantly, the basic entities of the scientific image are unimaginable because they 
are imperceptible.277 
 
The world as seen in the manifest image is the world as we perceive it; “in the manifest 
image, objects are colored or clear, heavy or light, coarse or smooth, etc.”278 The world of 
the scientific image is the world as science says it really is; “[w]ithin the scientific, it does not 
even make sense to think of its basic objects as colored or clear, or smelly or fragrant, as 
coarse or soft, bitter or sweet, etc.”279 
 Both images are still images of how the world is and thereby contain conceptions of 
what things are real, and what things are not. The manifest image is perhaps ontologically 
permissive, but it is still true that there are no such things as unicorns, say. What is important 
for Roberts’ account is that the manifest image is a person-based ontology—persons are its 
most basic entities. For the manifest image is itself derived from an ancestral image—the 
‘original image.’ In the original image, all entities are persons: “persons are not conceived as, 
in some sense, consisting of two things: a visible body and an invisible soul. Rather, being a 
river or a tree is a way of being a person.”280 The manifest image departs from the original image 
by a process of depersonalization, of “pruning” or “truncating” the concept of person.281 
Nonetheless, in the manifest image, persons are fundamental.  
 This conceptual commitment to the way the world is (and isn’t) within the manifest 
image gives sense to the claim that the mob has its own kind of metaphysics. The manifest 
image is the metaphysical view of commonsense, and it is a metaphysics in which persons 
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279 Ibid.  
280 Ibid., 127. See also Sellars (1963) 10. 
281 Ibid. 130. See also Sellars (1963) 12–14. 
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are fundamental. For Roberts, this is where Berkeley’s metaphysics meets up with 
commonsense, for Berkeley too countenances a metaphysics in which persons are 
fundamental.282  
 Of course, for Berkeley, persons are more properly called spirits, and this requires us to 
stop short of saying that Berkeley is a philosopher of the manifest image. Rather, he is a 
defender of what Roberts coins the ‘religious image’. The religious image, like the manifest 
image, is derived from the original image and so shares a common core with commonsense. 
It differs, though, in that it is both spirit-based and “irreducibly supernatural.”283 Roberts 
gives a lengthy account of the development of the religious image from Plato through 
Augustine to Descartes and Malebranche which I will not review. For our purposes, the 
crucial shift from original image to manifest image to religious image involves a shift from 
the adult human to God as the paradigm of the primary category of being. This shift leads to 
the conception of the natural world as, “distinct from, and fully dependent upon, the 
existence of the non-natural, i.e., the spiritual.”284  
 The religious image then views man-in-the-world as a spiritual creature made in the 
image of the paradigm of the primary category of being, God. This, of course, should sound 
very much like the Berkeleian view of the world. But, Roberts contends, this is also the 
image of Berkeley’s audience. Berkeley’s metaphysics is then a defense of commonsense to 
the extent that it is (or is nearly) the metaphysics of commonsense itself.285   
                                                
282 There is a potential difficulty for Roberts’ view here, since it can be seen to sit uncomfortably with 
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283 Roberts (2007) 129. 
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285 In his comments on an earlier version of this paper presented at the American Philosophical Association’s 
Pacific Division meeting, Roberts took issue with my treatment of his view as being structurally analogous to 
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4.6: RESPONSE TO ROBERTS 
 Roberts’ view faces difficulties analogous to those raised against Pappas. According to 
Roberts, “Idealism and the beliefs of ordinary folk … make their primary point of contact in 
theism.”286 He writes, “Certainly, the great bulk of the ‘vulgar’ are professing monotheists. 
This is the mob for which Berkeley speaks.”287 Berkeley’s defense of commonsense then just 
is his positive metaphysics insofar as it is essentially monotheistic; the defense of 
commonsense consists in the arguments for the positive metaphysics. 
 Granted, Berkeley’s mob probably is largely monotheistic. That Berkeley’s metaphysics is 
also monotheistic is a point of contact with popular opinion, and one Berkeley would be 
happy about. However, identifying commonsense with monotheism simply does not fit with 
the texts. The passages where Berkeley invokes commonsense almost all involve his 
criticisms of materialism and its paradoxical, skeptical consequences. It is hard to see how 
simply arguing for monotheism by itself counts against materialism and skepticism, since the 
materialists foremost in Berkeley’s mind—notably Locke and Descartes—were each 
monotheists.  
 Moreover, Roberts’ account does not serve to explain why Berkeley’s defense of 
commonsense is limited only to a defense of monotheism. Any interpretation that sees 
                                                
Pappas’. In particular, he highlighted what he calls Berkeley’s deflationary strategy with respect to abstract ideas 
and the importance to Berkeley of clearing the way of bad philosophy, aspects of his view that I ignore herein. 
I accept much of what Roberts says on these other issues; his deflationary account of Berkeley’s anti-
abstractionism is indeed quite consonant with my own. However, these other parts of Roberts’ account do not 
seem (to me) to be clearly linked with his interpretation of Berkeley’s defense of commonsense as a defense of 
the religious image. The defense of the religious image remains over and above the critical work of the anti-
abstractionism. Insofar as Roberts holds that Berkeley’s defense of commonsense consists in (some arguments 
for) a positive metaphysical view of the world embraced universally by the Vulgar, I maintain that his view is 
not structurally different than Pappas’.  
286 Roberts (2007) 74. 
287 Ibid. 143. 
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Berkeley as arguing for some popular opinions must also explain why he doesn’t argue for 
some others. It might be true that the great bulk of the Vulgar believe that the Earth does 
not move. What Roberts’ view does not explain is why the belief in God is worth defending 
from the point of commonsense and not the belief that the Earth does not move. It seems, 
in fact, that Roberts is aware of this problem and is prepared to accept that the defense of 
commonsense as he construes it is even more limited than it appears at first glance. 
[I]t will now be pointed out that this account only lines up Berkeley’s metaphysics 
with common sense insofar as the religious image itself is in line with common sense. 
… But if […] the religious image is denied the status of common sense, then Berkeley 
would readily reject the notion that his work is a defense of, or even consistent with, common sense. 
Berkeley is only interested in defending his view as common sense insofar as a 
commitment to a traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism is considered a part of 
common sense.288 
 
 This is just to admit that, on Roberts’ view, Berkeley’s so-called defense of 
commonsense is merely so-called: it is actually only a defense of a belief in monotheism, a 
belief which Berkeley antecedently accepts and which then only gets labeled 
‘commonsensical’. Roberts’ view is then not significantly different from that of Yandell: for 
Berkeley, “according with commonsense” turns out to mean just “in agreement with me.”289 
This is, as I said at the outset, a disappointing verdict. 
 
4.7: LETTING BERKELEY BE BERKELEY 
 The assumption that both Pappas and Roberts share—that Berkeley’s defense of 
commonsense consists in his arguments for (some) commonsensical beliefs—is the culprit. 
Berkeley’s total allegiance to commonsense cannot be maintained, and any account that sees 
him as offering an apology for only some selected commonsense views will be strained to 
                                                
288 Ibid. 142, my emphasis.  
289 See Yandell (1995) 418 and p. 2 above.  
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explain his mostly negative attitude toward common opinion writ large. Berkeley’s texts do 
not furnish us with the materials for such an explanation. We must either jettison the 
assumption that Berkeley is defending common opinions by way of apology or accept that 
his defense of commonsense is either unprincipled or disingenuous. As we have seen 
though, we can make sense of the defense of commonsense without making Berkeley out to 
be an apologist for vulgar opinions.  
 At the beginning, I set forth three criteria that any interpretation of Berkeley’s defense of 
commonsense should meet: (1) it should make clear the importance to Berkeley of 
commonsense; (2) it should make clear in what way Berkeley’s philosophy relates to 
commonsense; and (3) it should make fully credible Berkeley’s claims to have met with some 
success in his defense. This account meets all three criteria. No one is puzzled by Berkeley’s 
concern to oppose skepticism. So, if his defense of commonsense just is an attack on what 
he sees as the skeptical threats facing the naturally credulous vulgar, the importance of this 
project to him is transparent. It is clear how his philosophy relates to the defense of 
commonsense. The threat to the Vulgar is the doctrine of abstraction and the materialism 
and representative realism to which it gives rise. Berkeley’s attack on these views—his anti-
abstractionism and immaterialism—is central to his larger Idealism. So, the defense of 
commonsense is likewise central to his philosophy. We might not be prepared to accept 
either his anti-abstractionism or his immaterialism. But, we can easily see how Berkeley—
who found his own philosophy convincing—could have reasonably thought that it 
succeeded in defending commonsense. For, if the defense of commonsense is just the anti-
abstractionism and immaterialism, we should take as seriously his claims to have successfully 
defended commonsense as we do his anti-abstractionism and immaterialism.  
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 One important virtue of the present interpretation is that it allows us to see in what ways 
each of the different extant accounts of the defense of commonsense gets something right. 
We can now see that Bennett is, in a way, exactly right that Berkeley cared little for rescuing 
the plain person’s beliefs. Though we should not go on to conclude from this that Berkeley 
had no interest in defending what he could fairly describe as commonsense. Pappas is right 
to take Berkeley at his word when he writes of defending commonsense, and right that 
Berkeley does defend some members of the set C. His error lies in thinking that Berkeley’s 
defense consists only in his defense of those members of set C. We can see why one might 
read Berkeley’s attitude toward the Vulgar as “Janus-faced”, as Ian Tipton does, since we can 
now see that it’s true both that Berkeley defends “commonsense” and that he regards 
popular opinion with derision. Roberts is right to think that the structure of Berkeley’s 
metaphysics is important insofar as it is a rejection of any form of representative realism that 
might lead to skepticism. His error lies in assuming that Berkeley’s metaphysics is intended 
for the use of the Vulgar instead of, shall we say, merely on behalf of them.  
 More importantly, by properly recognizing the scope and strategy of Berkeley’s defense 
of commonsense, we can see that it is largely independent of his positive metaphysical 
theses. This means that interpretations of his metaphysics need not answer to what we, or 
Berkeley, think of as commonly held beliefs. Yet, as we have seen, this is just what we find in 
the most popular interpretations. This is to put the interpretive cart before the textual horse. 
Determining whether Berkeley’s philosophy counts as a defense of commonsense requires 
first determining what his philosophy is, and independently, what is commonsense (for 
Berkeley). This task is greatly complicated if one’s interpretation of the philosophy is itself 
constrained by a prefabricated account of what commonsense is and how Berkeley must go 
about defending it. My hope is that this essay removes the temptation to thus constrain 
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interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. If the best available interpretation of the text is one 
on which, for example, Berkeley denies that ideas and collections of them are publicly 
perceived, then we should accept it as such regardless of whether it conflicts with what one 
supposes “commonsense” to say. Once we recognize that Berkeley’s defense of 
commonsense doesn’t require his philosophy to be for the common person, we can allow 
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